Kubaanse missielkrisis - definisie, datum en feite

Kubaanse missielkrisis - definisie, datum en feite

1. Die U-2 lugfoto's is ontleed in 'n geheime kantoor bo 'n gebruikte motorhandelaar.
Die kritieke foto's wat deur U-2-verkenningsvliegtuie oor Kuba geneem is, is vir ontleding gestuur na 'n hoogs geheime CIA-fasiliteit op 'n baie onwaarskynlike plek: 'n gebou bokant die Steuart Ford-motorhandelaar in 'n afgeslote gedeelte van Washington, DC Terwyl verkopers van gebruikte motors was terwyl hy op 15 Oktober 1962 op die onderste verdieping rondry en handel, het die CIA-ontleders op die boonste verdieping in die moderne National Photographic Interpretation Center 24 uur per dag gewerk om honderde korrelige foto's te soek vir bewyse van 'n Sowjet-ballistiese raketterrein wat in aanbou is.

2. Die Sowjette het staatgemaak op geruite hemde en stywe woonbuurte om duisende troepe na Kuba te sluip.
In die somer van 1962 het die Sowjette 'n uitgebreide manier gebruik, met die naam Operasie Anadyr, om duisende gevegstroepe na Kuba te stuur. 'N Paar duisend soldate het geruite hemde aangetrek om as burgerlike landbouadviseurs voor te kom. Baie meer is arktiese toerusting uitgereik om die reuk af te gooi, aan boord van 'n vloot van 85 skepe gestuur en daarna aangesê om onder die dekke te bly vir die lang reis om ongemerk te bly. Toe die CIA op 20 Oktober 1962 beraam het dat 6 000 tot 8 000 Sowjet -troepe in Kuba gestasioneer was, was die werklike getal meer as 40 000.

3. Om te voorkom dat die nuus van die krisis lek, is 'n koue verkoue die skuld vir president Kennedy se kansellasie van openbare geleenthede.
Om te voorkom dat die publiek kommer in die eerste dae van die krisis wek, het Kennedy probeer om sy amptelike skedule te handhaaf, insluitend 'n beplande veldtog van sewe state voor die middeltermynverkiesings. Op 20 Oktober 1962 vlieg hy egter skielik terug van Chicago na Washington. Die dokter van die president het 'n verhaal saamgestel dat Kennedy se stem die vorige aand 'skelm' was en dat hy aan 'n verkoue en 'n effense koors ly. Terwyl assistente aan die pers gesê het dat Kennedy die res van die dag in die bed sou deurbring, het hy eerder vyf uur vergaderings met adviseurs gehad voordat hy besluit het om 'n vlootblokkade van Kuba in te stel. Vise -president Lyndon Johnson gee ook die skuld vir die verkoue omdat hy 'n reis na Honolulu kortgekeer het om na Washington terug te keer.

4. President Kennedy se assistente het 'n toespraak opgestel waarin 'n militêre inval in Kuba aangekondig word.
In 'n dramatiese toespraak op 22 Oktober 1962, het Kennedy die land in kennis gestel van die vlootblokkade rondom Kuba. 'N Alternatiewe toespraak met 'n heel ander boodskap is egter dae tevore opgestel, maar as die president verkies het vir 'n militêre aanval. 'Vanoggend het ek die weermag onwillig beveel om die kernopbou in Kuba aan te val en te vernietig,' begin die toespraak wat JFK nooit gelewer het nie.

5. 'n Sowjet -spioen was 'n waardevolle mol.
Kolonel Oleg Penkovsky, 'n Sowjet -militêre inligtingsbeampte, het belangrike spioenasie oor Sowjet -missielstelsels - insluitend tegniese handleidings - aan die CIA en Britse intelligensie -amptenare oorgedra. Hierdie kennis was uiters waardevol vir die CIA -agente wat die lugfoto's wat oor Kuba geneem is, ontleed. Op 22 Oktober 1962 het KGB -amptenare Penkovsky in Moskou gearresteer, en daar word geglo dat hy skuldig bevind is aan spioenasie en in 1963 tereggestel is.

6. Daar was Amerikaanse gevegsterftes.
Op 27 Oktober 1962 het 'n oppervlak-tot-lug-missiel wat deur Sowjet voorsien is, 'n Amerikaanse U-2-vliegtuig neergeslaan en sy vlieënier doodgemaak. Majoor Rudolf Anderson Jr., president Kennedy, het hom postuum die Distinguished Service-medalje toegeken. Vier dae voor Anderson se dood het 'n C-135-lugmagtransport wat voorrade na die Guantanamo Naval Air Station op Kuba gebring het, neergestort en die bemanning van sewe mense doodgemaak.

7. Albei kante het gekompromitteer.
Die Amerikaanse minister van buitelandse sake, Dean Rusk, het oor die Kubaanse missielkrisis gesê: "Ons het oog tot oogbal, en ek dink die ander een het net geknip." Die beoordeling is te eensydig. Terwyl die Sowjet -leier Nikita Chroesjtsjof op 28 Oktober 1962 beveel het om Sowjet -kernmissiele uit Kuba te verwyder, was dit nie 'n eensydige stap nie. Die Amerikaners het ook in die geheim belowe om tussentydse kernmissiele uit Turkye terug te trek en nie om Kuba binne te val nie.

8. Geheime agterdeur-diplomasie, eerder as brinkmanskap, het die krisis ontlont.
Nadat Kennedy die blokkade aangekondig het, was die Amerikaners en Sowjette gereeld in verbinding. Die ooreenkoms van 28 Oktober is die vorige aand gehamer in 'n geheime vergadering tussen prokureur -generaal Robert F. Kennedy en die Sowjet -ambassadeur Anatoly Dobrynin. Die prokureur -generaal se uitreiking en aanbod om missiele uit Turkye te verwyder was so klandestien dat slegs 'n handjievol presidensiële adviseurs destyds daarvan bewus was.

9. Die Kubaanse missielkrisis het meer as net 13 dae geduur.
Ja, dit was 13 dae nadat Bundy Kennedy die inkriminerende U-2-foto's gewys het tot die aankondiging van Radio Moskou oor die besluit van Chroesjtsjof om die missiele te verwyder, en die nommer is in die geskiedenis ingedruk met Robert Kennedy se postume memoires "Thirteen Days" en die mosie van 2000 gelyknamige prentjie. Maar alhoewel die wêreld 'n sug van verligting geslaan het ná die nuus van die 13de dag, het die gespanne situasie nie skielik bedaar nie. Die Amerikaanse weermag het nog drie weke op sy hoogste staat gebly terwyl hy die verwydering van die missiele gemonitor het.

10. Alhoewel die Kennedy -administrasie gedink het al die Sowjet -kere was weg, was dit nie so nie.
President Kennedy, tevrede met die Sowjet-versekering dat alle kernwapens verwyder is, het die Kubaanse blokkade op 20 November 1962 opgehef. Onlangs het Sowjet-dokumente wat opgegrawe is, onthul dat terwyl Chroesjtsjof die missiele van medium en middelafstand afgetakel het wat die Kennedy bekend was administrasie, het hy ongeveer 100 taktiese kernwapens gelaat - waarvan die Amerikaners nie bewus was nie - vir moontlike gebruik om enige indringende Amerikaanse magte af te weer. Chroesjtsjof was van plan om die Kubane op te lei en die missiele aan hulle oor te dra, solank hulle hul teenwoordigheid geheim hou. Sowjet -kommer oor die vraag of Castro vertrou kan word met die wapens wat aangebring is, en die Sowjette het op 1 Desember 1962 uiteindelik die laaste van die kernkragkoppe uit Kuba verwyder.


