Die Amerikaanse inval in Grenada

Die Amerikaanse inval in Grenada

Op 25 Oktober 1983, ses dae nadat premier Maurice Bishop tereggestel is deur die stalanistiese sekte van Bernard Coard, het die Amerikaanse weermag troepe op die strande van Grenada laat beland. aangevul deur ongeveer 300 militêre personeel van omliggende eilande, behoort die leser 'n bietjie te weet van die geskiedenis wat gelei het tot die konflik.Grenada, die beginjareGrenada is 'n klein eiland van 135 vierkante kilometer, met 'n bevolking van ongeveer 95,000. Dit is 'n golwende, bergagtige eiland wat bekend is vir sy geurige speserybome en ander produserende plante, waaronder neutmuskaat, naeltjies, gemmer, kaneel en koka. Die eerste kontak deur nie-inheemse mense was deur Christopher Columbus in 1498. Vincent, wat wou nie hul handelsroetes na die vasteland verloor nie. Die Britte het in 1783 weer beheer oor die eiland gekry en Grenada in 1877 tot 'n kroonkolonie gemaak.Tot die hedeUiteindelik, in 1974, word Grenada onafhanklik van Brittanje. Die nuwe regering, onder leiding van Sir Eric Gairy, het stadig na 'n totalitêre staat beweeg, wat 'n opstand veroorsaak het toe Gairy in Maart 1979 in die Verenigde Nasies was, het Maurice Bishop, 'n geliefde en opgevoede linkse, gelei 'n bloedlose staatsgreep om die beheer van die Grenadese regering oor te neem. Bishop's Marxistiese neigings het gelei tot bande met Kuba, Rusland en ander linkse lande.Bishop het Kubaanse ingenieurs na sy eiland genooi om 'n internasionale lughawe te bou om toerisme te verbeter. Dit word deur president Ronald Reagan beskou as 'n bedreiging vir die Verenigde State, omdat die landingsbaan gebruik kan word om 'n wapenkas op te bou en 'n militêre opbou in die Karibiese Eilande aan te dryf. minister en voormalige vriend, het gevoel dat Bishop nie ver genoeg na links opereer nie. Op 19 Oktober 1983 het Coard, gesteun deur sy eie weermag, die mag oorgeneem tydens 'n bloedige staatsgreep, toe tereggestel Biskop en lede van sy binnekring.Operasie Urgent FuryDie laaste poging om 'n Marxisties-Leninistiese regering in die Amerikaanse invloedsfeer te installeer, het lede van die Organisasie van Oos-Karibiese State so ontstel dat hulle 'n beroep op die VSA, Barbados en Jamaika gedoen het om in te gryp. Op die spel was nie net 'n stryd van ideologieë nie, maar ook 'n bedreiging vir ongeveer 1 000 mediese studente wat op die eiland woon, waarvan baie Amerikaners was. Terwyl die postuur in die Karibiese Eilande aan die gang was, het 'n vragmotorbom op 23 Oktober, half wêreldwyd in Beiroet, Libanon, dood en 241 Amerikaanse mariniers doodgemaak. Benewens die groot lewensverlies, was die voorval 'n groot verleentheid vir die Verenigde State. Die staatsgreep in Grenada het Reagan die kans gegee om 'n bietjie wraak te neem op anti-Amerikaanse regimes in die Karibiese Eilande en die res van die wêreld. Op 25 Oktober het die president 'n invalsmag gestuur, genaamd "Operasie Urgent Fury", om die eiland te bevry en die studente te red.Grenadaanse troepe het ongeveer 1200 getel, met ongeveer 800 Kubane (meestal konstruksiewerkers met handwapens) en 60 adviseurs van die Sowjet Unie, Noord -Korea, Oos -Duitsland, Bulgarye en Libië. Die klein kontingent word spoedig gekonfronteer deur 'n Amerikaanse mag onder leiding van ongeveer 7 300 man. inheemse Grenadane is vrygelaat, en 'n pro-Amerikaanse regering het die bewind oorgeneem.AfsluitingNet voor die inval het betogings teen die mure van die ovaalkantoor afgekom. Eerste minister Margaret Thatcher van die Verenigde Koninkryk het "in die sterkste terme" daarop aangedring dat "Grenada deel van die Britse Gemenebes was, en dat die Verenigde State geen sake inmeng nie." Reagan herinner later: "Sy was baie vasberade en het voortgegaan om aan te dring dat ons ons landings op Grenada kanselleer. Ek kon haar nie vertel dat dit reeds begin het nie. "Na die inval het Thatcher aan Reagan gesê:

"Hierdie aksie sal gesien word as ingryping deur 'n Westerse land in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van 'n klein onafhanklike nasie, hoe onaantreklik dit ook al is. Ek vra u om dit in ag te neem in die konteks van ons breër Oos-Wes-verhoudings en die feit dat ons sal in die komende dae aan ons parlement en mense die ligging van kruisraketten in hierdie land moet voorlê.

'N Onbevange Reagan sal later 'n grap maak dat Grenada binnegeval moet word omdat dit die grootste neutmuskaatprodusent ter wêreld is. 'U kan nie 'n eiervark sonder neutmuskaat maak nie,' merk hy op.


