Sou die manne van Hannibal van sy strategieë geweet het?

Sou die manne van Hannibal van sy strategieë geweet het?

By dinge soos die slag van die meer van Trasimene, Cannae, ens. Dit lyk asof Hannibal se planne altyd 'n mate van aas aan die Romeine bied, van 'n groep mans wat die Romeine (akkuraat) sou jaag, of daarop sou fokus, of wat ook al.

Gegewe hierdie gemeenskaplikheid in Hannibal se planne, is ek dus nuuskierig; sou sy manne eintlik geweet het dat dit hul rol was? Of doen hulle net soos hul hoër persone gesê het; en sou dit vir die Romeine dieselfde gewees het?


Top 12 feite oor Hannibal Barca

Hannibal Barca was 'n bekende generaal en staatsman. Hy was bekend vir sy vaardigheid as bevelvoerder en sy bydraes tot die weermag. Hy is in 247 vC gebore aan Hamilcar Barca, wat ook 'n opperhoof in die Kartago -leër was. Mago en Hasdrubal was sy jonger broers. Al sy familielede was in die weermag werksaam en het groot bydraes gelewer tot baie oorloë.

Hannibal is gebore in Tunisië in die Middellandse See -streek. Sy naam is van Latynse oorsprong en uniek in die Kartago -kultuur. Hy het 'n moeilike kinderjare gehad, aangesien sy pa besig was met die huursoldaatoorlog. Die situasie het vererger toe sy susters verloof geraak het en hy hul steun verloor het. Hamilcar het besluit om die lot van Kartago te verbeter nadat dit verliese gely het in die Eerste Puniese Oorlog, en Hannibal het sy pa ondersteun in die bou van 'n sterk leër en die stryd teen die Romeine. Op negejarige ouderdom het Hannibal kennis gemaak met wedywering tussen Romeine en Kartago. Hy is hoof-bevelvoerder van sy troepe gemaak en het terselfdertyd uitgebreide opleiding in die weermag gekry.


Generaal Hannibal Barca was 'n Swart Afrikaner

Hannibal se gevierde prestasie om die Alpe met oorlogsolifante oor te steek, het die Europese legende oorgedra: detail van 'n fresco deur Jacopo Ripanda, ca. 1510, Capitoline -museums, Rome.

Hannibal Barca was waarskynlik 'n swart Kartago -militêre bevelvoerder. Hy het beroemd geword vir sy kruising van die Alpe, sy strategiese glans voordat hy groot veldtogte aangepak het, sy taktiese genie op die slagveld en sy operasionele vaardigheid tydens gevegte.

Hy was een van die grootste militêre bevelvoerders in die geskiedenis. Tydens die Tweede Puniese Oorlog het Hannibal Romeinse leërs verpletterende nederlae toegedien, veral in die slag van Cannae waar 70 000 Romeine gesterf het na die verlowing. Toe sy leër na die stad Rome marsjeer, kon hy die stad nie verower nie, omdat sy leër nie die belegstoerusting en versterking gehad het wat nodig was om dit te neem nie. In 202 vC is Hannibal teruggeroep na Afrika om Kartago te verdedig teen die inval van Romeinse militêre magte, en daar is hy uiteindelik verslaan deur Scipio Africanus in die slag van Zama.

Die etnisiteit van Hannibal Barca

'N Toenemende aantal professionele militêre historici meen dat Hannibal Barca 'n etnies gemengde Numidiese kryger was met 'n donker vel. Kartago was 'n mengsel van inheemse swart Afrikaners, Berber -stamme, Semitiese Arabiere, wit Keltiese Germaanse krygers, Griekse vreemdelinge en wit Libiese stamgenote wat bestaan ​​het toe baie Fenisiese stede en kolonies Noord -Afrika versier het.

Alhoewel die Kartagers 'n gemengde bevolking was, is die Kartago -weermag oorheers deur Numidiërs, 'n mengsel van swart Afrikane, Nubiërs en Berber -uittreksels wat onder die Kartagoërs gewoon het en wat algemeen voorkom in Egipte, Marokko, Algerië en elders in Noord -Afrika. . Die Barca -familie is afkomstig van die gevierde Numidiese krygers.

Hannibal Barca muntstukke

Europese argeoloë het agt muntstukke gevind wat Hannibal se Karthagiese kenmerke uitbeeld. Die munte lyk nie soos mekaar nie. Van die agt muntstukke word slegs vyf muntstukke nie deur Europese argeoloë en historici erken nie. Die vyf muntstukke wat nie erken word nie, beeld Hannibal uit met sterk West -Afrikaanse etniese kenmerke.

Een van die muntstukke wat in Italië gevind is, naby die slagveld van die Trasimene -meer waar Hannibal se Kartago -leër die Romeine verslaan het, toon 'n Afrikaanse man aan die een kant met die kenmerkende sterk Afrikaanse kenmerke, soos krullerige hare, dik lippe en 'n vol neus teenoor die muntstuk. kant wys 'n olifant. Al die swart muntstukke wat in Afrika lyk, is koolstofgedateer teen die tyd dat Hannibal geleef het, maar die munitiese munte wat ongeveer 'n eeu of meer ná Hannibal se dood gedateer is.

Die koolstofdatering van die muntstuk is 217 vC. Aangesien die manlike beeld van die muntstuk getoon word op die manier waarop Apollo, die Romeinse en Griekse songod, uitgebeeld word, dui dit aan dat hy nie 'n gewone vegter was wat op 'n oorlogsolifant gery het nie, maar hy was 'n hoë militêre bevelvoerder. Hierdie muntstuk is die beste voorstelling van Hannibal. Hannibal was geneig tot die god, Apollo.

Aangesien die muntstuk gevind is naby die meer van Trasimene, waar Hannibal die Romeine verslaan het, bied hierdie feit 'n goeie bevestiging dat die beeld van die muntstuk lyk soos die werklike etniese voorkoms van Hannibal, want 'n manier om 'n oorwinning in die ou oorlog te vier was om 'n muntstuk ter ere van u te laat slaan toon jouself as jou vyand se godheid. Hierdie daad sou in daardie dae 'n ongelooflike sielkundige impak op die omliggende Romeinse bevolking hê.

Ontleding: Kartagoë en Hannibal Barca

Omdat Kartagoërs geen geskrewe kronieke van Hannibal se lewe bygehou het nie, was historiese kennis van Hannibal gebaseer op Carthaagse mondelinge tradisies en heeltemal op Romeinse geskrewe verslae. Volgens die legende het Hannibal se pa (Hamilcar Barca), voor die aanvang van die Spaanse veldtog, vereis dat die negejarige Hannibal sy ewige haat teen Rome moet belowe. Kartagers het Hannibal se kruising van die Alpe gevier met muntstukke wat sy gesig aan die een kant en 'n olifant aan die ander kant uitgebeeld het.


10 grootste militêre strateë uit die geskiedenis

Militêre strateë ontwikkel militêre strategieë om hul teenstanders in oorlog en geveg te verslaan. Die grootste militêre strateë kon met minimale verliese gevegte wen teen superieure magte en het dikwels groot konings of veroweraars geword. Hierdie lys is in geen spesifieke volgorde geskryf nie. As u dink dat daar iets in hierdie lys ontbreek, is dit waarskynlik op ons lys van groot veroweraars wat die wêreld of die grootste Romeinse generaals amper oorgeneem het.