10 feite oor die Kubaanse missielkrisis

Laat ek 'n interessante konfrontasie tussen die Verenigde State en Kuba toon Feite oor die Kubaanse missielkrisis. Hierdie gebeurtenis is baie belangrik in die geskiedenis omdat die kernoorlog amper plaasgevind het. Die belangrikste kwessie hou verband met die implementering van die Sowjetunie se ballistiese sending in Kuba. Die krisis het 13 dae geduur. Dit begin op 16 Oktober 1962 en eindig op 28 Oktober 1962. Die ander name van die Kubaanse missielkrisis is die missielskrik, die Karibiese krisis of die oktoberkrisis. Kyk hieronder na ander feite oor die Kubaanse missielkrisis:


'N Jong Fidel Castro

Castro, gebore in 1926 in Mayarí, Kuba, het grootgeword in 'n stewige middelklashuis. Hy studeer aan die Universiteit van Havana in 1950 met 'n regsgraad. Gedurende die meeste van die vroeë jare van Castro regeer Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar (1901–1973), 'n onderdrukkende diktator ('n leier wat geweld en terreur gebruik om beheer te behou), Kuba. Batista was sedert 1933 in volle beheer van die eiland, hetsy direk of deur ander presidente. Batista se ekonomiese beleid het gehelp om ligte nywerhede, soos blikkieskuns, te vestig, en het buitelandse ondernemings, baie uit die Verenigde State, toegelaat om hul ondernemings in Kuba te bou. Amerikaanse korporasies het die suikerbedryf, olieproduksie en ander belangrike aspekte van die eiland se ekonomie oorheers. Die grootste deel van die rykdom van Kuba was in besit van 'n klein persentasie van die bevolking, die meeste Kubaanse burgers het in ernstige armoede geleef. Onder hierdie omstandighede was Kuba ryp vir revolusie, en Castro, die aantreklike, intense jong advokaat, was 'n charismatiese leier.

In 1953 het Castro probeer om Batista omver te werp en is hy tronk toe gestuur. Na sy vrylating in 1955, is Castro na Mexiko en het dadelik rebelle bymekaargemaak. In Desember 1956 het Castro en sy manne in Kuba geland en die guerrilla, of onreëlmatige en onafhanklike, aanvalle op die weermag van Batista uitgevoer. Die mense van Kuba, veral die wat in armoede geleef het, het toenemend die jong revolusionêre ondersteun, of diegene wat radikale verandering soek. Op 1 Januarie 1959 vlug Batista uit Kuba. Binne enkele weke het Castro hom as premier aangestel.

Aanvanklik het die Verenigde State Castro ondersteun, wat destyds nie 'n kommunis was nie. Kommuniste glo dat die beste ekonomiese stelsel een is wat privaat eienaarskap van eiendom uitskakel. Onder hierdie stelsel word die geproduseerde goedere en die opgeboude rykdom in teorie deur almal gelyk gedeel. 'N Enkele party, die Kommunistiese Party, beheer die regering en byna alle ander aspekte van die samelewing. Kommunisme staan ​​in direkte kontras met die waardes van demokratiese, kapitalistiese lande soos

die Verenigde State. 'N Demokratiese regeringstelsel vereis dat regeringsleiers en ander wat 'n openbare amp beklee, deur die burgers verkies word tydens algemene verkiesings. Kandidate verteenwoordig verskillende politieke partye - en uiteindelik al die mense wat daarvoor stem. Kapitalistiese ekonomiese stelsels laat private eienaarskap van eiendom en besighede toe. Mededinging in 'n vrye, of oop, mark bepaal pryse, produksie en verspreiding van goedere.

Die Amerikaanse media, insluitend Lewe en Reader's Digest tydskrifte, wat Castro as 'n geleerde, gewaagde, vasberade soldaat beskou het. Castro wou die Kubane uit armoede ophef. Hy het huurgeld verlaag, verbeterde onderwys en gesondheidsorg voorgestel, en hervorming van die boerdery ingestel, of dramatiese verandering. Hy het groot boedels in kleiner pakkies verdeel vir gewone burgers om te boer. Hy het ook probeer om Amerika se oorheersing van die Kubaanse ekonomie te beëindig. Castro het egter geen beweging gemaak om vrye verkiesings op te stel nie, wat hy vroeër beloof het om te doen. Ontsteld oor Castro se optrede het baie middelklas en welgestelde Kubane na die Verenigde State gevlug. Van daar af het hulle 'n anti-Castro-veldtog begin om die Kubane wat agtergebly het, te beïnvloed. Tot Castro se ontsteltenis het die Verenigde State niks gedoen om die poging teen Castro te stop nie. Toe Castro hulp soek vir sy hervormings van die Verenigde State, is hy geweier. Gedurende 1960 het Kuba se betrekkinge met die Verenigde State vinnig afgeneem. Die Sowjetunie was gereed en kon ingryp en in Februarie 1960 'n handelsooreenkoms met Castro onderteken.


Algemene oorsigte

Die Kubaanse missielkrisis word goed bedien deur onlangse algemene oorsigte, waarvan die meeste daarna streef om Sowjet- en Kubaanse perspektiewe sowel as Amerikaanse perspektiewe op te neem. Die belangrikste is Dobbs 2008 en Naftali en Fursenko 1997. Beide boeke is boeiend geskrewe verslae wat baie op vars bronne put. Colman 2016 gebruik dokumente uit argiewe regoor die wêreld om die missielkrisis in sy breër internasionale en chronologiese konteks te plaas. Die ontleding in Garthoff 1989 word verryk deur die ervaring van die skrywer as 'n amptenaar wat leiding gee aan die Withuis. George 2013, Munton en Welch 2012 en White 1997 is baie geskik vir voorgraadse studente, net soos die politieke wetenskaplike klassieke Allison en Zelikow 1999 (oorspronklik gepubliseer in 1971). Holsti, et al. 1964 bied 'n ander belangrike politieke wetenskaplike verslag.

Allison, Graham en Philip Zelikow. Die essensie van die besluit: verduidelik die Kubaanse missielkrisis. 2de uitg. New York: Longman, 1999.

Opgedateerde weergawe van 'n politieke wetenskapstandaard, met drie teoretiese modelle om te verstaan ​​wat aangaan.

Colman, Jonathan. Die Kubaanse missielkrisis: oorsprong, verloop en nagevolge. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

Stel die krisis voor as 'n internasionale gebeurtenis buite die Verenigde State, die Sowjetunie en Kuba, en ondersoek sommige van die gevolge tot 1970.

Dobbs, Michael M. Een minuut tot middernag: Kennedy, Khrushchev en Castro op die rand van die kernoorlog. New York: Knopf, 2008.

Benut uitgebreide nuwe navorsing om daagliks 'n oortuigende verslag te gee van die krisis, insluitend onthullings soos Sowjet-voorbereidings om die Amerikaanse vlootbasis in Guantanamobaai in Kuba te vernietig.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Besinning oor die Kubaanse missielkrisis. Eerwaarde red. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989.

Beklemtoon die gevare van 'onbeheerde gebeurtenisse', probeer om reg te laat geskied aan die Kubaanse rol en gee 'n aantal Amerikaanse dokumente weer.

George, Alice L. Die Kubaanse missielkrisis: die drempel van kernoorlog. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Gedetailleerde uiteensetting van die missielkrisis wat die episode in sy breër Koue Oorlog -konteks plaas, en beweer dat die oorlog in Viëtnam spruit uit 'n misplaaste geloof in Washington na Oktober 1962 in die Amerikaanse vermoë om sy wil op te lê.

Holsti, Ole, Richard Brody en Robert North. "Meting van affek en aksie in internasionale reaksiemodelle: empiriese materiaal uit die Kubaanse krisis van 1962." Journal of Peace Research 1.3–4 (1964): 170–189.

'N Vroeë invloed op krisisnavorsers.

Munton, Don en David Welch. Die Kubaanse missielkrisis: 'n bondige geskiedenis. 2de uitg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

'N Goeie vertelling wat gebiede van historiese debat beklemtoon, sowel as weglatings in die verslag.

Naftali, Timothy en Aleksandr Fursenko. "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958–1964. Londen: John Murray, 1997.

'N Omvattende multi-argief opname. Een van die argumente is dat Chroesjtsjof se hoofmotief vir die opstel van missiele in Kuba was om die regime daar te verdedig.

Wit, Mark J. Rakette in Kuba: Kennedy, Chroesjtsjov, Castro en die 1962 -krisis. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997.

'N Duidelike en innemende inleiding wat Sowjet en Kubaanse gebruik, saam met Amerikaanse materiaal.

Gebruikers sonder 'n intekening kan nie die volledige inhoud op hierdie bladsy sien nie. Teken in of meld aan.