Die Amerikaanse inval in Grenada, 1983 - Howard Zinn

Historikus Howard Zinn se verslag van die Amerikaanse inval in die klein Karibiese eiland Grenada, oënskynlik om Amerikaanse burgers te 'beskerm', maar in werklikheid om Amerikaanse militêre en finansiële oorheersing oor die streek weer te laat geld.

In die herfs van 1982 stuur president Reagan Amerikaanse mariniers in 'n gevaarlike situasie in Libanon, waar 'n burgeroorlog woed, en weer die vereistes van die Wet op Oorlogsmagte ignoreer, soos die regering met Kambodja in die Mayaguez -aangeleentheid gedoen het. Die jaar daarna is meer as tweehonderd van die mariniers dood toe 'n bom deur terroriste in hul kaserne ontplof het.

Kort daarna, in Oktober 1983 (met 'n paar ontleders wat tot die gevolgtrekking gekom het dat dit 'n kloon was om aandag te skenk aan die ramp in Libanon), stuur Reagan Amerikaanse magte om die klein Karibiese eiland Grenada binne te val. Weer is die kongres in kennis gestel, maar nie geraadpleeg nie. Die redes wat die Amerikaanse volk vir hierdie inval (amptelik Operation Urgent Fury) genoem is, was dat 'n onlangse staatsgreep wat in Grenada plaasgevind het, Amerikaanse burgers (studente aan 'n mediese skool op die eiland) in gevaar gestel het en dat die Verenigde State ontvang het 'n dringende versoek van die Organisasie van Oos -Karibiese State om in te gryp.

'N Ongewone skerp artikel in die New York Times op 29 Oktober 1983 deur korrespondent Bernard Gwertzman het die redes gesloop:

Die formele versoek dat die VSA en ander vriendelike lande militêre hulp verleen, is verlede Sondag deur die Organisasie van Oos -Karibiese State op versoek van die Verenigde State gerig, wat bewys wil lewer dat daar versoek is om op te tree ingevolge die groepsverdrag . Die bewoording van die formele versoek is egter in Washington opgestel en deur spesiale Amerikaanse afgevaardigdes aan die Karibiese leiers oorgedra.

Sowel Kuba as Grenada het, toe hulle sien dat Amerikaanse skepe op pad is na Grenada, dringende boodskappe gestuur waarin belowe word dat Amerikaanse studente veilig is en dring daarop aan dat daar nie 'n inval plaasvind nie & hellip het erken dat daar geen neiging was om met die Grenadiese owerhede te probeer onderhandel nie en hellip & ldquo Ons het betyds daar aangekom, en die president het gesê. 'N Belangrike punt in die geskil is of die Amerikaners op die eiland in werklikheid so gevaarlik was dat hulle 'n inval sou regverdig. Geen amptenaar het vaste bewyse gelewer dat die Amerikaners mishandel word of dat hulle nie sou kon vertrek as hulle wou nie.

Die werklike rede vir die inval, het 'n hoë Amerikaanse amptenaar aan Gwertzman gesê, was dat die Verenigde State moes wys (vasbeslote om die gevoel van nederlaag in Viëtnam te oorkom) dat dit 'n werklik magtige nasie is: gebruik u dit nooit? & rdquo

Die verband tussen die Amerikaanse militêre ingryping en die bevordering van kapitalistiese ondernemings was nog altyd in die Karibiese Eilande besonder kras. Wat Grenada betref, het 'n artikel in die Wall Street Journal agt jaar na die militêre inval (29 Oktober 1991) gepraat van 'n belegging in banke en het opgemerk dat St. George & rsquos, die hoofstad van Grenada, met 7.500 mense, 118 buitelandse banke gehad het, een vir elke 64 inwoners. & ldquoSt. George & rsquos het die Casablanca van die Karibiese Eilande geword, 'n vinnig groeiende toevlugsoord vir geldwassery, belastingontduiking en verskillende finansiële bedrog en hellip.

Na 'n studie van verskeie Amerikaanse militêre ingrypings, het die politieke wetenskaplike Stephen Shalom (imperial Alibis) tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat mense in die binnegevalde lande gesterf het en dat hulle nie Amerikaanse burgers kan red nie, wat baie veiliger sou gewees het sonder Amerikaanse ingryping, maar sodat Washington dit duidelik kon maak het die Karibiese Eilande regeer en dat hy bereid was om geweld te onderneem om die wil daarvan af te dwing. & rdquo Hy vervolg:

Daar was gevalle waar Amerikaanse burgers werklik in gevaar was: byvoorbeeld die vier kerkvroue wat in 1980 in El Salvador deur die regering geborg is. Maar daar was geen Amerikaanse ingryping nie, geen mariene landings, geen beskermende bombardemente nie. . In plaas daarvan ondersteun Washington die regime van die doodsgroep met militêre en ekonomiese hulp, militêre opleiding, intelligensie -deelname en diplomatieke ondersteuning. Die verhaal in Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala en Suidoos -Asië was tragies soortgelyk.


Hierdie artikel is geneem uit Howard Zinn & rsquos uitstekende A People's History of the United States. Ons beveel u ten sterkste aan om A People's History of the United States nou te koop. OCR geskryf deur Linda Towlson en liggies geredigeer deur libcom - spelling van die VSA na die Verenigde Koninkryk, bykomende besonderhede, verduidelikings en skakels bygevoeg .