Napoleon is een van die grootste militêre strateë en taktici wat ooit geleef het. Hy het een van die belangrikste ryke in die geskiedenis geskep en 'n groot impak op die wêreld gehad. Napoleon het tydens die rewolusionêre oorloë baie suksesvolle veldtogte gelei en uiteindelik keiser geword nadat die monargie omvergewerp is. Napoleon was geliefd onder sy mense, waarvan baie gevoel het dat hy onkwetsbaar was en nooit verslaan kon word nie. Die grootste oorwinnings van Napoleon het gekom tydens die slag van Austerlitz, waar hy 'n beslissende oorwinning behaal het oor 'n alliansie van die Russiese Ryk en die Heilige Romeinse Ryk. Hy het 'n minderwaardige mag gehad en veg teen twee groot ryke en verslaan hulle albei.

Zhuge Liang

Zhuge Liang is een van die bekendste militêre strateë in die Chinese geskiedenis en een van die mees bekwame strateë van sy era. Zhuge Liang het onder Liu Shan gewerk om die Han -dinastie te herstel, wat volgens hulle deur Cao Mengde oorgeneem is. Die bekendste geveg van Zhuge Liang was die Slag van Red Cliff, waar hy gehelp het om die reuse Wei -leër te verslaan wat tot 800 000 sterk kon wees. Hulle het daarin geslaag om te wen as gevolg van 'n vuuraanval teen die vyandelike vloot, wat die Wei -vloot verwoes het. Zhuge Liang het in China beroemd geword vir sy vele oorwinnings, waaronder die onderwerping Nanzhong.

Sun Tzu is die skrywer van die kuns van oorlog, miskien die bekendste militêre handleiding van alle tye. Hy is wêreldwyd bekend as 'n geniale strateeg, en sy lesse word vandag nog deur mense gebruik, in verskillende nywerhede oor die hele wêreld. Mense het uiteindelik besef dat sy lesse nie net nuttig was vir militêre strategie nie, maar ook vir sake, en omtrent alles wat mededingend was. Sun Tzu is nie net 'n leunstoelstrateeg nie, maar het eintlik 'n paar suksesvolle gevegte gevoer teen baie beter magte wat bewys dat sy lesse gewig het. In een van die bekendste verhale oor Sun Tzu is hy uitgedaag deur die koning van Wu, wat belangstel om hom aan te stel. Die koning wou die bewering van Sun Tzu toets dat hy enigiemand in 'n soldaat kon verander. Hy het son Tzu 180 beskutte byvroue (minnares) wat nog nooit konflik gesien het nie, gegee en dit in soldate verander. Sun Tzu het twee bevelvoerders gekies om die res te behartig. Daarna het hy hulle almal opgelei, maar toe hy bevele gee, het hulle net gegiggel. Sun Tzu het gesê dat as die troepe die eerste keer nie bevele volg nie, dit die generaal se skuld is, en die bevele herhaal. Hulle lag weer. Hierdie keer het hy gesê dat as hulle twee keer ongehoorsaam is, dit die skuld van die bevelvoerders is en hulle koppe voor die troepe afgekap en nuwe bevelvoerders aangestel het. Toe hy later bevele gegee het, het hulle altyd gehoor gegee.

Subutai was die grootste strateeg van Genghis Khan, en baie mense beweer sonder Subutai dat die Mongoolse Ryk nooit so sterk sou gewees het nie. Hy het meer as twintig militêre veldtogte gelei, waarin hy twee en dertig nasies verower het en vyf en sestig veldslae gewen het. In hierdie veldtogte het hy meer gebied as enige ander bevelvoerder in die geskiedenis oorskry of verower. Hy is maklik een van die grootste militêre strateë, hoewel relatief onbekend. Subutai kon maklik groot uiteenlopende leërs bestuur. Hy het 'n ongelooflike militêre prestasie behaal toe hy beide leërs van Pole in Hongarye binne twee dae van mekaar verslaan het, met leërs 500 km van mekaar af.

Hannibal is 'n Carthaagse generaal wat sy militêre prestasies in die verwoesting van die leërs van die Romeinse Ryk geken het, en omdat hy 'n hele leër vervoer het, sou hy oor verraderlike land die meeste onmoontlik geag het. Een van Hannibal se grootste prestasies was om sy leër oor die Alpe te vervoer om Rome aan te val waar hulle dit die minste verwag het. Hannibal het deur die Alpe gereis met duisende infanterie, kavallerie en selfs 'n paar olifante. Baie van die troepe het gesterf weens die uiters koue weer en lukraak aanvalle van stamme wat die Alpe bewoon het, maar uiteindelik het hy daarin geslaag om sy leër oor die Alpe te kry, selfs met olifante. Sy mees gevierde oorwinning is waarskynlik die Slag van Cannae. Die Romeine was siek vir sy voortdurende oorwinnings oor hulle en besluit om 'n leër bymekaar te maak wat so groot was dat niemand dit kon verslaan nie. Met behulp van geniale taktiek het hy hul leër verslaan. Dit was een van die grootste oorwinnings in die militêre geskiedenis, en een van die grootste nederlae. Na sy vele oorwinnings oor Rome is Hannibal in die geskiedenis gesementeer as een van die grootste militêre strateë daarvan.

Alexander die Grote

Alexander III van Masedonië is wêreldwyd bekend vir sy reusagtige ryk. Alexander is nooit in die geveg verslaan nie en het net opgehou om sy ryk uit te brei omdat sy manne te moeg was om aan te hou veg. As hulle aanhou, het hy moontlik sy ryk uitgebrei tot die dag van sy dood. Toe hy koning Darius van Persië in die slag van Gaugamela verslaan het, het hy die grootste Ryk van die antieke wêreld regeer. Darius het al die voordele in hierdie geveg gehad, sy leër het Alexander 200 000 tot 35 000 verdwerg, en die grond waarop hulle geveg het, het Darius se strydwaens in die stryd bevoordeel. Alexander het Darius verslaan deur hom te mislei om sy kavallerie minder gunstig op die land te jaag, en toe die Persiese lyn verdun het, het Alexander 'n kavallerielading deur hul agterkant gelei.

Shivaji Maharaj

Shivaji Maharaj was 'n Indiese vegterskoning en lid van die Bhonsle Maratha -stam. Shivaji het 'n rewolusie in militêre taktiek gemaak en was 'n pionier in guerrilla -oorlogsmetodes wat spoed en verrassing gebruik het om groter en magtiger vyande aan te gaan. Een van Shivaji se grootste oorwinnings was die slag van Pratapgad. Shivaji was heeltemal in getal met 13 000 man teen Afzal Khan se 60 000 plus, maar het daarin geslaag om die vyand te verslaan. Dit was sy eerste belangrike oorwinning oor 'n groot moondheid, en dit het hom groot dele grond, hulpbronne en roem besorg. Shivaji laat ou Hindoe politieke tradisies en hofkonvensies herleef en bevorder die gebruik van Sanskrit in plaas van Persies in die hof en administrasie.

Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba

Cordoba is die vader van slootoorlogvoering en word algemeen die 'The Great Captain' genoem. Cordoba was 'n pionier in die moderne oorlogvoering en het 'n groot invloed gehad op sommige van die grootste en bekendste generaals en taktici in die geskiedenis, waaronder Wellington en die beste generaals van Karel V en Filips II. Cordoba was die eerste persoon in die geskiedenis wat 'n geveg met buskruit -handwapens gewen het, en het nuwe revolusionêre taktieke op die gebied van oorlog geskep.

Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus

Africanus is een van die grootste militêre strateë wat die Romeinse Ryk ooit opgelewer het. Hy het die bekende Hannibal Barca verslaan, wat vermoedelik ook een van die grootste generaals van alle tye is. Africanus het baie epiese oorwinnings tydens die Tweede Puniese Oorloë behaal, maar sy grootste oorwinning oor Hannibal Barca was tydens die Slag van Zama, wat die einde van die Tweede Puniese oorlog beteken het. Africanus moes een van die grootste militêre strateë in die geskiedenis met 'n kleiner mag in die gesig staar, wat sy oorwinning nog indrukwekkender maak. Hierdie geveg was die einde van die Tweede Puniese oorloë, nadat Kartago 'n ontevrede vrede moes aanvaar en Scipio die titel Africanus ontvang het.

Admiraal Lord Nelson

Admiraal Lord Nelson is veral bekend tydens sy vele heroïese oorwinnings tydens die Napoleontiese oorlog. Hy onthou die wonderlike oorwinning wat hy in die slag van Trafalgar behaal het toe hy 'n veel groter vlootleër verslaan het sonder om 'n enkele skip te verloor, en slegs 'n klein deel van sy manne. Dit was een van die grootste oorwinnings in die Engelse geskiedenis. Die koninklike vloot veg in 1805 teen 'n kombinasie van die Franse en Spaanse vloot. Nelson was 'n taktiese genie en beveel sy vloot om op 'n heeltemal onortodokse manier te reël. Normaalweg sou skepe 'n lyn parallel met die vyand vorm, maar Nelson het sy vloot in 'n loodregte lyn gerangskik en die vyandelike vloot vernietig. Dit was die grootste oorwinning van Nelson, maar ook sy laaste; hy is deur 'n verdwaalde koeël geskiet en is tydens die geveg dood.


7 Die Britte het Spanje per ongeluk in 2002 binnegeval

In 2002 het twee dosyn Britse mariniers op 'n oefenoefening 'n strand ingestorm wat hulle per ongeluk in Gibraltar bevind het. Dit blyk toe dat hulle eerder aan wal gekom het op 'n strandoord in La Linea, Spanje. Die mariniers het eers hul fout besef nadat die inwoners en twee polisiemanne hulle meegedeel het dat hulle op die verkeerde plek was.

Die Britte skryf die voorval later toe aan slegte weer en vra om verskoning vir hul fout, 'n gebaar wat Spaanse amptenare genadiglik aanvaar het. In 'n skeidingsskoot het die plaaslike bevolking wreed daarop gewys dat Gibraltar nie moeilik moet wees om te mis nie, aangesien dit 'n rots van 426 meter (1400 voet) hoog is vir 'n baken.

Om eerlik te wees teenoor die Britte, was hulle die enigste wat per ongeluk 'n land binnegeval het. Die beroemde verdedigingsgerigte land, Switserland, het ook sy klein buurman Liechtenstein per ongeluk net een keer, maar drie keer binnegeval. Hulle moes Liechtenstein selfs een keer vergoed toe Switserse soldate 'n bosbrand veroorsaak het.


Arthur Wellesley, 1ste hertog van Wellington (1769-1852)

Wie was hy? Hy is die man wat vir 16 lang, moeisame jare, byna onophoudelik, regoor Indië, Spanje, Frankryk en België geveg het. Maar, soos Žižka hierbo, is hy nooit in 'n groot geveg verslaan nie - en het hy nooit 'n veldtog verloor nie. Hy was ook die man wat (suksesvol) gepoog het om die teregstelling van Napoleon na Waterloo te voorkom. Edel van geboorte en natuur.

Wat het hy gedoen? Bemeester die kuns van oorlog. Wellington het 'n ongelooflike vermoë om te improviseer, verwoestende effektiewe verdediging te skep (kyk na Talavera, Busaco, Salamanca en Vittoria vir bewys) en om sy vyande met vrymoedigheid vinnig aan te val (soos by Assaye). Hy word ook gereeld verkeerdelik aangehaal omdat hy sy soldate die 'skuim van die aarde' genoem het. In werklikheid het hy gesê sy soldate was gewerf van die 'skuim van die aarde' en dat 'dit werklik wonderlik is dat ons hulle die goeie mense gemaak het wat hulle is'.

Wat kan ons by hom leer? Om nie 'n boek aan die omslag te oordeel nie. Of dit nou in die sakewêreld of op die slagveld is, dit neem tyd om talent te slyp - en Wellington het die potensiaal in sy manne raakgesien nog voordat hulle dit gedoen het. Dit is van onskatbare waarde om die beste by mense te sien, want jy sal meer verbaas wees oor hul vaardighede as om teleurgesteld te wees.


Strategie in antieke tye

Miskien word die vroegste bespreking van strategie in die Ou Testament van die Bybel aangebied (Bracker, 1980). Ongeveer 3 500 jaar gelede het Moses nogal 'n uitdaging gestaan ​​nadat hy sy mede -Hebreërs uit slawerny in Egipte gelei het. Moses was oorweldig as die enigste strateeg aan die stuur van 'n nasie wat moontlik 'n miljoen mense oorskry het. Op advies van sy skoonpa het Moses begin om gesag te delegeer aan ander leiers, wat elkeen toesig gehou het oor 'n groep mense. Hierdie hiërargiese delegering van gesag het 'n bevelstruktuur geskep wat Moses vrygemaak het om op die grootste besluite te konsentreer en hom gehelp het om sy strategieë te implementeer (Tabel 1.4 “Strategie in die antieke tyd ”). Net so is die eise van strategiese bestuur vandag eenvoudig te veel vir 'n uitvoerende hoof (die hoofleier van 'n onderneming) om alleen te hanteer. Baie belangrike take word dus aan visepresidente en ander bestuurders toevertrou.

In antieke China het strateeg en filosoof Sun Tzu gedagtes gegee oor strategie wat vandag steeds deur sake- en militêre leiers noukeurig bestudeer word. Sun Tzu se bekendste werk is Die kuns van oorlog. Soos hierdie titel impliseer, het Sun Tzu die kreatiewe en misleidende aspekte van strategie beklemtoon.

Een van Sun Tzu se idees met talle saketoepassings is dat die wen van 'n geveg sonder om te veg die beste manier is om te wen. Apple se gedrag in die persoonlike rekenaarbedryf bied 'n goeie voorbeeld van hierdie idee in aksie. Baie rekenaarvervaardigers soos Toshiba, Acer en Lenovo ding mee met mekaar, hoofsaaklik op grond van die prys. Dit lei tot prysoorloë wat die wins van die rekenaarmakers ondermyn. Daarteenoor verkies Apple om unieke funksies vir sy rekenaars te ontwikkel, funksies wat 'n baie lojale stel kliënte geskep het. Apple vra met vrymoedigheid veel meer vir sy rekenaars as wat sy mededingers vir hulle rekenaars vra. Apple is nie eers bekommerd of die sagteware van sy rekenaars versoenbaar is met die sagteware wat deur die meeste ander rekenaars gebruik word nie. In plaas daarvan om 'n stryd met ander ondernemings te voer, wen Apple in die rekenaarbedryf deur sy eie unieke mark te skep en 'n stel lojale kliënte aan te trek. Sun Tzu sal waarskynlik Apple se benadering bewonder.