Kubaanse missielkrisis

1962, groot koue oorlog koue Oorlog,
term wat gebruik word om die veranderende stryd om mag en aansien tussen die Westerse moondhede en die kommunistiese blok te beskryf vanaf die einde van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog tot 1989. Van wêreldwye omvang was die konflik stilswyend in die ideologiese verskille tussen kommunisme en
. Klik op die skakel vir meer inligting. konfrontasie tussen die Verenigde State en die Sowjetunie. In reaksie op die Bay of Pigs Invasion Invasie van Bay of Pigs,
1961, 'n onsuksesvolle inval in Kuba deur Kubaanse ballinge, ondersteun deur die Amerikaanse regering. Op 17 April 1961 beland 'n gewapende mag van ongeveer 1500 Kubaanse ballinge in die Bah & iacutea de Cochinos (Baai van varke) aan die suidkus van Kuba.
. Klik op die skakel vir meer inligting. en ander Amerikaanse optrede teen Kuba sowel as teen president Kennedy Kennedy, John Fitzgerald,
1917 󈞫, 35ste president van die Verenigde State (1961 󈞫), geb. Brookline, Mass. Seun van Joseph P. Kennedy. Vroeë lewe

Terwyl hy 'n voorgraadse student was aan Harvard (1936 󈞔), dien hy kortliks in Londen as sekretaris van sy vader, wat
. Klik op die skakel vir meer inligting. Met die opbou in Italië en Turkye van Amerikaanse strategiese kernkragmagte met die eerste-aanval aanval op die Sowjetunie, het die USSR sy steun aan Fidel Castro verhoog Castro, Fidel
(Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz), 1926 �, Kubaanse revolusionêr, premier van Kuba (1959 󈞸), president van die Raad van State en van die Ministerraad (1976 �).
. Klik op die skakel vir meer inligting. se Kubaanse regime. In die somer van 1962, Nikita Chroesjtsjov Chroesjtsjov, Nikita Sergejevitsj
, 1894 �, Sowjet -kommunistiese leier, premier van die USSR (1958 󈞬), en eerste sekretaris van die Kommunistiese party van die Sowjetunie (1953 󈞬).
. Klik op die skakel vir meer inligting. in die geheim besluit om kernwapende ballistiese missiele in Kuba te installeer. Toe Amerikaanse verkenningsvlugte die klandestiene konstruksie van raketlanseerplekke onthul, het president Kennedy die Sowjet -optrede in die openbaar veroordeel (22 Oktober 1962). Hy het 'n vlootblokkade op Kuba opgelê en verklaar dat enige missiel wat uit Kuba gelanseer is, 'n grootskaalse weerwraakaanval deur die Verenigde State teen die Sowjetunie sou regverdig. Op 24 Oktober het Russiese skepe wat missiele na Kuba vervoer het, teruggedraai, en toe Chroesjtsjof ingestem het (28 Oktober) om die missiele terug te trek en die missielplekke uitmekaar te haal, eindig die krisis so skielik as wat dit begin het. Die Verenigde State het op 20 November sy blokkade beëindig, en teen die einde van die jaar is die missiele en bomwerpers uit Kuba verwyder. Die Verenigde State het in ruil daarvoor belowe om Kuba nie binne te val nie, en daarna, ter nakoming van 'n geheime ooreenkoms met Chroesjtsjof, die ballistiese missiele wat in Turkye geplaas is, verwyder.

Bibliografie

Sien ER May en P. D. Zeilkow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1997) R. F. Kennedy, Dertien dae (1969, herh. 1971) A. Chayes, Die Kubaanse missielkrisis (1974) R. Garthoff, Besinning oor die Kubaanse missielkrisis (1989) A. Fursenko en T. Naftali, "Een hel van 'n waagstuk" (1997) M. Frankel, Middag in die Koue Oorlog (2004) M. Dobbs, Een minuut tot middernag (2008) S. M. Stern, Die Kubaanse missielkrisis in Amerikaanse geheue (2012) M. J. Sherwin, Dobbel met Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette van Hiroshima na die Kubaanse missielkrisis (2020).


Die week waarin die wêreld nog gestaan ​​het: Die Kubaanse missielkrisis en eienaarskap van die wêreld

Die wêreld het 50 jaar gelede in die laaste week van Oktober stilgestaan, vanaf die oomblik toe hy verneem dat die Sowjetunie kernwapens in Kuba geplaas het totdat die krisis amptelik beëindig is, maar slegs amptelik onbekend vir die publiek.

Die beeld van die wêreld wat stilstaan, is die frasewisseling van Sheldon Stern, voormalige historikus by die John F. Kennedy Presidensiële Biblioteek, wat die gesaghebbende weergawe van die opnames van die ExComm -vergaderings gepubliseer het waar Kennedy en 'n noue kring van adviseurs gedebatteer het hoe reageer op die krisis. Die vergaderings is in die geheim deur die president opgeneem, wat daarop dui dat sy standpunt gedurende die opgetekende sessies relatief gematig is in vergelyking met ander deelnemers, wat nie bewus was dat hulle met die geskiedenis praat nie.

Stern het pas 'n toeganklike en akkurate resensie van hierdie kritiek belangrike dokumentêre rekord gepubliseer, wat uiteindelik in die laat 1990's gedeklassifiseer is. Ek sal hierby hou. Nooit voor of sedertdien nie, ” sluit hy af, “ was die voortbestaan ​​van die menslike beskawing op die spel in 'n paar kort weke van gevaarlike beraadslaging, en 'n hoogtepunt in “ die week het die wêreld stilgestaan. ”

Daar was goeie rede vir die wêreldwye kommer. 'N Kernoorlog was te dreigend, 'n oorlog wat die noordelike halfrond kan vernietig, en president Dwight Eisenhower het gewaarsku. Kennedy se eie oordeel was dat die waarskynlikheid van oorlog so hoog as 50%kon gewees het. Die ramings het hoër geword namate die konfrontasie sy hoogtepunt bereik het en die “ geheime ondergangsplan om te verseker dat die regering se voortbestaan ​​in Washington in werking tree, soos beskryf deur joernalis Michael Dobbs in sy goed nagevorsde topverkoper oor die krisis (alhoewel hy verduidelik nie waarom dit baie sinvol is om dit te doen nie, gegewe die waarskynlike aard van kernoorlog).

Dobbs haal Dino Brugioni aan, 'n belangrike lid van die CIA -span wat die opbou van die Sowjet -missiel monitor, en#8221 wat geen uitweg kon sien nie, behalwe die oorlog en volledige vernietiging, terwyl die klok na 'n minuut tot middernag beweeg het, en #8221 die titel van sy boek. Die nabye medewerker van Kennedy, historikus Arthur Schlesinger, beskryf die gebeure as die gevaarlikste oomblik in die geskiedenis van die mensdom. Robert McNamara, minister van verdediging, het hardop gewonder of hy nog 'n Saterdagaand sou sien erken dat ons 'n paar geluk gehad het ” — skaars.

“Die gevaarlikste oomblik ”

'N Nader kyk na wat plaasgevind het, dra by tot hierdie oordele, met nagalm tot die huidige oomblik.

Daar is verskeie kandidate vir “ die gevaarlikste oomblik. ” Een daarvan is 27 Oktober, toe Amerikaanse vernietigers wat 'n kwarantyn rondom Kuba afdwing, diepteaanklagte op Sowjet -duikbote laat val. Volgens Sowjet -verslae, berig deur die National Security Archive, is duikbote se bevelvoerders genoeg gesukkel om te praat oor die afvuur van kern torpedo's, waarvan die 15 kiloton plofbare opbrengste die bom benader wat Hiroshima in Augustus 1945 verwoes het. ”

In een geval is 'n aangemelde besluit om 'n kerntorpedo bymekaar te maak vir strydgereedheid op die laaste minuut deur die tweede kaptein Vasili Arkhipov, wat moontlik die wêreld van 'n kernramp gered het, afgebreek. Daar is min twyfel wat die Amerikaanse reaksie sou gewees het as die torpedo afgevuur is, of hoe die Russe sou gereageer het toe hul land besig was om te rook.

Kennedy het reeds verklaar dat die hoogste kernwaarskuwing kort na die bekendstelling was (DEFCON 2), wat “NATO -vliegtuie met Turkse vlieëniers … [of ander] … gemagtig het om op te styg, na Moskou te vlieg en 'n bom te laat val, &# 8221 volgens die goed ingeligte Harvard-universiteit se strategiese ontleder Graham Allison, wat in die groot establishmentjoernaal skryf Buitelandse sake.