Grenada, Amerikaanse ingryping in

Grenada, Amerikaanse ingryping in (1983) .Grenada trek die eerste keer die militêre belang van die Verenigde State in 1979. 'n Marxistiese ‐Leninistiese staatsgreep daardie jaar, onder leiding van Maurice Bishop en die New Jewel -beweging, het die regering omvergewerp, die kommuniste het ook begin met die bou van 'n 9.800 voetstrook . 'N Tweede en meer gewelddadige staatsgreep in 1983 het Bishop en meer as 100 ander Grenadiane dood en adjunk -premier Bernard Coard en genl Hudson Austin in beheer. In reaksie op hierdie geweld en wanorde het die goewerneur -generaal van Grenada, sir Paul Scoon, heimlik die Organisasie van Oos -Karibiese State (OECS) om hulp gevra om die orde te herstel. Die OECS het op sy beurt hulp van die Verenigde State versoek.

Vir die sterk anti -#Kommunistiese Amerikaanse president, Ronald Reagan, was die moontlikheid van 'n Sowjet -kliënt op so 'n strategiese plek onaanvaarbaar. Die vliegveld word beskou as 'n bedreiging vir lewensbelangrike Karibiese seilane en die Panamakanaal, en dit kon gebruik gewees het vir die opstel van Kubaanse en Sowjet -militêre vlugte na Afrika en Nicaragua. Amerikaanse amptenare het ook hul kommer uitgespreek oor die veiligheid van ongeveer 1 000 Amerikaners, meestal mediese studente, wat in Grenada woon. Die dag nadat Bishop vermoor is, is 'n taakmag van die Amerikaanse vloot, saam met mariniers, na Grenada beveel.

Amerikaanse militêre ingryping in Grenada in 1983, met die kode ‐naam “Urgent Fury, ” is inderhaas beplan, maar oorweldigend. Die invalmag het die Onafhanklikheid Carrier Battle Group die helikopterdraer Guam en Amfibiese eskader Vier 1700 mariniers van die 22ste Marine Amfibiese eenheid twee weermagwagters bataljons 'n gereed brigade van die 82ste lugafdeling verskillende spesiale operasie -eenhede en tekenmagte van die OECS. Dit het geblyk dat die eiland slegs deur ongeveer 500 tot 600 Grenadiese troepe verdedig is, 2 000 tot 2 500 milisieërs en 750 tot 800 Kubane, meestal militêre konstruksiewerkers.

William C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and Documentation, 1984.
Paul Seabury en Walter A. McDougall, reds., The Grenada Papers, 1984.


Die Amerikaanse inval in Grenada, 1983 - Howard Zinn

Historikus Howard Zinn se verslag oor die Amerikaanse inval in die klein Karibiese eiland Grenada, oënskynlik om Amerikaanse burgers te 'beskerm', maar in werklikheid om Amerikaanse militêre en finansiële oorheersing oor die streek weer te laat geld.

In die herfs van 1982 stuur president Reagan Amerikaanse mariniers in 'n gevaarlike situasie in Libanon, waar 'n burgeroorlog woed, en weer die vereistes van die Wet op Oorlogsmagte ignoreer, soos die regering met Kambodja in die Mayaguez -aangeleentheid gedoen het. Die jaar daarna is meer as tweehonderd van die mariniers dood toe 'n bom deur terroriste in hul kaserne ontplof het.

Kort daarna, in Oktober 1983 (met sommige ontleders wat tot die gevolgtrekking gekom het dat dit 'n kloon was om aandag te skenk aan die Libanon -ramp), het Reagan Amerikaanse magte gestuur om die klein Karibiese eiland Grenada binne te val. Weer is die kongres in kennis gestel, maar nie geraadpleeg nie. Die redes wat die Amerikaanse volk vir hierdie inval (amptelik Operation Urgent Fury) genoem is, was dat 'n onlangse staatsgreep wat in Grenada plaasgevind het, Amerikaanse burgers (studente aan 'n mediese skool op die eiland) in gevaar gestel het en dat die Verenigde State ontvang het 'n dringende versoek van die Organisasie van Oos -Karibiese State om in te gryp.

'N Ongewone skerp artikel in die New York Times op 29 Oktober 1983 deur korrespondent Bernard Gwertzman het die redes gesloop:

Die formele versoek dat die VSA en ander vriendelike lande militêre hulp verleen, is verlede Sondag deur die Organisasie van Oos -Karibiese State op versoek van die Verenigde State gerig, wat bewys wil lewer dat daar versoek is om op te tree ingevolge die groepsverdrag . Die bewoording van die formele versoek is egter in Washington opgestel en deur spesiale Amerikaanse afgevaardigdes aan die Karibiese leiers oorgedra.

Beide Kuba en Grenada het, toe hulle sien dat Amerikaanse skepe op pad is na Grenada, dringende boodskappe gestuur waarin belowe word dat Amerikaanse studente veilig is en dring daarop aan dat 'n inval nie plaasvind nie en hellip het erken dat daar geen neiging was om met die Grenadese owerhede te probeer onderhandel nie en hellip & ldquo Ons het betyds daar aangekom, en die president het gesê. 'N Belangrike punt in die geskil is of die Amerikaners op die eiland in werklikheid so gevaarlik was dat hulle 'n inval sou regverdig. Geen amptenaar het vaste bewyse gelewer dat die Amerikaners mishandel word of dat hulle nie sou kon vertrek as hulle wou nie.