Miskien draai die bekendste voorbeeld van strategie in antieke tye rondom die Trojaanse perd. Volgens die legende wou Griekse soldate 'n manier vind om die poorte van Troje binne te gaan en die stad van binne aan te val. Hulle het 'n truuk bedink wat behels het om 'n reuse -houtperd te skep, soldate in die perd weg te steek en die perd as 'n geskenk aan die Trojane te bied. Die Trojane het hulle mislei en die perd na hul stad gebring. Toe die nag aanbreek, het die verborge Griekse soldate die poorte vir hul leër oopgemaak, wat gelei het tot 'n Griekse oorwinning. In die moderne tyd, die term Trojaanse perd verwys na gebare wat op die oppervlak voordelig blyk te wees vir die ontvanger, maar wat 'n sinvolle bedoeling bedek. Rekenaarvirusse word soms ook Trojaanse perde genoem.

'N Baie edeler benadering tot strategie as die Grieke word toegeskryf aan koning Arthur van Brittanje. Anders as die hiërargiese benadering tot die organisering van Moses, het Arthur na bewering homself en elkeen van sy ridders as 'n gelyke sê geag om die groep se strategie te ontwerp. Daar word vermoed dat die groep sy vergaderings aan 'n ronde tafel gehou het sodat geen stem, insluitend Arthur's, as belangriker as die ander beskou sou word nie. Die keuse van meubels in moderne uitvoerende suites is miskien onthullend. Die meeste bevat reghoekige vergadertafels, wat moontlik aandui dat een persoon - die hoof uitvoerende beampte - in beheer is.

'N Ander implikasie vir die strategiese bestuur wat King Arthur en sy Knights of the Round Table bied, behels die konsep van sending. Hulle kragtige soektog om die Heilige Graal te vind (die legendariese beker wat Jesus en sy dissipels tydens die Laaste Avondmaal gebruik het) dien as voorbeeld vir die belangrikheid van 'n sentrale missie om organisatoriese strategie en aksies te lei.


Alexander die Grote word met 'n goeie rede beskou as die grootste militêre genie van die antieke wêreld. Hy het daarin geslaag om byna die helfte van die antieke wêreld te verower, terwyl sy koninkryk na Indië, Egipte, Iran en Pakistan versprei het. Hy het 13 jaar lank probeer om die Oosterse en die Westerse Wêreld deur militêre mag te verenig, maar ook met kulturele uitruil. Baie sal Alexander onthou as die oorwinnaar, maar sy bedoeling was om die lande te bevry en kulturele ervarings met hulle uit te ruil.

Een van die grootste prestasies van Alexander is die feit dat hy in 15 jaar oorlog nooit 'n enkele geveg verloor het nie. Alexander het sy militêre opleiding onder sy vader Philip begin, wat die Masedonië tot oorwinnings teenoor antieke Griekeland gelei het. Na die dood van sy vader, het Alexander die ondenkbare, antieke Persië aangeval met net meer as 50 000 soldate. In al die gevegte met Persië, sowel as sy beleëringe in Egipte en Sirië, het Alexander die Grote nooit 'n geveg verloor nie. Hy kombineer uitstekende taktiek, strategie, woede en ervare soldate.

'N Groot deel van Alexander se sukses was sy leër. Geen bevelvoerder kan 'n geveg wen nie, laat staan ​​'n oorlog alleen. Alexander, soos baie ander, het die ondersteuning van sy goed opgeleide leër in sy verowerings nodig gehad. Dit was Philip wat 'n rewolusie in die weermag gemaak het, maar Alexander het hulle na 'n ander vlak geneem.

Phillip II het 'n grootliks ondoeltreffende en onervare leër geërf. Sy eerste bevel was om die weermag te revolusioneer en te moderniseer. Die eerste taak was om die aantal leërs te verhoog en hoe die weermag werk. Alexander het dieselfde beginsels gehou. Alexander het ook ingenieurs aangestel om beleëringswapens te ontwikkel.

Die kern van die leër was die falanks, 'n hoogs opgeleide infanterie. Hulle was in 'n boksformasie geplaas, wat dit onmoontlik maak om hulle vanuit 'n ander posisie as die voorkant aan te val. Al die soldate in die falanks was gehoorsaam en baie lojaal. Hulle het ligte uniforms gedra, wat dit vir hulle moontlik maak om op die veld te beweeg. Hulle was gewapen met lang snoeke van 18 tot 20 meter. Elke soldaat moes sy snoek op die skouer van die man voor hom plaas, wat die verdediging van die falanks verder verhoog het. Elke eenheid van die falanks het sy eie bevelvoerder, wat kommunikasie vergemaklik het. Wiskundig gesproke het elke eenheid van die falanks uit 1540 mans bestaan, verdeel in drie onderafdelings van 512 mans. Elke afdeling was verdeel in 32 "dekas", of 'n lyn van 10, later 16 krygers.

Afgesien van die falanks, het die leër van Alexander die Grote ook 'n eenheid hipaspiste ingesluit, of ook skilddraers genoem. Hulle het korter spiese of spiese gedra. Die hipaspiste was meer beweeglik en kon maklik van die een kant na die ander beweeg. Daar was drie klasse hipaspiste, waarvan een verantwoordelik was vir die bewaking van die koning.

Nadele van die falanks

Die falanks was 'n byna perfekte weermag, maar dit het 'n groot fout en nadeel. Gelukkig was Alexander slim genoeg om die nadeel weg te steek en die falanks ten volle te benut. Die nadeel van die falanks is dat dit die beste gewerk het in 'n plat, ongebroke land. Op 'n land met ongelyke terrein was die falanks nie voordelig nie. Soos genoem, het Alexander sy leër altyd op dieselfde manier geposisioneer. Hy was egter ook slim genoeg om dinge deurmekaar te maak wanneer die veld dit vereis. Een voorbeeld is die geveg by Hydaspes, waar Alexander die Grote gedwing is om sy boogskutters as die voorste linie te gebruik om die olifante van die opponerende leër teë te werk.

Die Cavarly

Die Kavalerie was die grootste wapen in Alexander se beskikking. Dit was sy belangrikste slagmag en 'n eenheid waarop hy altyd kon staatmaak. Die kavallerie is in twee afdelings verdeel, die metgeselle en die verkenners.

Die metgesel-afdeling was verdeel in agt eskaders van 200 mans wat gewapen was met 'n lans van nege voet en met min pantser. Alexander het altyd 'n vaste voorraad perde en reservate gehou, aangesien hy geweet het dat sy kavallerie die belangrikste eenheid van die leër is. Alexander was altyd voor in die geveg, en hy het die Royal Companion -eskader gelei wat altyd aan die regterkant van die falanks was.

Slagstrategie

In al die gevegte waaraan hy deelgeneem het, het Alexander die Grote aan die voorkant van die geveg gelei. Hy het geglo dat hy vrees in die opponerende leër tref en sy eie inspireer. Maak nie saak dat hy kwesbaar was in die posisie nie, Alexander was altyd voor in die geveg.

Sy eenhede was in 'n wigposisie geplaas, wat volgens Alexander moeiliker was om te kraak en dit was vir die opponerende leër onmoontlik om 'n gat daarin te slaan.

As hy toeslaan, slaan Alexander altyd met sy falanks in die middel van die opponerende leër en probeer om in 'n skuins hoek te slaan. Terselfdertyd het hy die kavallerie gebruik om gate in die flanke te slaan.