'N Ander kandidaat is 26 Oktober. Daardie dag is gekies as die gevaarlikste oomblik deur B-52-vlieënier majoor Don Clawson, wat een van die NAVO-vliegtuie bestuur het en 'n opvallende beskrywing gee van die besonderhede van die Chrome Dome-missies tydens die krisis — “B-52's op waarskuwing in die lug ” met kernwapens “ aan boord en gereed om te gebruik. ”

26 Oktober was die dag waarop die land die naaste aan kernoorlog was, en hy skryf in sy eerbiedige staaltjies van 'n vlieënier van die lugmag, en#8221 Is dit iets wat die bemanning moet weet? Op daardie dag was Clawson self in 'n goeie posisie om 'n moontlike terminale ramp te veroorsaak. Hy kom tot die gevolgtrekking: "Ons was baie gelukkig dat ons die wêreld nie opgeblaas het nie, en nee dankie aan die politieke of militêre leierskap van hierdie land."

Die foute, verwarring, bykans ongelukke en wanbegrip van die leierskap wat Clawson berig, is verstommend genoeg, maar niks soos die operatiewe bevel-en-beheer-reëls nie, of 'n gebrek daaraan. Terwyl Clawson sy ervarings vertel tydens die 15 24-uur-CD-missies wat hy gevlieg het, het die amptelike bevelvoerders nie die vermoë gehad om te verhoed dat 'n skelm bemanning of bemanningslid hul termonucleaire wapens kan bewapen en loslaat nie, &# 8221 of selfs van die uitsending van 'n missie wat die hele lugwaarskuwingsmag sou gestuur het sonder dat dit herroep kon word. hulle almal sonder verdere insette van die grond af. Daar was geen remmer op enige van die stelsels nie. ”

Ongeveer 'n derde van die totale mag was in die lug, volgens generaal David Burchinal, direkteur van planne oor die lugpersoneel by die lugmag se hoofkwartier. Dit lyk asof die Strategic Air Command (SAC), tegnies in beheer, min beheer gehad het. En volgens Clawson se verslag is die burgerlike nasionale kommando -owerheid deur die SAC in die duister gehou, wat beteken dat die besluitnemers van ExComm ” wat oor die lot van die wêreld nadink, nog minder weet. Die mondelinge geskiedenis van die Burchinale is nie minder haarroeiend nie en onthul nog groter minagting vir die burgerlike bevel. Volgens hom was daar nooit twyfel oor Russiese kapitulasie nie. Die CD -operasies was bedoel om dit vir die Russe glashelder te maak dat hulle skaars eens aan die militêre konfrontasie deelneem en vinnig vernietig kon word.

Uit die ExComm -rekords kom Stern tot die gevolgtrekking dat president Kennedy op 26 Oktober neig na militêre optrede om die missiele in Kuba uit te skakel, gevolg deur 'n inval, volgens Pentagon -planne. Dit was toe duidelik dat die daad moontlik kon lei tot terminale oorlog, 'n gevolgtrekking wat deur baie later onthullings versterk is dat taktiese kernwapens ontplooi is en dat Russiese magte veel groter was as wat Amerikaanse intelligensie berig het.

Terwyl die ExComm -vergaderings om 18:00 tot 'n einde was. op die 26ste het 'n brief van die Sowjet -premier Nikita Chroesjtsjof, direk aan president Kennedy, gekom. Sy boodskap het duidelik gelyk, en Stern skryf: “ die missiele sou verwyder word as die VSA beloof het om nie Kuba binne te val nie. ”

Die volgende dag, om 10:00, het die president weer die geheime band aangeskakel. Hy lees 'n draaddiensverslag wat pas aan hom oorhandig is, voor: Premier Chroesjtsjof het vandag in 'n boodskap aan president Kennedy gesê dat hy aanvallende wapens uit Kuba sou onttrek as die Verenigde State sy vuurpyle uit Turkye sou onttrek en#8221 — Jupiter -missiele met kernplofkoppe. Die verslag is spoedig geverifieer.

Alhoewel die komitee dit as 'n onverwagte uit die bloute ontvang het, was dit eintlik verwag: "Ons het geweet dat dit 'n week kan kom," het Kennedy hulle meegedeel. Dit sou moeilik wees om openbare toestemming te weier, besef hy. Dit was verouderde missiele, wat reeds vir onttrekking bestem was, wat binnekort vervang sal word deur veel meer dodelike en effektief onaantasbare Polaris -duikbote. Kennedy erken dat hy in 'n “ sou weesnie ondersteunbaar nie posisie as dit 'n voorstel van [Chroesjtsjov word], ”, beide omdat die Turkse missiele nutteloos was en in elk geval teruggetrek word, en omdat dit aan enige man by die Verenigde Nasies of enige ander rasionele man, dit sal na 'n baie billike handel lyk. ”

Hou die Amerikaanse krag onbeperk

Die beplanners het dus voor 'n ernstige dilemma te staan ​​gekom. Hulle het twee ietwat verskillende voorstelle van Chroesjtsjof in die hand om die bedreiging van 'n katastrofale oorlog te beëindig, en elkeen lyk vir 'n billike handel 'n billike handel. Hoe om dan te reageer?

Een moontlikheid sou gewees het om 'n sug van verligting te slaag dat die beskawing kan voortbestaan ​​en albei aanbiedinge om aan te kondig dat die VSA die volkereg sou nakom en die bedreiging om Kuba binne te val, gretig aanvaar en die onttrekking van die verouderde missiele in Turkye voortgaan , verloop soos beplan om die kernbedreiging teen die Sowjetunie op te gradeer na 'n veel groter en natuurlik slegs 'n deel van die wêreldwye omsingeling van Rusland. Maar dit was ondenkbaar.

Die basiese rede waarom daar nie oor so 'n gedagte gedink kan word nie, is deur die nasionale veiligheidsadviseur McGeorge Bundy, voormalige dekaan van Harvard en na bewering die helderste ster in die uitspansel van Camelot, uiteengesit. Hy het daarop aangedring dat die wêreld moet besef dat die huidige bedreiging vir vrede die huidige is nie in Turkye, dit is in Kuba, ” waar missiele teen die VSA gerig is die westelike halfrond en verder kan getuig van talle ander, die slagoffers van die voortslepende terreuroorlog wat die VSA toe teen Kuba gevoer het, of diegene wat opgevee is in die veldtog van haat in die Arabiese wêreld wat so verbaas was Eisenhower, hoewel nie die Nasionale Veiligheidsraad nie, wat dit duidelik verduidelik het.

Die idee dat die VSA deur internasionale reg beperk moet word, was natuurlik te belaglik om te oorweeg. Soos onlangs verduidelik deur die gerespekteerde links-liberale kommentator Matthew Yglesias, is een van die belangrikste funksies van die internasionale institusionele bestel juis om wettig die gebruik van dodelike militêre mag deur westerse moondhede, wat beteken dat die VSA ongelooflik naïef is, en dat dit inderdaad redelik is, om voor te stel dat dit die internasionale reg moet gehoorsaam of ander voorwaardes wat ons aan die magteloses stel. Dit was 'n openhartige en welkome uiteensetting van werkende aannames, refleksief as vanselfsprekend aanvaar deur die ExComm -vergadering.

In die daaropvolgende gesprek het die president beklemtoon dat ons in 'n slegte posisie sou wees as ons sou besluit om 'n internasionale verwoesting aan die gang te sit deur voorstelle te verwerp wat vir oorlewendes redelik sou lyk (indien enige omgee). Hierdie “pragmatiese ” standpunt was omtrent sover morele oorwegings kon bereik.