Die werklike rede vir die inval, het 'n hoë Amerikaanse amptenaar aan Gwertzman gesê, was dat die Verenigde State moes wys (vasbeslote om die gevoel van nederlaag in Viëtnam te oorkom) dat dit 'n werklik magtige nasie is: gebruik u dit nooit? & rdquo

Die verband tussen die Amerikaanse militêre ingryping en die bevordering van kapitalistiese ondernemings was nog altyd in die Karibiese Eilande besonder kras. Wat Grenada betref, het 'n artikel in die Wall Street Journal agt jaar na die militêre inval (29 Oktober 1991) gepraat van 'n belegging in banke en het opgemerk dat St. George & rsquos, die hoofstad van Grenada, met 7.500 mense, 118 buitelandse banke gehad het, een vir elke 64 inwoners. & ldquoSt. George & rsquos het die Casablanca van die Karibiese Eilande geword, 'n vinnig groeiende toevlugsoord vir geldwassery, belastingontduiking en verskillende finansiële bedrog en hellip.

Na 'n studie van verskeie Amerikaanse militêre ingrypings, het die politieke wetenskaplike Stephen Shalom (imperial Alibis) tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat mense in die binnegevalde lande gesterf het en dat hulle nie Amerikaanse burgers sou red nie, wat baie veiliger sou gewees het sonder Amerikaanse ingryping, maar sodat Washington dit duidelik kon maak het die Karibiese Eilande regeer en dat hy bereid was om geweld te onderneem om die wil daarvan af te dwing. & rdquo Hy vervolg:

Daar was gevalle waar Amerikaanse burgers werklik in gevaar was: byvoorbeeld die vier kerkvroue wat in 1980 in El Salvador deur die regering geborg is. Maar daar was geen Amerikaanse ingryping nie, geen mariene landings, geen beskermende bombardemente nie. . In plaas daarvan ondersteun Washington die regime van die doodsgroep met militêre en ekonomiese hulp, militêre opleiding, intelligensie -deelname en diplomatieke ondersteuning. Die verhaal in Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala en Suidoos -Asië was tragies soortgelyk.


Hierdie artikel is geneem uit Howard Zinn & rsquos uitstekende A People's History of the United States. Ons beveel u aan om A People's History of the United States nou te koop. OCR geskryf deur Linda Towlson en liggies geredigeer deur libcom - spelling van die VSA na die Verenigde Koninkryk, bykomende besonderhede, verduidelikings en skakels bygevoeg .


Die inval en nagevolge

Dit was Scoon en die Organisasie van Oos -Karibiese State (OECS) wat dekking gegee het vir die Verenigde State om binne te val, beide versoek die inval deur geheime diplomatieke kanale. Toe die magte op 25 Oktober in Operasie Urgent Fury beland, het die Verenigde State verklaar dat dit op versoek van onderskeidelik Tom Adams en Eugenia Charles, die eerste ministers van Barbados en Dominica, gedoen is. Oor 'n paar dae het ongeveer 7000 Amerikaanse troepe en 300 ander van die Organisasie van Amerikaanse State (OAS) geveg met ongeveer 1500 Grenadese soldate en ongeveer 700 gewapende Kubaanse onderdane wat verdedigende posisies ingeneem het. Sommige van die Amerikaanse magte wou Amerikaanse studente "red" op die mediese kampus van die St. George's University op die eiland, wat 'n belangrike komponent van Amerikaanse binnelandse propaganda sou word om die imperialistiese aanval te regverdig.

Teen die tyd dat die geveg verby was, het die Amerikaanse militêre superioriteit geseëvier, en slegs 19 Amerikaanse magte is dood. Kubaanse en Grenadiese magte het groter slagoffers gely, net soos burgerlikes, waaronder 18 wat dood is tydens die 'toevallige' bomaanval op 'n geesteshospitaal.

Die Amerikaanse regering verdedig die inval: dit was 'n aksie wat geneem is om Amerikaanse burgers wat op die eiland woon, te beskerm, veral die mediese studente. Die OAS -handves, het die Amerikaanse staatsdepartement aangevoer, verwys na situasies "wat die vrede in gevaar kan stel" en die OAS en die Verenigde Nasies se handves "erken die bevoegdheid van plaaslike veiligheidsliggame om streeksvrede en stabiliteit te verseker." Volgens die Amerikaanse imperialisme het die OCES die invasie goedgekeur, die Verenigde State van enige oortreding bevry.

Dit was natuurlik alles 'n leuen. Die VN-handves verbied die gebruik van geweld deur lidlande, behalwe in gevalle van selfverdediging of wanneer dit spesifiek deur die VN se Veiligheidsraad goedgekeur word, wat nie een van die twee van toepassing was nie. Die Algemene Vergadering van die VN veroordeel die inval as '' 'n flagrante oortreding van die internasionale reg '', en die Veiligheidsraad het 'n soortgelyke resolusie wat die Verenigde State dan veto gelê het, oorweldigend aanvaar.