Die wigposisie van sy leër het Alexander in staat gestel om missiele van vyandelike linies teë te werk. Aangesien hy die skilddraers voor het, kon hulle die konsentrasie maklik met missiele van die opponerende front afweer. Die mans in die wig ontplooi in óf trapeziumvormige óf driehoekige formasie. Die wig het Alexander gehelp om die vyandelike lyn in te slaan en die effek van sy langafstand wapens, soos spies, te maksimeer.

Die mobiliteit daarvan was egter waarskynlik die grootste sterkte van die Army of Alexander. Alexander was 'n briljante verstand, 'n groot taktikus en militêre spesialis. Hy het gereeld gevegsaanpassings gemaak, maar hy het sy leër nodig gehad om vinnig van die een na die ander posisie te kon beweeg. Om die beweging moontlik te maak, gebruik Alexander ligte pantser vir sy leër. Boonop het Alexander altyd die terrein ondersoek waar die geveg kon plaasvind, en hy het die potensiaal en voordele van die terrein probeer maksimeer.

Gewilde gevegte

Die eerste groot slag van Alexander se verowering in Persië het by die Granicusrivier plaasgevind, en die geveg staan ​​nou bekend as die Slag van die Granicusrivier. Die geveg het plaasgevind in 334 vC, in die huidige Turkye, naby Troje. Alexander het verkies om naby die rivier te veg, aangesien dit die voordeel van die Perse in getalle verminder het.

Die belangrikste fout wat die Perse gemaak het, was om hul kavallerie aan die voorkant te plaas, wat hulle kwesbaar gemaak het vir die lang spiese van die falanks. Alexander plaas sy phalanx in die middel en kavallerie aan die kant. Alexander het dit ook reggekry om die Perse onkant te vang, en dadelik aangeval en van links geslaan. Terwyl die Perse die kant versterk het, het Alexander reeds met sy wigvorming die middel van die voorkant platgeslaan. Deur 'n gat in die middel oop te maak, het Alexander die infanterie geplaas om deur die Persiese leër te slaan.

Nog 'n geveg wat naby 'n rivier gespeel is, die slag van Issus het in 333 vC naby die Pinarusrivier plaasgevind.

Alexander het sy infanterie in 'n verdedigende houding geplaas en Darius bespot om aan te val. Terwyl Darius die infanterie probeer aanval, slaan Alexander en sy koninklike metgeselle aan die linkerkant van die Persiese leër. Van daar af het Alexander 'n vinnige roete gelei en sy kavallerie direk na Darius en sy wa gelei. Darius het die toneel gevlieg. Die slag van Issus was 'n beduidende oorwinning vir Alexander en het die val van die Persiese Ryk begin.

Hierdie geveg was die einde van die Persiese Ryk. Darius het sy beste kavallerie, strydwaens en 'n massiewe leër gemobiliseer. Maar hy word weer die slagoffer van die briljante strategie van Alexander en sy taktiek.

Alexander het die weermag in twee eenhede verdeel. Hy beveel die regterkant, terwyl links onder bevel was van Parmenion, 'n persoonlike vriend en 'n betroubare bevelvoerder van Alexander. Alexander het die falanks eers beveel om na die middel van die vyandelike front te marsjeer. Terselfdertyd het Darius die waens gelanseer, maar Alexander het hulle onderskep met Agrianians, 'n infanterie gewapen met spies. Alexander vorm 'n wig en slaan die middel van die Persiese leër. Aangesien die sentrum verswak het, het Alexander 'n duidelike pad na Darius gehad.


Hoe (en waar) het Hannibal die Alpe oorgesteek?

Chris Allen sit op 'n rand van die Col de la Traversette, dink hard, luister na stilte en kyk na die onsienlike. So bleek soos papier en amper so dun, het die 50-jarige mikrobioloog die grootste deel van hierdie midsomeroggend deurgebring deur die smal bergpas wat aan die grens suidoos van Grenoble in Frankryk en suidwes van Turyn in Italië lê, te klim. En nou, terwyl hy in die mis van die oudheid staar, verbeel hy hom 'n toneel wat moontlik 2 235 jaar gelede hier afgespeel het: die Kartagoanse generaal Hannibal het sy neerslagtige troepe bymekaargeskraap tydens hul brutale inval in die Romeinse Republiek aan die begin van die Tweede Puniese Oorlog.

Aan die linkerkant van Allen skiet 'n snywind oor 'n ry rotsnaalde en af ​​na die vallei aan die Italiaanse kant, byna 10 000 voet onder. Aan sy regterkant hang Mount Viso, die kolossus met twee pieke, teen 'n bakblou lug. Allen reik in sy rugsak, trek 'n eksemplaar van Polybius ’ terug Geskiedenisse en lees 'n gedeelte hardop: “Hannibal kon sien dat die swaarkry wat hulle ondervind het, en die afwagting op meer wat kom, die moraal in die hele leër verswak het. Hy het 'n vergadering byeengeroep en probeer om hul gemoedere op te wek, hoewel sy enigste bate die sigbaarheid van Italië was, wat so onder die berge uitsprei dat die Alpe vanuit 'n panoramiese perspektief die akropolis van die hele Italië vorm. ”

Die oomblik hang in die lug. “Watter pad het Hannibal na Rome gelei? ” Allen vra 'n besoeker uit Amerika. Die kwelvraag is een van die probleme op die grens van geskiedenis en aardrykskunde wat fassinerend en miskien onoplosbaar is. Daar is baie ink gemors om die roete van Hannibal se onwaarskynlike rit van vyf maande, duisend myl, van Katalonië oor die Pireneë, deur die Languedoc na die oewer van die Rhône, en dan oor die Alpe na die vlaktes van Italië, te bepaal. Baie stewels is verslete by die bepaling van die alpinpas waardeur tienduisende voetsoldate en kavaleriste, duisende perde en muile, en, beroemd, 37 Afrikaanse gevegsolifante getrap het.

Spekulasie oor die kruisplek strek meer as twee millennia lank terug toe Rome en Kartago, 'n Noord-Afrikaanse stadstaat in die huidige Tunisië, supermoondhede was wat oorheers het in die Middellandse See. Geen karthagiese bronne van enige aard het oorleef nie, en die verslae van die Griekse historikus Polybius (ongeveer 70 jaar na die optog geskryf) en sy Romeinse eweknie Livy (120 jaar daarna) is uiters vaag. Daar is nie minder nie as 'n dosyn mededingende teorieë wat gevorder word deur 'n ryk verwarring van akademici, antiquariërs en staatsmanne wat mekaar weerspreek en soms hulself. Napoleon Bonaparte favored a northern route through the Col du Mont Cenis. Edward Gibbon, author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, was said to be a fan of the Col du Montgenèvre. Sir Gavin de Beer, a onetime director of what is now the Natural History Museum in London, championed the Traversette, the gnarliest and most southerly course. In 1959, Cambridge engineering student John Hoyte borrowed an elephant named Jumbo from the Turin zoo and set out to prove the Col du Clapier (sometimes called the Col du Clapier-Savine Coche) was the real trunk road—but ultimately took the Mont Cenis route into Italy. Others have charted itineraries over the Col du Petit St. Bernard, the Col du l’Argentière and combinations of the above that looped north to south to north again. To borrow a line attributed to Mark Twain, riffing on a different controversy: “The researches of many commentators have already thrown much darkness on this subject, and it is probable that, if they continue, we shall soon know nothing at all about it.”

A relative newcomer to the debate, Allen insists that until now no hard material evidence has been presented that would indicate the most likely path. “Nada, zero, zip, zilch,” he says. “Everything has been guesswork based on readings of the classical texts.” He believes that he and his team of collaborators—led by Canadian geomorphologist Bill Mahaney—recently unearthed the first compelling clues, thanks to a massive patty of ancientmanure.