In 'n oorsig van onlangs vrygestelde dokumente oor die terrorisme in die Kennedy-era, merk die Latyns-Amerikaner van die Harvard-universiteit, Jorge Domínguez, op: 'Slegs een keer in hierdie byna duisend bladsye dokumentasie het 'n Amerikaanse amptenaar iets geopper wat lyk soos 'n dowwe morele beswaar teen terrorisme wat deur die Amerikaanse regering geborg word' #8221: 'n lid van die personeel van die Nasionale Veiligheidsraad het voorgestel dat aanvalle wat onskuldiges gevaarlik is en doodmaak, 'n slegte pers in sommige vriendelike lande kan beteken. ”

Dieselfde gesindhede heers tydens die interne besprekings tydens die missielkrisis, soos toe Robert Kennedy gewaarsku het dat 'n grootskaalse inval in Kuba vreeslik baie mense sal doodmaak, en ons gaan vreeslik baie hitte daaroor neem . ” En hulle heers tot die hede, met slegs die skaarsste uitsonderings, soos maklik gedokumenteer.

Ons sou miskien selfs 'n slegter posisie gewees het as die wêreld meer geweet het van wat die VSA destyds gedoen het. Pas onlangs is verneem dat die VSA ses maande tevore in die geheim missiele in Okinawa ontplooi het, feitlik identies aan dié wat die Russe na Kuba sou stuur. Dit was sekerlik gerig op China op 'n oomblik van verhoogde plaaslike spanning. Tot vandag toe bly Okinawa 'n groot aanvallende Amerikaanse militêre basis oor die bittere besware van die inwoners wat tans minder entoesiasties is oor die versending van ongelukgevoelige V-22 Osprey-helikopters na die militêre basis Futenma, in die hartjie van 'n swaarbevolkte stedelike sentrum.

'N Onsedelike respek vir die menings van die mensdom

Die beraadslagings wat gevolg het, is onthullend, maar ek sal dit hier opsy sit. Hulle het wel tot 'n gevolgtrekking gekom. Die VSA het belowe om die verouderde missiele uit Turkye terug te trek, maar sou dit nie in die openbaar doen of die aanbod op skrif stel nie: dit was belangrik dat Chroesjtsjof sou kapituleer. 'N Interessante rede is aangebied en word aanvaar as redelik deur geleerdheid en kommentaar. Soos Dobbs dit stel: As dit blyk dat die Verenigde State die missielbasisse eensydig afbreek, onder druk van die Sowjetunie, kan die [NAVO] alliansie breek of 'n bietjie meer akkuraat herformuleer as die Die VSA het nuttelose missiele vervang met 'n baie meer dodelike bedreiging, soos reeds beplan, in 'n handel met Rusland wat enige rasionele man as baie regverdig sou beskou, dan kan die NAVO -alliansie breek.

As Rusland ongetwyfeld 'n afskrikmiddel teen 'n voortgesette Amerikaanse aanval en 'n ernstige bedreiging het om die direkte inval in die lug in te gaan en stilweg van die toneel af weg te gaan, sou die Kubane woedend wees ( dit was eintlik verstaanbaar). Maar dit is 'n onregverdige vergelyking om die standaardredes: ons is mense wat saak maak, terwyl hulle bloot mense is, om die nuttige sin van George Orwell aan te pas.

Kennedy het ook 'n informele belofte gemaak om Kuba nie binne te val nie, maar met voorwaardes: nie net die terugtrekking van die missiele nie, maar ook die beëindiging, of ten minste 'n groot vermindering, en#8221 van enige Russiese militêre teenwoordigheid. (Anders as Turkye, aan die grense van Rusland, waar niks van die aard bedink kan word nie.) As Kuba nie meer 'n gewapende kamp is nie, sal ons waarskynlik nie binnedring nie, en in die president ” #8217s woorde. Hy het bygevoeg dat Kuba, as hy hoop om vry te wees van die bedreiging van die Amerikaanse inval, sy politieke ondergrawing in Latyns -Amerika moet beëindig. “Political subversion” had been a constant theme for years, invoked for example when Eisenhower overthrew the parliamentary government of Guatemala and plunged that tortured country into an abyss from which it has yet to emerge. And these themes remained alive and well right through Ronald Reagan’s vicious terror wars in Central America in the 1980s. Cuba’s “political subversion” consisted of support for those resisting the murderous assaults of the U.S. and its client regimes, and sometimes even perhaps — horror of horrors — providing arms to the victims.

The usage is standard. Thus, in 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had outlined “three basic forms of aggression.” The first was armed attack across a border, that is, aggression as defined in international law. The second was “overt armed attack from within the area of each of the sovereign states,” as when guerrilla forces undertake armed resistance against a regime backed or imposed by Washington, though not of course when “freedom fighters” resist an official enemy. The third: “Aggression other than armed, i.e., political warfare, or subversion.” The primary example at the time was South Vietnam, where the United States was defending a free people from “internal aggression,” as Kennedy’s U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson explained — from “an assault from within” in the president’s words.

Though these assumptions are so deeply embedded in prevailing doctrine as to be virtually invisible, they are occasionally articulated in the internal record. In the case of Cuba, the State Department Policy Planning Council explained that “the primary danger we face in Castro is… in the impact the very existence of his regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American countries… The simple fact is that Castro represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half,” since the Monroe Doctrine announced Washington’s intention, then unrealizable, to dominate the Western hemisphere.

Not the Russians of that moment then, but rather the right to dominate, a leading principle of foreign policy found almost everywhere, though typically concealed in defensive terms: during the Cold War years, routinely by invoking the “Russian threat,” even when Russians were nowhere in sight. An example of great contemporary import is revealed in Iran scholar Ervand Abrahamian’s important upcoming book of the U.S.-U.K. coup that overthrew the parliamentary regime of Iran in 1953. With scrupulous examination of internal records, he shows convincingly that standard accounts cannot be sustained. The primary causes were not Cold War concerns, nor Iranian irrationality that undermined Washington’s “benign intentions,” nor even access to oil or profits, but rather the way the U.S. demand for “overall controls” — with its broader implications for global dominance — was threatened by independent nationalism.

That is what we discover over and over by investigating particular cases, including Cuba (not surprisingly) though the fanaticism in that particular case might merit examination. U.S. policy towards Cuba is harshly condemned throughout Latin America and indeed most of the world, but “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind” is understood to be meaningless rhetoric intoned mindlessly on July 4th. Ever since polls have been taken on the matter, a considerable majority of the U.S. population has favored normalization of relations with Cuba, but that too is insignificant.

Dismissal of public opinion is of course quite normal. What is interesting in this case is dismissal of powerful sectors of U.S. economic power, which also favor normalization, and are usually highly influential in setting policy: energy, agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, and others. That suggests that, in addition to the cultural factors revealed in the hysteria of the Camelot intellectuals, there is a powerful state interest involved in punishing Cubans.

Saving the World from the Threat of Nuclear Destruction

The missile crisis officially ended on October 28th. The outcome was not obscure. That evening, in a special CBS News broadcast, Charles Collingwood reported that the world had come out “from under the most terrible threat of nuclear holocaust since World War II” with a “humiliating defeat for Soviet policy.” Dobbs comments that the Russians tried to pretend that the outcome was “yet another triumph for Moscow’s peace-loving foreign policy over warmongering imperialists,” and that “[t]he supremely wise, always reasonable Soviet leadership had saved the world from the threat of nuclear destruction.”

Extricating the basic facts from the fashionable ridicule, Khrushchev’s agreement to capitulate had indeed “saved the world from the threat of nuclear destruction.”

The crisis, however, was not over. On November 8th, the Pentagon announced that all known Soviet missile bases had been dismantled. On the same day, Stern reports, “a sabotage team carried out an attack on a Cuban factory,” though Kennedy’s terror campaign, Operation Mongoose, had been formally curtailed at the peak of the crisis. The November 8th terror attack lends support to Bundy’s observation that the threat to peace was Cuba, not Turkey, where the Russians were not continuing a lethal assault — though that was certainly not what Bundy had in mind or could have understood.

More details are added by the highly respected scholar Raymond Garthoff, who also had rich experience within the government, in his careful 1987 account of the missile crisis. On November 8th, he writes, “a Cuban covert action sabotage team dispatched from the United States successfully blew up a Cuban industrial facility,” killing 400 workers according to a Cuban government letter to the U.N. Secretary General.

Garthoff comments: “The Soviets could only see [the attack] as an effort to backpedal on what was, for them, the key question remaining: American assurances not to attack Cuba,” particularly since the terrorist attack was launched from the U.S. These and other “third party actions” reveal again, he concludes, “that the risk and danger to both sides could have been extreme, and catastrophe not excluded.” Garthoff also reviews the murderous and destructive operations of Kennedy’s terrorist campaign, which we would certainly regard as more than ample justification for war, if the U.S. or its allies or clients were victims, not perpetrators.