Die siniese regverdiging dat die inval die mediese studente beskerm het, het grootliks in die Verenigde State gewerk. Hulle skool was naby die Kubaanse boubaan wat die Verenigde State beweer het dat dit vir militêre doeleindes was en nie vir 'n internasionale lughawe nie. soos Amerikaanse diplomate in Iran vier jaar tevore was. Die meeste Demokrate het byvoorbeeld opgestel agter die speaker van die Reagan Administration House Tip O'Neill, byvoorbeeld, het sy standpunt verander na 'n steunpunt. Die enkele uitsonderings was die Congressional Black Caucus en 'n klein groepie van sewe Demokratiese kongreslede wat 'n onsuksesvolle besluit ingedien het om Reagan te beskuldig.

Die Amerikaanse aanval op Grenada was daarop gemik om 'n bourgeois-nasionalistiese regering te herstel wat die imperialisme sou doen. Die Amerikaanse en Karibiese regerings het presies dit gedoen en Scoon vinnig weer geïnstalleer as koningin Elizabeth se enigste verteenwoordiger in Grenada, met volle gesag. Hy organiseer noukeurig georkestreerde nuwe verkiesings wat in Desember 1984 'n nuwe pro-imperialistiese premier, Herbert Blaize, aan bewind gebring het.


  • 1974: Grenada word onafhanklik van Groot -Brittanje en word lid van die Statebond
  • 1979: Maurice Bishop neem die regering oor tydens 'n staatsgreep en vorm die People's Revolutionary Government
  • Maart 1983: President Reagan waarsku dat die lughawe in Grenada, wat tans in aanbou is, as 'n Sowjet-Kubaanse lugbasis gebruik kan word, en 'n duidelike bedreiging vir die VSA inhou

Grenada is in 'n onstabiele toestand met (politieke) geweld en gerig op sosialisme.


13 Maart 1979: Die Grenada -rewolusie

Op 13 Maart 1979 is die premier van Grenada, Eric Gairy, uitgestoot tydens 'n staatsgreep wat deur die New Jewel Movement gereël is en gelei is deur Maurice Bishop. Bishop is aangestel as premier van die nuutgestigte People's Revolutionary Government. Bill Bigelow beskryf in Grenada: 'A Lovely Little War':

In 1979 het die sosialistiese New Jewel Movement die korrupte en ongewilde diktator Eric Gairy in 'n byna bloedlose staatsgreep omvergewerp. Gairy regeer jare lank uit vrees. Sy geheime polisie, die 'Mongoose Gang', is verskaf deur die Amerikaanse gesteunde Pinochet-diktatuur in Chili. Die revolusie wat deur die New Jewel Movement geloods is - die 'Revo', soos dit met liefde genoem is - was baie gewild.

Teen 1982, toe ek die eiland die eerste keer besoek het, was 'n geletterdheidsveldtog aan die gang, nuwe skole is gebou en werklose jeugdiges op die platteland het baat by nuwe landboukoöperasies. Grenada het Kubaanse hulp verwelkom: onderwysers, gesondheidswerkers en konstruksiewerkers op die nuwe internasionale lughawe wat daarop gemik was om die verouderde en gevaarlike vliegveld in die berge te vervang.

In net vier jaar is die werkloosheid van 49 persent tot 14 persent verminder. In plaas daarvan om sigarette en drank te adverteer, het kleurvolle advertensieborde op die hele eiland onderwys bevorder: "Elkeen leer een", "As jy weet, leer as jy nie leer nie," en "Onderwys is ook produksie."

Hieronder vind u hulpbronne vir onderrig oor die Grenada -rewolusie, insluitend 'n videogreep van Bishop wat aan die Hunter College in New York praat oor hoe en waarom die staatsdepartement Grenada as 'n bedreiging voorgestel het. Die snit word gevolg deur 'n dokumentêr oor die vordering van die rewolusie in Grenada.


/> KUBANSE EN VSA INVASIE VAN GRENADA. (Video's/foto's)

The Invasion of Grenada, met die kodenaam Operation ‘Urgent Fury ’, was 'n 1983-Amerikaanse inval in Grenada, 'n eiland in die Karibiese Eilande met 'n bevolking van net meer as 100,000, 160 myl noord van Venezuela. Dit is veroorsaak deur 'n militêre staatsgreep wat 'n kort revolusionêre regering afgedank het.

Die suksesvolle inval het gelei tot 'n regeringswisseling, maar was omstrede weens die aanklagte van Amerikaanse imperialisme, politiek van die Koue Oorlog, die betrokkenheid van Kuba, die onstabiele toestand van die Grenadiese regering en die status van Grenada as 'n Statebond met Elizabeth II as die monarg. Grenada het in 1974 onafhanklikheid van die Verenigde Koninkryk verkry, en linkse rebelle het die bewind in 1979 oorgeneem. 'n mag van ongeveer 7 600 troepe uit die Verenigde State, Jamaika en lede van die Regional Security System (RSS) het die Grenadiese verset verslaan en die militêre regering van Hudson Austin is afgedank. Burgerlike sterftes sluit alle inwoners van die eiland se enigste geesteshospitaal in.