Embedded 16 inches deep in a bog on the French side of the Traversette is a thin layer of churned-up, compacted scat that suggests a large footfall by thousands of mammals at some point in the past. “If Hannibal had hauled his traveling circus over the pass, he would have stopped at the mire to water and feed the beasts,” reasons Allen. “And if that many horses, mules and, for that matter, elephants did graze there, they would have left behind a MAD.” That’s the acronym for what microbiologists delicately term a “mass animal deposition.”

By examining sediment from two cores and a trench—mostly soil matted with decomposed plant fiber—Allen and his crew have identified genetic materials that contain high concentrations of DNA fragments from Clostridia, bacteria that typically make up only 2 or 3 percent of peat microbes, but more than 70 percent of those found in the gut of horses. The bed of excrement also contained unusual levels of bile acids and fatty compounds found in the digestive tracts of horses and ruminants. Allen is most excited about having isolated parasite eggs—associated with gut tapeworms—preserved in the site like tiny genetic time capsules.

“The DNA detected in the mire was protected in bacterial endospores that can survive in soil for thousands of years,” he says. Analyses by the team, including carbon dating, suggest that the excreta dug up at the Traversette site could date to well within the ballpark of the Punic forces’ traverse.

Since Allen’s conclusions at times rest on the slippery slopes of conjecture, what they add up to is open to considerable interpretation. Andrew Wilson, of the Institute of Archaeology at the University of Oxford, maintains that the date range doesn’t follow from the data presented, and that the MAD layer could have accumulated over several centuries. Allen, a lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast, is unfazed. “I believe in hypothesis-driven science,” he says. “Naturally, some people are going to be skeptical of our deductions and say they are—for lack of a better word—crap. Which is perfectly healthy, of course. Skepticism is what science is all about.”

(Margaret Kimball)

Allen’s long, ascetic face, with narrow eyes and raised eyebrows, lends him an expression of perpetual seriousness that belies his sardonic good humor. This is an Englishman whose appreciation of pathogenic bacteria derived in part from Monty Python (Q: What’s brown and sounds like a bell? A: Dung!) and who named the goldfish in his backyard pond Nosey, Scrumpy, Motley, Blind Pew, Spunky and William. “I hand-feed William peas and garlic,” Allen says. “He won’t eat mealworms. He’s too discerning.”

He was delighted last year when the Belfast Telegraph headlined a front-page feature about his research team: QUEEN’S DUNG BOFFINS GET TO BOTTOM OF HANNIBAL ALPS RIDDLE IN PIECE OF 2000-YEAR-OLD POO. (“Boffin,” Allen kindly explains, is British slang for a scientist with technical expertise.) The accompanying cartoon depicted him holding an enormous roll of toilet paper. “Ever since that article appeared, people all over the world have been mailing me fecal samples,” Allen says. He pauses. “I’m only kidding!”

He learned to jest as a lad in Bristol, hometown of the great conceptual jokester Banksy. “I was a rather confused child,” Allen says. He toyed with the idea of becoming a paratrooper and then a train driver before deciding that “a career in science would be cool.” His earliest memories of scientific endeavor include designing a burglar alarm for his bedroom (age 6), leaving homemade stink bombs on his neighbor’s doorstep (age 8) and “looking at bits of unpleasant things” under the microscope (age 9). “Little did I know that the latter would later become my main source of income,” he says.

While in college—he has a doctorate in microbiology from the University of Warwick—Allen realized that he could have a lot of fun and generate research pay dirt by “doing things that other people hadn’t thought of yet”: Hence his current research interests are as diverse as understanding the microbial ecology defining the Anthropocene, corpse microbiology, hunting for microbial genetic signatures associated with ancient comet impact events and, of course, solving the Hannibal Enigma through metagenomics—the study of micro-organisms by direct extraction and cloning of DNA.

Allen is the latest British boffin to argue for the Traversette. The earliest was a naturalist named Cecil Torr, who in his 1924 book Hannibal Crosses the Alps tells us that as a teenager he set out, fruitlessly, to find traces of vinegar used, after fires were set to heat rock, in fracturing boulders that blocked the Carthaginian army. (A procedure, notes Cambridge classical scholar Mary Beard, “which has launched all kinds of boy-scoutish experiments among classicists-turned-amateur-chemists.”) Still, Torr was branded a Hannibal heretic and the route he recommended was dismissed as untenable. His theory was largely ignored until 1955, when Gavin de Beer took up the cause. In Alps and Elephants, the first of several books that the evolutionary embryologist wrote on Hannibal, he displayed something of the Kon-Tiki spirit with the claim that he’d personally inspected the topography. For centuries only traders and smugglers had used the Traversette scholars avoided it not just because the climb was so dicey, but due to what de Beer called “the ease with which triggers are pulled in that area.”


Hannibal

Hannibal (also known as Hannibal Barca, l. 247-183 BCE) was a Carthaginian general during the Second Punic War between Carthage and Rome (218-202 BCE). He is considered one of the greatest generals of antiquity and his tactics are still studied and used in the present day. His father was Hamilcar Barca (l. 275-228 BCE), the great general of the First Punic War (264-241 BCE).

These wars were fought between the cities of Carthage in North Africa and Rome in northern Italy for supremacy in the Mediterranean region and the second war resulted directly from the first. Hannibal assumed command of the troops following his father's death and led them victoriously through a number of engagements until he stood almost at the gates of Rome at which point he was stopped, not by the Romans, but through a lack of resources to take the city.

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He was called back to Africa to defend Carthage from Roman invasion, was defeated at the Battle of Zama in 202 BCE by Scipio Africanus (l. 236-183 BCE) and retired from service to Carthage. The remainder of his life was spent as a statesman and then in voluntary exile at the courts of foreign kings. He died in 183 BCE by drinking poison.

Vroeë lewe

Although Hannibal is easily one of the most famous generals of antiquity, he remains a figure of some mystery. Scholar Philip Matyszak notes:

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There is much we do not know about this man, though he was one of the greatest generals in antiquity. No surviving ancient biography makes him the subject, and Hannibal slips in and out of focus according to the emphasis that other authors give his deeds and character. (24)

Nothing is known of his mother and, although he was married at the time of some of his greatest victories, no records make mention of his wife other than her name, Imilce, and the fact that she bore him a son. What became her or her son is not known. The story of Hannibal's life is told largely by his enemies, the Romans, through the historians who wrote of the Punic Wars.

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The Greek historian Polybius (l. c. 208-125 BCE) writes how Hannibal's father invited him to join an expedition to Spain when the boy was around nine years old. Hannibal eagerly accepted the invitation but, before he was allowed to join up, his father "took Hannibal by the hand and led him to the altar. There he commanded Hannibal to lay his hand on the body of the sacrificial victim and to swear that he would never be a friend to Rome" (3:11). Hannibal took the vow gladly - and never forgot it.

He accompanied his father to Spain and learned to fight, track and, most importantly, out-think an opponent. Matyszak comments how "the modern concept of teenagers as somewhere between child and adult did not exist in the ancient world, and Hannibal was given charge of troops at an early age" (23). When his father drowned, command of the army passed to Hasdrubal the Fair (l. c. 270-221 BCE), Hamilcar's son-in-law, and when Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221 BCE the troops unanimously called for the election of Hannibal as their commander even though he was only 25 years old at the time.