From the same source we learn further that, on August 23, 1962, the president had issued National Security Memorandum No. 181, “a directive to engineer an internal revolt that would be followed by U.S. military intervention,” involving “significant U.S. military plans, maneuvers, and movement of forces and equipment” that were surely known to Cuba and Russia. Also in August, terrorist attacks were intensified, including speedboat strafing attacks on a Cuban seaside hotel “where Soviet military technicians were known to congregate, killing a score of Russians and Cubans” attacks on British and Cuban cargo ships the contamination of sugar shipments and other atrocities and sabotage, mostly carried out by Cuban exile organizations permitted to operate freely in Florida. Shortly after came “the most dangerous moment in human history,” not exactly out of the blue.

Kennedy officially renewed the terrorist operations after the crisis ebbed. Ten days before his assassination he approved a CIA plan for “destruction operations” by U.S. proxy forces “against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges, harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships.” A plot to assassinate Castro was apparently initiated on the day of the Kennedy assassination. The terrorist campaign was called off in 1965, but reports Garthoff, “one of Nixon’s first acts in office in 1969 was to direct the CIA to intensify covert operations against Cuba.”

We can, at last, hear the voices of the victims in Canadian historian Keith Bolender’s Voices From the Other Side, the first oral history of the terror campaign — one of many books unlikely to receive more than casual notice, if that, in the West because the contents are too revealing.

In the current issue of Political Science Quarterly, the professional journal of the association of American political scientists, Montague Kern observes that the Cuban missile crisis is one of those “full-bore crises… in which an ideological enemy (the Soviet Union) is universally perceived to have gone on the attack, leading to a rally-’round-the-flag effect that greatly expands support for a president, increasing his policy options.”

Kern is right that it is “universally perceived” that way, apart from those who have escaped sufficiently from the ideological shackles to pay some attention to the facts. Kern is, in fact, one of them. Another is Sheldon Stern, who recognizes what has long been known to such deviants. As he writes, we now know that “Khrushchev’s original explanation for shipping missiles to Cuba had been fundamentally true: the Soviet leader had never intended these weapons as a threat to the security of the United States, but rather considered their deployment a defensive move to protect his Cuban allies from American attacks and as a desperate effort to give the U.S.S.R. the appearance of equality in the nuclear balance of power.” Dobbs, too, recognizes that “Castro and his Soviet patrons had real reasons to fear American attempts at regime change, including, as a last resort, a U.S. invasion of Cuba… [Khrushchev] was also sincere in his desire to defend the Cuban revolution from the mighty neighbor to the north.”

The American attacks are often dismissed in U.S. commentary as silly pranks, CIA shenanigans that got out of hand. That is far from the truth. The best and the brightest had reacted to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion with near hysteria, including the president, who solemnly informed the country: “The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong… can possibly survive.” And they could only survive, he evidently believed, by massive terror — though that addendum was kept secret, and is still not known to loyalists who perceive the ideological enemy as having “gone on the attack” (the near universal perception, as Kern observes). After the Bay of Pigs defeat, historian Piero Gleijeses writes, JFK launched a crushing embargo to punish the Cubans for defeating a U.S.-run invasion, and “asked his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to lead the top-level interagency group that oversaw Operation Mongoose, a program of paramilitary operations, economic warfare, and sabotage he launched in late 1961 to visit the ‘terrors of the earth’ on Fidel Castro and, more prosaically, to topple him.”

The phrase “terrors of the earth” is Arthur Schlesinger’s, in his quasi-official biography of Robert Kennedy, who was assigned responsibility for conducting the terrorist war, and informed the CIA that the Cuban problem carries “[t]he top priority in the United States Government — all else is secondary — no time, no effort, or manpower is to be spared” in the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. The Mongoose operations were run by Edward Lansdale, who had ample experience in “counterinsurgency” — a standard term for terrorism that we direct. He provided a timetable leading to “open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime” in October 1962. The “final definition” of the program recognized that “final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention,” after terrorism and subversion had laid the basis. The implication is that U.S. military intervention would take place in October 1962 — when the missile crisis erupted. The events just reviewed help explain why Cuba and Russia had good reason to take such threats seriously.

Years later, Robert McNamara recognized that Cuba was justified in fearing an attack. “If I were in Cuban or Soviet shoes, I would have thought so, too,” he observed at a major conference on the missile crisis on the 40th anniversary.

As for Russia’s “desperate effort to give the U.S.S.R. the appearance of equality,” to which Stern refers, recall that Kennedy’s very narrow victory in the 1960 election relied heavily on a fabricated “missile gap” concocted to terrify the country and to condemn the Eisenhower administration as soft on national security. There was indeed a “missile gap,” but strongly in favor of the U.S.

The first “public, unequivocal administration statement” on the true facts, according to strategic analyst Desmond Ball in his authoritative study of the Kennedy missile program, was in October 1961, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric informed the Business Council that “the U.S. would have a larger nuclear delivery system left after a surprise attack than the nuclear force which the Soviet Union could employ in its first strike.” The Russians of course were well aware of their relative weakness and vulnerability. They were also aware of Kennedy’s reaction when Khrushchev offered to sharply reduce offensive military capacity and proceeded to do so unilaterally. The president failed to respond, undertaking instead a huge armaments program.

Owning the World, Then and Now

The two most crucial questions about the missile crisis are: How did it begin, and how did it end? It began with Kennedy’s terrorist attack against Cuba, with a threat of invasion in October 1962. It ended with the president’s rejection of Russian offers that would seem fair to a rational person, but were unthinkable because they would have undermined the fundamental principle that the U.S. has the unilateral right to deploy nuclear missiles anywhere, aimed at China or Russia or anyone else, and right on their borders and the accompanying principle that Cuba had no right to have missiles for defense against what appeared to be an imminent U.S. invasion. To establish these principles firmly it was entirely proper to face a high risk of war of unimaginable destruction, and to reject simple and admittedly fair ways to end the threat.

Garthoff observes that “in the United States, there was almost universal approbation for President Kennedy’s handling of the crisis.” Dobbs writes, “The relentlessly upbeat tone was established by the court historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who wrote that Kennedy had ‘dazzled the world’ through a ‘combination of toughness and restraint, of will, nerve and wisdom, so brilliantly controlled, so matchlessly calibrated.'” Rather more soberly, Stern partially agrees, noting that Kennedy repeatedly rejected the militant advice of his advisers and associates who called for military force and the dismissal of peaceful options. The events of October 1962 are widely hailed as Kennedy’s finest hour. Graham Allison joins many others in presenting them as “a guide for how to defuse conflicts, manage great-power relationships, and make sound decisions about foreign policy in general.”

In a very narrow sense, that judgment seems reasonable. The ExComm tapes reveal that the president stood apart from others, sometimes almost all others, in rejecting premature violence. There is, however, a further question: How should JFK’s relative moderation in the management of the crisis be evaluated against the background of the broader considerations just reviewed? But that question does not arise in a disciplined intellectual and moral culture, which accepts without question the basic principle that the U.S. effectively owns the world by right, and is by definition a force for good despite occasional errors and misunderstandings, one in which it is plainly entirely proper for the U.S. to deploy massive offensive force all over the world while it is an outrage for others (allies and clients apart) to make even the slightest gesture in that direction or even to think of deterring the threatened use of violence by the benign global hegemon.

That doctrine is the primary official charge against Iran today: it might pose a deterrent to U.S. and Israeli force. It was a consideration during the missile crisis as well. In internal discussion, the Kennedy brothers expressed their fears that Cuban missiles might deter a U.S. invasion of Venezuela, then under consideration. So “the Bay of Pigs was really right,” JFK concluded.