Die biskopregering het met die hulp van Brittanje, Kuba, Libië, Algerië en ander nasies begin bou. Die lughawe is die eerste keer deur die Britse regering in 1954 voorgestel, toe Grenada nog 'n Britse kolonie was. Dit is ontwerp deur Kanadese, onderskryf deur die Britse regering, en deels gebou deur 'n Londense firma. Die Amerikaanse regering beskuldig Grenada van die oprigting van fasiliteite om 'n Sowjet-Kubaanse militêre opbou in die Karibiese Eilande te help, en om die Sowjet- en Kubaanse vervoer van wapens na Sentraal-Amerikaanse opstandelinge te help. Die regering van die biskop beweer dat die lughawe gebou is om kommersiële vliegtuie met toeriste te huisves, en daarop gewys dat sulke stralers nie op die bestaande lughawe in die noorde van die eiland kan beland nie. Die bestaande lughawe, self, kon ook nie uitgebrei word namate die aanloopbaan teen 'n berg loop nie.

In Maart 1983 begin Ronald Reagan waarskuwings uitreik oor die bedreiging wat die Verenigde State en die Karibiese Eilande inhou deur die “Soviet-Kubaanse militarisering ”, soos blyk uit die buitensporige lang aanloopbaan van die vliegtuig sowel as intelligensiebronne. Hy het gesê dat die aanloopbaan en die tenk vir olieopslag onnodig was vir kommersiële gebruik, en dat bewyse daarop dui dat die lughawe 'n Kubaanse-Sowjet-militêre vliegbasis sou word. Ons het 'n geheime ingryping in Grenada geken/ingelig van 'n spesiale mag onder leiding van die Kubaanse generaal Ochoa (nog 'n paar maande voor 'n brandweer as verraaier) en 'n harde kern van bewese eersteklas kaders van Castro ’s ’s 8220 internasionale vegters ”. Dit is ook in die geheim geneem van die eiland af, dit is deur die Kubaanse regering bekend van die naderende Amerikaanse ingryping.

Amerikaanse ingryping ..

Die inval, wat op 25 Oktober 1983 om 05:00 begin het, was die eerste groot operasie wat die Amerikaanse weermag sedert die Viëtnam -oorlog uitgevoer het. [Verwysing benodig] vise -admiraal Joseph Metcalf, III, bevelvoerder Tweede Vloot, was die algemene bevelvoerder van die VSA magte, aangewese Joint Task Force 120, wat elemente van elke militêre diens en verskeie spesiale operasie -eenhede ingesluit het. Die geveg het etlike dae voortgeduur en die totale aantal Amerikaanse troepe het ongeveer 7 000 bereik, saam met 300 troepe van die OECS. Die indringende magte het ongeveer 1 500 Grenadese soldate en ongeveer 700 Kubane teëgekom. Ook was daar 60 adviseurs uit die Sowjetunie, Noord -Korea, Oos -Duitsland, Bulgarye en Libië teenwoordig. Volgens joernalis Bob Woodward in sy boek Veil was die vermeende gevange militêre adviseurs van die voormelde lande eintlik geakkrediteerde diplomate en ingesluit hul afhanklikes. Nie een het werklik aan die geveg deelgeneem nie. Sommige van die “ -konstruksiewerkers ” was eintlik 'n afdeling van die Kubaanse militêre spesiale magte en gevegsingenieurs.

Amptelike Amerikaanse bronne verklaar dat die verdedigers goed voorbereid, goed geposisioneer en hardnekkige weerstand was, in die mate dat die VSA op die aand van 26 Oktober twee bataljons versterkings ingeroep het. Die totale vloot- en lug superioriteit van die koalisiemagte - insluitend helikoptergeweerskepe en ondersteuning van die skote - het die plaaslike magte oorweldig. Byna agtduisend soldate, matrose, vlieëniers en mariniers het saam met 353 Karibiese bondgenote van die GPF aan DRINGENDE FURY deelgeneem. U.S. forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded Cuban forces sustained 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 combatants captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358 wounded at least 24 civilians.

The Cuban government sent these troops there to support the leftist government of the country. In 2008 the government of Grenada announced a move to build a monument to honor the Cubans killed during the invasion. At the time of the announcement the Cuban and Grenadian government are still seeking to locate a suitable site for the monument.

While the invasion enjoyed broad public support in the United States,and received support from some sectors in Grenada from local groups who viewed the post-coup regime as illegitimate, it was criticized by the United Kingdom, Canada and the United Nations General Assembly, which condemned it as “a flagrant violation of international law”.25 October is a national holiday in Grenada, called Thanksgiving Day, to commemorate the invasion, and on 29 May 2009 the was officially renamed in honor of the slain pre-coup leader Maurice Bishop by the Government of Grenada.


/>Cuban and US Invasion of Grenada

The called or code named Operation ‘Urgent Fury’, was a 1983 US-led, a Caribbean island nation with a population of just over 100,000 located 100 miles (160 km) north of Venezuela. It was triggered by a military coup which ousted a brief revolutionary government. The successful invasion led to a change of government but was controversial due to charges of American imperialism, Cold War politics, the involvement of Cuba, the unstable state of the Grenadian government, and Grenada’s status as a Commonwealth realm with Elizabeth II as the monarch.

Grenada gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1974, and Leftist rebels seized power in a coup in 1979. After a 1983 internal power struggle ended with the deposition and murder of revolutionary Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, the invasion began on 25 October 1983. A combined force of about 7,600 troops from the United States, Jamaica, and members of the Regional Security System (RSS) defeated Grenadian resistance and the military government of Hudson Austin was deposed. Civilian deaths include all the residents of the island’s only Mental Hospital.