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Crossing the Alps & Early Victories

Following the First Punic War the treaty between Carthage and Rome stipulated that Carthage could continue to occupy regions in Spain as long as they maintained the steady tribute they now owed to Rome and remained in certain areas. In 219 BCE the Romans orchestrated a coup in the city of of Saguntum which installed a government hostile to Carthage and her interests. Hannibal marched on the city in 218 BCE, lay siege to it, and took it. The Romans were outraged and demanded Carthage hand their general over to them when Carthage refused, the Second Punic War was begun.

Hannibal decided to bring the fight to the Romans and invade northern Italy in 218 BCE by crossing the mountain range of the Alps. He left his brother Hasdrubal Barca (l. c. 244-207 BCE) in charge of the armies in Spain and set out with his men for Italy. On the way, recognizing the importance of winning the people to his side, he portrayed himself as a liberator freeing the people of Spain from Roman control.

His army grew steadily with new recruits until he had 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry by the time he reached the Alps. He also had with him a number of elephants which he had found very useful in terrorizing the Roman army and their cavalry. Upon reaching the mountains he was forced to leave behind his siege engines and a number of other supplies he felt would slow their progress and then had the army begin their ascent.

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The troops and their general had to battle not only the weather and the incline but hostile tribes who lived in the mountains. By the time they reached the other side, 17 days later, the army had been reduced to 26,000 men in total and a few elephants. Still, Hannibal was confident he would be victorious and led his men down onto the plains of Italy.

The Romans, meanwhile, had no idea of Hannibal's movements. They never considered he would move his army over the mountains to reach them and thought he was still in Spain somewhere. When word reached Rome of Hannibal's maneuver, however, they were quick to act and sent the general Scipio (father of Scipio Africanus the Elder, who accompanied him) to intercept. The two armies met at the Ticino River where the Romans were defeated and Scipio almost killed

Hannibal next defeated his enemies at Lake Trasimeme and quickly took control of northern Italy. He had no siege machines and no elephants to take any of the cities and so relied on his image as liberator to try to coax the cities over to his side. He then sent word to Carthage for more men and supplies, especially siege engines, but his request was denied. The Carthaginian senate believed he could handle the situation without any added expense on their part and suggested his men live off the land.

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Hannibal's Tricks & the Battle of Cannae

Hannibal's strategy of presenting himself as a liberator worked and a number of cities chose to side with him against Rome while his victories on the field continued to swell his ranks with new recruits. After the Battle of Trebbia (218 BCE), where he again defeated the Romans, he retreated for the winter to the north where he developed his plans for the spring campaign and developed various strategems to keep from being assassinated by spies in his camp or hired killers sent by the Romans. Polybius writes how Hannibal,

had a set of wigs made, each of which made him look like a man of a different age. He changed these constantly, each time changing his apparel to match his appearance. Thus he was hard to recognize, not just by those who saw him briefly, but even by those who knew him well. (3:78)

Once spring came, Hannibal launched a new assault, destroying the Roman army under Gaius Flaminius and another under Servilius Geminus.

The Romans then sent the general Quintus Fabius Maximus (l. c. 280-203 BCE) against Hannibal who employed a new tactic of wearing Hannibal down by keeping him constantly on the move and off balance. Fabius became known as "the delayer" by refusing to face Hannibal directly and delaying any face-to-face engagement he preferred instead to strategically place his armies to prevent Hannibal from either attacking or retreating from Italy. So successful was Fabius' strategy that he almost caught Hannibal in a trap.

He had the Carthaginians penned up near Capua where retreat was blocked by the Volturnus River. It seemed that Hannibal had to either fight his way out or surrender but then, one night, the Romans saw a line of torches moving from the Carthaginian camp emplacement toward an area they knew was held by a strong garrison of their own.

It seemed clear Hannibal was trying to break out of the trap. Fabius' generals encouraged him to mount a night attack to support the garrison and crush the enemy between them but Fabius refused, believing that the garrison in place could easily prevent Hannibal from breaking out and would hold until morning. When the garrison mobilized to march out and meet Hannibal in battle, however, they found only cattle with torches tied on their horns and Hannibal's army had slipped away through the pass the Romans had left untended.

Fabius' tactic of refusing to meet Hannibal in open battle was beginning to wear on the Romans who demanded direct action. They appointed a younger general, Minucius Rufus (dates unknown), as co-commander as Rufus was confident he could defeat Hannibal and bring peace back to the region. Fabius understood that Hannibal was no common adversary, however, and still refused to engage. He gave Rufus half the army and invited him to do his best. Rufus attacked Hannibal near the town of Gerione and was so badly defeated that Fabius had to save him and what was left of his troops from complete annihilation. Afterwards, Fabius resigned his position and Rufus disappears from history.

Hannibal then marched to the Roman supply depot of Cannae, which he took easily, and then gave his men time to rest. The Romans sent the two consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus (d. 216 BCE) and Caius Terentius Varro (served c. 218-200 BCE), with a force of over 80,000, against his position Hannibal had less than 50,000 men under his command. As always, Hannibal spent time learning about his enemy, their strengths and weaknesses, and knew that Varro was eager for a fight and over-confident of success. As the two consuls traded off command of the army, it worked to Hannibal's advantage that the more ambitious and reckless of the two, Varro, held supreme authority on the first day of battle.

Hannibal arranged his army in a crescent, placing his light infantry of Gauls at the front and center with the heavy infantry behind them and light and heavy cavalry on the wings. The Romans under Varro's command were placed in traditional formation to march toward the center of the enemy's lines and break them. Varro believed he was facing an opponent like any of the others Roman legions had defeated in the past and was confident that the strength of the Roman force would break the Carthaginian line this was precisely the conclusion Hannibal hoped he would reach.

When the Roman army advanced, the center of the Carthaginian line began to give way so that it seemed as though Varro had been correct and the center would break. The Carthaginian forces fell back evenly, drawing the Romans further and further into their lines, and then the light infantry moved to either end of the crescent formation and the heavy infantry advanced to the front. At this same time, the Carthaginian cavalry engaged the Roman cavalry and dispersed them, falling on the rear on the Roman infantry.

The Romans, continuing in their traditional formation with their well-rehearsed tactics, continued to press forward but now they were only pushing those in the front lines into the killing machine of the Carthaginian heavy infantry. The Carthaginian cavalry had now closed the gap behind and the forces of Rome were completely surrounded. Of the 80,000 Roman soldiers who took the field that day, 44,000 were killed while Hannibal lost around 6,000 men. It was a devastating defeat for Rome which resulted in a number of the Italian city-states defecting to Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon (r. 221-179 BCE) declaring in favor of Hannibal and initiating the First Macedonian War with Rome.

The people of Rome mobilized to defend their city, which they were sure Hannibal would move on next. Veterans and new recruits alike refused pay in order to defend the city. Hannibal, however, could make no move on Rome because he lacked siege engines and reinforcements for his army. His request for these necessary supplies was refused by Carthage because the senate did not want to exert the effort or spend the money.

Hannibal's commander of the cavalry, Maharbal, encouraged Hannibal to attack anyway, confident they could win the war at this point when the Roman army was in disarray and the people in a panic. When Hannibal refused, Maharbal said, "You know how to win a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to use it." Hannibal was right, however his troops were exhausted after Cannae and he had neither elephants nor siege engines to take the city. He did not even have enough men to reduce the city by encircling it for a long siege. If Carthage had sent the requested men and supplies at this point, history would have been written very differently but they did not.