These principles still contribute to the constant risk of nuclear war. There has been no shortage of severe dangers since the missile crisis. Ten years later, during the 1973 Israel-Arab war, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger called a high-level nuclear alert (DEFCON 3) to warn the Russians to keep their hands off while he was secretly authorizing Israel to violate the cease-fire imposed by the U.S. and Russia. When Reagan came into office a few years later, the U.S. launched operations probing Russian defenses and simulating air and naval attacks, while placing Pershing missiles in Germany with a five-minute flight time to Russian targets, providing what the CIA called a “super-sudden first strike” capability. Naturally this caused great alarm in Russia, which unlike the U.S. has repeatedly been invaded and virtually destroyed. That led to a major war scare in 1983. There have been hundreds of cases when human intervention aborted a first strike minutes before launch, after automated systems gave false alarms. We don’t have Russian records, but there’s no doubt that their systems are far more accident-prone.

Meanwhile, India and Pakistan have come close to nuclear war several times, and the sources of the conflict remain. Both have refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, along with Israel, and have received U.S. support for development of their nuclear weapons programs — until today in the case of India, now a U.S. ally. War threats in the Middle East, which might become reality very soon, once again escalate the dangers.

In 1962, war was avoided by Khrushchev’s willingness to accept Kennedy’s hegemonic demands. But we can hardly count on such sanity forever. It’s a near miracle that nuclear war has so far been avoided. There is more reason than ever to attend to the warning of Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, almost 60 years ago, that we must face a choice that is “stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race or shall mankind renounce war?”


#6 US was preparing an invasion of Cuba just before the crisis was resolved

On the evening of October 22, President Kennedy informed the nation of the discovery of the nuclear missiles in Cuba and the US response of a naval blockade around Cuba in a nationwide televised address. On October 24, a crucial moment in the crisis arrived when Soviet ships neared the blockade but military confrontation was avoided. With the Soviet Union showing no inclination to back down, by October 26, US was in the early stages of preparing an invasion of Cuba and a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union presuming they would retaliate militarily to the Cuban invasion.


October 22, 1962 -- Cuban Missile Crisis

In a televised speech of extraordinary gravity, President John F. Kennedy announces that U.S. spy planes have discovered Soviet missile bases in Cuba. These missile sites—under construction but nearing completion—housed medium-range missiles capable of striking a number of major cities in the United States, including Washington, D.C. Kennedy announced that he was ordering a naval “quarantine” of Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from transporting any more offensive weapons to the island and explained that the United States would not tolerate the existence of the missile sites currently in place. The president made it clear that America would not stop short of military action to end what he called a “clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace.”

What is known as the Cuban Missile Crisis actually began on October 15, 1962—the day that U.S. intelligence personnel analyzing U-2 spy plane data discovered that the Soviets were building medium-range missile sites in Cuba. The next day, President Kennedy secretly convened an emergency meeting of his senior military, political, and diplomatic advisers to discuss the ominous development. The group became known as ExCom, short for Executive Committee. After rejecting a surgical air strike against the missile sites, ExCom decided on a naval quarantine and a demand that the bases be dismantled and missiles removed. On the night of October 22, Kennedy went on national television to announce his decision. During the next six days, the crisis escalated to a breaking point as the world tottered on the brink of nuclear war between the two superpowers.

On October 23, the quarantine of Cuba began, but Kennedy decided to give Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev more time to consider the U.S. action by pulling the quarantine line back 500 miles. By October 24, Soviet ships en route to Cuba capable of carrying military cargoes appeared to have slowed down, altered, or reversed their course as they approached the quarantine, with the exception of one ship—the tanker Bucharest. At the request of more than 40 nonaligned nations, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant sent private appeals to Kennedy and Khrushchev, urging that their governments “refrain from any action that may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war.” At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. military forces went to DEFCON 2, the highest military alert ever reached in the postwar era, as military commanders prepared for full-scale war with the Soviet Union.

On October 25, the aircraft carrier USS Essex and the destroyer USS Versnellingattempted to intercept the Soviet tanker Bucharest as it crossed over the U.S. quarantine of Cuba. The Soviet ship failed to cooperate, but the U.S. Navy restrained itself from forcibly seizing the ship, deeming it unlikely that the tanker was carrying offensive weapons. On October 26, Kennedy learned that work on the missile bases was proceeding without interruption, and ExCom considered authorizing a U.S. invasion of Cuba. The same day, the Soviets transmitted a proposal for ending the crisis: The missile bases would be removed in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.

The next day, however, Khrushchev upped the ante by publicly calling for the dismantling of U.S. missile bases in Turkey under pressure from Soviet military commanders. While Kennedy and his crisis advisers debated this dangerous turn in negotiations, a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, and its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed. To the dismay of the Pentagon, Kennedy forbid a military retaliation unless any more surveillance planes were fired upon over Cuba. To defuse the worsening crisis, Kennedy and his advisers agreed to dismantle the U.S. missile sites in Turkey but at a later date, in order to prevent the protest of Turkey, a key NATO member.

On October 28, Khrushchev announced his government’s intent to dismantle and remove all offensive Soviet weapons in Cuba. With the airing of the public message on Radio Moscow, the USSR confirmed its willingness to proceed with the solution secretly proposed by the Americans the day before. In the afternoon, Soviet technicians began dismantling the missile sites, and the world stepped back from the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was effectively over. In November, Kennedy called off the blockade, and by the end of the year all the offensive missiles had left Cuba. Soon after, the United States quietly removed its missiles from Turkey.


The True Story Behind ‘The Courier’

In November 1960, Greville Wynne, a 41-year-old British businessman, sat down for a lunch that would change his life. His dining companion, Dickie Franks, revealed himself to be an officer of the British Secret Intelligence Service, also known as MI6, and asked Wynne for his help. An industrial sales consultant who regularly traveled through Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union representing British electrical and steel companies, Wynne was told it would be helpful if on his next trip, he could arrange for a meeting with a state committee in Moscow dedicated to developing opportunities with foreigners in science and technology, and report back on his conversations. Despite having no previous experience in intelligence work, Wynne was being recruited to serve as an MI6 agent.

Wynne agreed, and during his visit to Moscow the following month he wound up connecting with Oleg Penkovsky, a lieutenant colonel in the GRU (the Soviet Union’s foreign-intelligence agency) who was eager to leak high-level military information to Western powers. Penkovsky felt stunted in his career with GRU and expected that by helping the West for a year or two, he and his family could be relocated and build a better life, and that he would personally be showered with recognition and honor. Wynne went along, slightly concerned about whether Penkovsky was on the level and concerned about putting himself into a dangerous situation, kicking off what would be one of the most productive clandestine operations in Cold War history. Penkovsky’s information, and Wynne’s help in delivering it to British and American intelligence officers, would produce mountains of material, play a role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and land both men in prison.

These events serve as the inspiration for Die koerier, the new film starring Benedict Cumberbatch as Wynne and Georgian actor Merab Ninidze as Penkovsky, out in theaters on March 19. The film’s screenwriter, Tom O’Connor, found Wynne’s story of a nobody suddenly becoming a somebody compelling. “He just was an ordinary man who got thrust into this just extraordinary, life-altering situation that was going to define his existence forever,” says O’Connor. “The burden of that is hard to imagine.”

But as he began researching Wynne’s story, he learned that this ordinary man could also tell some extraordinary lies. In the late 1960s, after he had been imprisoned for his spycraft and could no longer assist MI6 nor the CIA, the amateur spy authored a pair of books: The Man From Moscow: The Story of Wynne and Penkovsky en The Man From Odessa, that were riddled with falsehoods.

“[Wynne], bless him, for all his wonderful work, was a menace and a fabricator,” says Nigel West, who has written numerous books on British and American intelligence organizations, including two books specifically about fabricators in the intelligence arena. “He just couldn’t tell the truth. It was pathological with him.”

While its standard for Hollywood films to take liberties with the facts, insert composite characters, devise imagined conversations, and smooth-out timelines to ensure a brisk pace, it’s less common for a based-on-a-true-story movie to have to be more truthful than the source material.

O’Connor makes clear that Die koerier is “not a documentary,” even as he explains that he took pains to stick to the facts as much as they could be ascertained—drawing on works such as Jerrold L. Shecter and Peter S. Deriabin’s The Spy Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the Course of the Cold War and other accounts that could be trusted more than Wynne’s own inventions.

“There’s a fair amount of source material from all different kinds of authors, so by reading everybody—not just Wynne’s books, but other historians, and the official history put out by the American side and the Soviet side — I was able to try and work out what made the most sense and what seemed liked disinformation,” says O’Connor.