The Bishop government began constructing the Point Salines International Airport with the help of Britain, Cuba, Libya, Algeria, and other nations. The airport had been first proposed by the British government in 1954, when Grenada was still a British colony. It had been designed by Canadians, underwritten by the British government, and partly built by a London firm. The U.S. government accused Grenada of constructing facilities to aid a Soviet-Cuban military build-up in the Caribbean, and to assist the Soviet and Cuban transportation of weapons to Central American insurgents. Bishop’s government claimed that the airport was built to accommodate commercial aircraft carrying tourists, pointing out that such jets could not land at the existing airport on the island’s north. Neither could the existing airport, itself, be expanded as its runway abutted a mountain.

In March 1983, Ronald Reagan began issuing warnings about the threat posed to the United States and the Caribbean by the “Soviet-Cuban militarization” as evidenced by the excessively long airplane runway being built as well as intelligence sources. He said that the 9,000-foot (2,700 m) runway and the oil storage tanks were unnecessary for commercial , and that evidence pointed that the airport was to become a Cuban-Soviet military airbase.

CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES

The invasion, which commenced at 05:00 on 25 October 1983, was the first major operation conducted by the U.S. military since the Vietnam War.[citation needed] Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, Commander Second Fleet, was the overall commander of U.S. forces, designated Joint Task Force 120, which included elements of each military service and multiple special operations units. Fighting continued for several days and the total number of U.S. troops reached some 7,000 along with 300 troops from the OECS. The invading forces encountered about 1,500 Grenadian soldiers and about 700 Cubans. Also present were 60 advisors from the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Libya.According to journalist Bob Woodward in his book Veil, the supposed captured “military advisers” from the aforementioned countries were actually accredited diplomats and included their dependents. None took any actual part in the fighting. Some of the “construction workers” were actually a detachment of Cuban Military Special Forces and combat engineers.

Official U.S. sources state that the defenders were well-prepared, well-positioned and put up stubborn resistance, to the extent that the U.S. called in two battalions of reinforcements on the evening of 26 October. The total naval and air superiority of the coalition forces – including helicopter gunships and naval gunfire support – overwhelmed the local forces. Nearly eight thousand soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines had participated in URGENT FURY along with 353 Caribbean allies of the CPF. U.S. forces had sustained 19 killed and 116 wounded Cuban forces sustained 25 killed, 59 wounded and 638 combatants captured. Grenadian forces casualties were 45 killed and 358 wounded at least 24 civilians.

The Cuban government sent these troops there to support the leftist government of the country. In 2008 the government of Grenada announced a move to build a monument to honor the Cubans killed during the invasion. At the time of the announcement the Cuban and Grenadian government are still seeking to locate a suitable site for the monument.

While the invasion enjoyed broad public support in the United States,and received support from some sectors in Grenada from local groups who viewed the post-coup regime as illegitimate, it was criticized by the United Kingdom, Canada and the United Nations General Assembly, which condemned it as “a flagrant violation of international law”.25 October is a national holiday in Grenada, called Thanksgiving Day, to commemorate the invasion, and on 29 May 2009 the Point Salines International Airport was officially renamed in honor of the slain pre-coup leader Maurice Bishop by the Government of Grenada.

Sources: Wiki/CubanWars/InternetPhotos/TheCubanHistory.com
Invasion of Grenada/ The Cuban History/ Arnoldo Varona, Editor

LA INVASION DE GRENADA

La operación llamada o nombre en clave,’Furia Urgente’ fue un 1983 liderada por Estados Unidos a una nación insular del Caribe con una población de poco más de 100.000 situado a 100 millas (160 km) al norte de Venezuela, Grenada.

Provocada por un golpe militar que derrocó a un gobierno revolucionario breve. El éxito de la invasión condujo a un cambio de gobierno, pero fue polémico debido a las acusaciones de imperialismo estadounidense, la política de la Guerra Fría, la participación de Cuba, el estado inestable del gobierno de Granada, y el estado de Granada como un reino de la Commonwealth, con Isabel II como el monarca. Granada, obtuvo su independencia del Reino Unido en 1974, y los rebeldes de izquierda tomó el poder en un golpe de estado en 1979. Después de una lucha de poder interna de 1983 terminó con la deposición y el asesinato del revolucionario Primer Ministro Maurice Bishop, la invasión comenzó el 25 de octubre de 1983. Una fuerza combinada de cerca de 7.600 tropas de los Estados Unidos, Jamaica, y los miembros del Sistema de Seguridad Regional (RSS) derrotó a la resistencia granadina y el gobierno militar de Hudson Austin fue depuesto. Las muertes de civiles son todos los residentes de el único Hospital Mental de la isla.

El gobierno de Bishop empezaron a construir el aeropuerto internacional de Point Salines, con la ayuda de Gran Bretaña, Cuba, Libia, Argelia y otros países. El aeropuerto había sido propuesto por primera vez por el gobierno británico en 1954, cuando Granada era todavía una colonia británica. Había sido diseñado por los canadienses, suscrito por el gobierno británico, y en parte construida por una firma de Londres. El gobierno de EE.UU. acusó a Granada de la construcción de instalaciones para ayudar a un cubano-soviética fortalecimiento militar en el Caribe, y para ayudar al transporte soviético y cubano de armas a los insurgentes de América central. El gobierno del obispo afirmó que el aeropuerto fue construido para alojar a los turistas de aviones comerciales que transportan, señalando que estos chorros no pudo aterrizar en el aeropuerto existente en el norte de la isla. Tampoco pudo el aeropuerto existente, en sí, se amplió su pista de aterrizaje como tope de una montaña.