Further Campaigns & The Battle of Zama

Among the Roman warriors who survived Cannae was the man who would come to be known as Scipio Africanus the Elder. Scipio's father and uncle, two of the former commanders, had been killed fighting Hasdrubal Barca in Spain and, when the Roman senate called for a general to defend the city against Hannibal, all of the most likely commanders refused believing, after Cannae, that any such command was simply a suicide mission. Scipio, only 24 years old at the time, volunteered. He left Rome with only 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to meet Hannibal's much larger force.

Scipio began in Spain - not Italy - in an effort to subdue Hasdrubal first and prevent reinforcements from reaching Italy. He first took the city Carthago Nova and moved on from there to other victories. In 208 BCE, he defeated Hasdrubal at the Battle of Baecula using the same tactic Hannibal had at Cannae.

Hasdrubal, recognizing that Spain was a lost cause, crossed the Alps to join Hannibal in Italy for a united attack on Rome. At the Battle of the Metaurus River in 207 BCE, however, Hasdrubal's army was defeated by the Romans under Gaius Claudius Nero (c. 237-199 BCE) Hasdrubal was killed and his forces scattered. Nero had been engaging Hannibal in the south but slipped away in the night, defeated Hasdrubal, and returned without Hannibal ever noticing. The first Hannibal knew of Hasdrubal's defeat was when a Roman contingent threw his brother's head to the sentries of his camp.

Scipio, still in Spain, requested money and supplies from the Roman senate to take the fight to Hannibal by attacking Carthage a move which, he was sure, would force Carthage to recall Hannibal from Italy to defend the city. The Roman senate refused and so Scipio shamed them by raising his own army and appealing to the people of Rome for support the senate then relented and gave him command of Sicily from which to launch his invasion of North Africa.

Hannibal, in the meantime, was forced to continue his previous strategy of striking at Rome in quickly orchestrated engagements, and trying to win city-states to his cause, without being able to take any city by storm. Matyszak writes:

In the field, Hannibal remained umatched. In 212 and 210 he took on the Romans and defeated them. But he now understood that the wound Rome had received at Cannae had not been mortal. The flow of defections to the Carthaginian side slowed and then stopped. (39)

In Spain, the Carthaginians had been defeated by Scipio but Hannibal had no knowledge of this he only knew his brother had been killed but not that Spain was under Roman control.

By this time, Scipio was already set to invade North Africa and his plan would work exactly as he predicted. In 205 BCE he landed his forces and allied himself with the Numidian King Masinissa. He quickly took the Carthaginian city of Utica and marched on toward Carthage. Hannibal was recalled from Italy to meet this threat and the two forces met on the field in 202 BCE at the Battle of Zama.

Scipio had studied Hannibal's tactics carefully in the same way that Hannibal had always taken pains to know his enemy and out-think his opponents. He had no experience in facing Scipio, however, and only knew him as the young general who had somehow managed to defeat Hasdrubal in Spain. Scipio seemed to conform to Hannibal's expectations when he arranged his forces in traditional formation in a seemingly tight cluster.

Hannibal was certain he would scatter these Romans easily with an elephant charge but Scipio used his front line as a screen for a very different kind of formation: instead of the closely-packed configuration presenting a horizontal front across the line (the formation Hannibal saw from his position) he arranged his troops in vertical rows behind the front line. When Hannibal launched his elephant charge, Scipio's front line simply moved aside and the elephants ran harmlessly down the alleys between the Roman troops who then killed their handlers and turned the elephants around to crush the ranks of the Carthaginians Hannibal was defeated and the Second Punic War was over.

Later Years & Legacy

After the war, Hannibal accepted a position as Chief Magistrate of Carthage at which he performed as well as he had as a military leader. The heavy fines imposed on defeated Carthage by Rome, intended to cripple the city, were easily paid owing to the reforms Hannibal initiated. The members of the senate, who had refused to send him aid when he needed it in Italy, accused him of betraying the interests of the state by not taking Rome when he had the chance but, still, Hannibal remained true to the interests of his people until the senators trumped up further charges and denounced Hannibal to Rome claiming he was making Carthage a power again so as to challenge the Romans. Exactly why they decided to do this is unclear except for their disappointment in him following defeat at Zama and simple jealousy over his abilitites.

In Rome, Scipio was also dealing with problems posed by his own senate as they accused him of sympathizing with Hannibal by pardoning and releasing him, accepting bribes, and misappropiating funds. Scipio defended Hannibal as an honorable man and kept the Romans from sending a delegation demanding his arrest but Hannibal understood it was only a matter of time before his own countrymen turned him over and so he fled the city in 195 BCE for Tyre and then moved on to Asia Minor where he was given the position of consultant to Antiochus III (the Great, r. 223-187 BCE) of the Seleucid Empire.

Antiochus, of course, knew of Hannibal's reputation and did not want to risk placing so powerful and popular a man in control of his armies and so kept him at court until necessity drove him to appoint Hannibal admiral of the navy in a war against Rhodes, one of Rome's allies. Hannibal was an inexperienced sailor, as was his crew, and was defeated even though, much to his credit, he came close to winning. When Antiochus was defeated by the Romans at Magnesia in 189 BCE, Hannibal knew that he would be surrendered to Rome as part of the terms and again took flight.

At the court of King Prusias of Bithynia in 183 BCE, with Rome still in pursuit, Hannibal chose to end his life rather than be taken by his enemies. He said, "Let us put an end to this life, which has caused so much dread to the Romans" and then drank poison. Hy was 65 jaar oud. During this same time, in Rome, the charges against Scipio had disgusted him so much that he retreated to his estate outside the city and left orders in his will that he be buried there instead of in Rome. He died the same year as Hannibal at the age of 53.

Hannibal became a legend in his own lifetime and, years after his death, Roman mothers would continue to frighten their unwilling children to bed with the phrase "Hannibal ad Porto" (Hannibal is at the door). His campaign across the Alps, unthinkable even in his day, won him the grudging admiration of his enemies and enduring fame ever since.

Hannibal's strategies, learned so well by Scipio, were incorporated into Roman tactics and Rome would consistently use them to good effect following the Battle of Zama. After the deaths of Hannibal and Scipio, Carthage continued to cause problems for Rome which eventually resulted in the Third Punic War (149-146 BCE) in which Carthage was destroyed.

The historian Ernle Bradford writes that Hannibal's war against the Romans,

may be regarded as the last effort of the old eastern and Semitic peoples to prevent the domination of the Mediterranean world by a European state. That it failed was due to the immense resilience of the Romans, both in their political constitution and in their soldiery. (210)

While there is some truth to this, Hannibal's ultimate defeat was brought about by his own people's weakness for luxury, wealth, and ease as much as by the Roman refusal to surrender after Cannae. There is no doubt, as Bradford also notes, that had Hannibal "been fighting against any other nation in the ancient world. his overwhelming victories would have brought them to their knees and to an early capitulation" (210) but the cause of Hannibal's defeat was just as much the fault of the Carthaginian elite who refused to support the general and his troops who were fighting for their cause.

No records exist of Carthage awarding Hannibal any recognition for his service in Italy and he was honored more by Scipio's pardon and defense than by any actions on the part of his countrymen. Even so, he continued to do his best for his people throughout his life and remained true to the vow he had taken when young to the end, he remained an enemy of Rome and his name would be remembered as Rome's greatest adversary for generations - and even to the present day.