Even though Wynne wasn’t exactly a reliable narrator for what he did during his time as a secret agent, the materials he smuggled from behind the Iron Curtain were the real thing. After the initial meeting in December 1960, Penkovsky provided Wynne with film of Soviet military documents and later promised more information if an arrangement with British or American intelligence could be made. Wynne dutifully passed the images to his contacts with British intelligence, who established their legitimacy. Thus began their fruitful relationship, one that involved Wynne hosting Penkovsky in London, who was visiting under the pretense of cultivate new opportunities in the West. On this trip, Penkovsky submitted to hours of interviews with British and American intelligence officials about the Soviet Union’s military and political developments.

“Penkovsky’s dynamism and enthusiasm, his wide-ranging and passionate denunciations of the Soviet system and its leaders illustrated with anecdotes, fascinated and captivated the American and British teams,” write Schecter and Deriabin. “Never before had there been a Soviet spy like him.”

Wynne also enthusiastically embraced his role, enjoying the part of a daring secret agent where he could apply his salesman skills to a higher-stakes game. During their visits, Penkovsky and Wynne would get out on the town, visiting restaurants, nightclubs and shops under the cover of talking business, with each man proudly showing the other around his home country. They made an odd contrast—the short, energetic, and thinly mustachioed Wynne alongside the military bearing of Penkovsky—but there seemed to be genuine affection between the two, and this friendship is a central focus of Die koerier.

“These guys were in the foxhole together—they each had a secret that only the other man knew,” says O’Connor. “They were alone in the world with this incredible burden except for the other man.”

But the chummy interactions between the agents and Penkovsky’s prolific, even reckless, acquisition of materials grew increasingly perilous—and finally caught the KGB’s attention. After a meeting in Paris in September 1961, Penkovsky’s next trips were mysteriously cancelled at the last minute. When Wynne visited Moscow in July 1962, his hotel room and luggage were searched, and he was tailed during his travels.

On October 29 of that year, just hours after the Soviets stood down during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Wynne went to Soviet-occupied Budapest with a traveling exhibition of British industrial goods, against the advice of his MI6 handlers. Wynne would later relate that as he walked down the steps of an exhibition pavilion, four men suddenly appeared as a car pulled up and Wynne was pushed inside. He was flown to Moscow, imprisoned, and tried alongside Penkovsky, who it would later be learned had been arrested the week before Wynne entered Hungary.

“They had to go through a show trial, basically, so on the stand Wynne accused MI6 of using him as a dupe—he may have just been saying whatever he could say because he worried they might execute him,” says Jeremy Duns, an author of several spy novels set during the Cold War as well as the history book Codename: Hero: The True Story of Oleg Penkovsky and the Cold War’s Most Dangerous Operation.

For his treason, Penkovsky was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad days after the trial ended (though Wynne would later claim he died of suicide). Wynne, despite claiming ignorance of what materials he was smuggling to the West, was sentenced to eight years in prison. After months of negotiations, the British government was eventually able to arrange a trade of Wynne for the Soviet spy Gordon Lonsdale, who’d been arrested the year before and was serving a 25-year sentence in England.

In all, Penkovsky had provided Western intelligence with about 140 hours of interviews and 111 exposed rolls of film, contributing to some 10,000 pages of intelligence reports. The operation was “the most productive classic clandestine operation ever conducted by the CIA or MI6 against the Soviet target,” as Schecter and Deriabin put it, and key to its success was the mustachioed courier with no prior intelligence experience.

“Penkovsky gave a huge amount of details about what missiles the Soviets had, how old they were, how there were queues for food—it was an extremely vivid portrait of the country and the people within intelligence,” says Duns. “He was senior enough that you could sit down with the agents for hours and explain the entire context of how Soviet intelligence worked.”

Among the materials Penkovsky provided to Wynne were four photocopies of plans for construction sites of missile-launching installations in Cuba. This gave American officials a clearer picture of what the Soviets were doing in the region, bringing in medium-range ballistic missiles. It also helped Americans to understand how limited the Soviets’ capabilities actually were in the area, so as tensions grew during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy “knew how much rope he could give [Soviet Premier Nikita] Khrushchev,” as Duns puts it.

Upon release from prison, Wynne’s old life was in tatters—he’d lost much of his business and the time spent in the Soviet prison seemed to have caused long-term damage. Seeking ways to parlay the notoriety he received, he became what Duns calls a “rent-a-spokesperson for all kinds of espionage stuff,” making appearances in the media about anything related to spycraft, whether or not it was anything he had experience with. This led to the publication of his dubious memoirs. At the time, they were largely accepted at face value and sold well. The BBC produced a TV movie based on them. But over time, intelligence experts and those involved in the case, though reluctant to share sensitive information, cast doubt on much of what Wynne laid out in his books.

Wynne’s fabrications range from small to huge. In one of his biggest whoppers, Wynne explains that he and Penkovsky took a trip together in a private military jet from the U.K. to Washington, D.C. The two then visited the White House where President John F. Kennedy personally thanked them for their service—then the two returned to the U.K. just 18 hours later. Not only was this account widely denied shortly after publication by members of the CIA and Kennedy’s staff, but it would have been against the way espionage is run—keeping heads of state a safe distance from the details of intelligence work. To top it off, it would have been physically impossible at the time.

“In 1961, jet travel did not allow someone to fly from the U.K. to the U.S. and back again in 24 hours,” says West.

Why did Wynne make up so much, when the truths of his 18 months as a spy are already filled with astounding details? Among the explanations are a desire for money or fame, a ruinous case of alcoholism, or perhaps even psychological scars left by his time in Soviet prison or the shame he felt for publicly turning against British intelligence during the trial. West maintains that it’s the result of something all too typical in the intelligence community—what he calls “post-usefulness syndrome.”

“Imagine that I recruit you and I tell you that whatever you report to me, within an hour, it will be on the president’s desk. You, in your own mind, have developed this sense of self-importance,” says West. “Then after your service, when you haven’t even told your family or friends about this, you’re told, ‘thank you very much, indeed. Don’t call us, we’ll call you in a couple years.’ When Greville got out of prison, he was not prepared, as people obviously are not in those circumstances, to be ignored.”

When it came to writing the screenplay, O’Connor laments that the true story of Wynne’s experiences may never be known. Even the official accounts put out by American and Russian authorities regarding the Penkovsky affair include disinformation and spin that he, or any historian, has to navigate through.


Nadraai

Six Soviet missile transporters are loaded onto a ship at the Port of Casilda in Cuba, November 6, 1962

The Soviet Union began to dismantle the nuclear sites in Cuba within a day of the agreement. Fidel Castro—furious with Khrushchev’s decision to give in to American demands—refused to let in any U.N. inspectors to verify the removal of the missiles. The Soviets had to resort to loading missiles on ship decks and uncovering them at sea, where they could be photographed by American planes. The United States lifted the blockade on November 20 and removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey by April 1963. In the end, however, the removal of the missiles was a fairly meaningless gesture as the new Minuteman ICBMs had rendered the Jupiters obsolete.

"Let's get a lock for this thing!" Washington Post cartoon, November 1962

The shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a highly influential factor in the success of future arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as the ban on atmospheric testing. As Khrushchev affirmed only days after the end of the crisis, “We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water” (Hanhimaki and Westad 488). Less than a year later, the two superpowers signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which included the principles outlined by Khrushchev. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) followed in 1968.

Nevertheless, the years after the crisis also saw a massive increase in the construction of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. The Soviet stockpile tripled by the end of the decade and peaked at over 40,000 warheads during the 1980s. This phenomenon can be explained in part by the fact that Soviet leaders felt they had little choice but to capitulate during the crisis given the comparative weakness of their nuclear arsenal. As Soviet lieutenant general Nikolai Detinov explained, “Because of the strategic [imbalance] between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had to accept everything that the United States dictated to it and this had a painful effect on our country and our government…. All our economic resources were mobilized [afterward] to solve this problem” (Rhodes 94).

The crisis also prompted the creation of the Moscow-Washington hotline, a direct telephone link between the Kremlin and the White House designed to prevent future escalations. Kennedy also ordered the creation of the nuclear “football” which would give him and future presidents the means to order a nuclear strike within minutes.