En marzo de 1983, Ronald Reagan comenzó a emitir advertencias sobre la amenaza que plantea a los Estados Unidos y el Caribe por la “militarización soviético-cubana”, como lo demuestra la pista de aterrizaje excesivamente largo se está construyendo, así como las fuentes de inteligencia. Dijo que la pista de 9.000 pies (2.700 m) y los tanques de almacenamiento de petróleo eran innecesarios para fines comerciales, y que la evidencia señala que el aeropuerto se convertiría en un militar cubano-soviética base aérea.

CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES

Intervención de EE.UU. ..

La invasión, que comenzó a las 05:00 el 25 de octubre de 1983, fue la primera gran operación llevada a cabo por los militares de EE.UU. desde la Guerra de Vietnam. [Cita requerida] El vicealmirante Joseph Metcalf III, comandante de la Flota En segundo lugar, era el comandante general de los EE.UU. fuerzas, de la Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta designado 120, que incluía elementos de cada servicio militar y varias unidades de operaciones especiales. La lucha continuó durante varios días y el número total de tropas de Estados Unidos llegó a unos 7.000, junto con 300 tropas de la OECS. Las fuerzas invasoras encontraron unos 1.500 soldados granadinos y cubanos alrededor de 700. También estuvieron presentes los 60 consejeros de la Unión Soviética, Corea del Norte, Alemania Oriental, Bulgaria y Libya.

According al periodista Bob Woodward en su libro Veil, los supuestos “asesores militares capturados” de los países antes mencionados fueron en realidad los diplomáticos acreditados e incluyó a su cargo . Ninguno tuvo una parte real en la lucha. Algunos de los “trabajadores de la construcción” eran en realidad un destacamento de fuerzas militares cubanas especiales e ingenieros de combate.

Oficial de Estado de EE.UU. de fuentes que los defensores estaban bien preparados, bien posicionada y ofrecieron una resistencia tenaz, en la medida en que los EE.UU. llamó a dos batallones de refuerzos en la noche del 26 de octubre. La superioridad naval total y el aire de las fuerzas de la coalición, incluyendo helicópteros de combate y apoyo de fuego naval – abrumado a las fuerzas locales. Casi ocho mil soldados, marineros, aviadores e infantes de marina habían participado en FURIA URGENTE junto con 353 aliados del Caribe de la ACB. Las fuerzas estadounidenses habían sufrido 19 muertos y los heridos 116 fuerzas cubanas sufrió 25 muertos, 59 combatientes heridos y 638 capturados. Bajas fuerzas de Granada fueron 45 muertos y heridos 358, por lo menos 24 civiles.

El gobierno cubano ha enviado estas tropas allí para apoyar al gobierno de izquierda del país. En 2008 el gobierno de Granada anunció un movimiento para construir un monumento para honrar a los cubanos muertos durante la invasión. En el momento del anuncio del gobierno de Cuba y Granada se sigue tratando de localizar un lugar adecuado para el monumento.

Mientras que la invasión contó con el apoyo del público en general en los Estados Unidos, y recibió el apoyo de algunos sectores en Granada de los grupos locales que vieron el régimen post-golpe de estado ilegítimo, que fue criticado por el Reino Unido, Canadá y las Naciones Unidas la Asamblea General, que lo condenó como “una violación flagrante del derecho internacional” 25 de octubre es un día de fiesta nacional en Granada, llamada Día de Acción de Gracias, para conmemorar la invasión, y el 29 de mayo de 2009, el aeropuerto internacional de Point Salines fue rebautizado oficialmente en honor de los muertos antes de la líder del golpe, Maurice Bishop por el Gobierno de Grenada.


By Naval Institute Archives

It is the anniversary of the invasion of Grenada which took place 30 years ago. The following article, The Guard in Grenada by Dale L. Thompson was first published in Naval Institute Proceedings in November, 1984.

Grenadian children from the town of Gouyave greet the crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Cape Fox. Quartermaster Chief Nicholas H. Lobkowicz looks on.

In late October 1983, Grenada was torn by internal revolution. Its Marxist government had come apart, and conditions of anarchy and bloody repression were reported. Concerns for the lives of the U. S. citizens on the island and for stability in that portion of the Caribbean led to the 25 October rescue mission. The invasion force contained personnel from all the U. S. services and six other Caribbean Island states, which made up the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (CPF). The U. S. Coast Guard participated on the invasion day with two search and rescue platforms, a C-130 aircraft, and the USCGC Chase (WHEC-718). Later, in December, the Coast Guard returned in force to the island.

By November 1983, organized resistance to the combined U. S. and Caribbean Peacekeeping Force rescue mission had collapsed. But an ongoing security presence was needed to give the country time to reestablish order and decide its future without outside interference. Psychologically, the population was still shaken by the events of the previous weeks and cowed by two successive autocratic governments – one right wing, one Marxist.

An interim government had been formed. Led by the former British Crown Colony adviser, Sir Paul Scoon, it was a volunteer advisory council primarily composed of businessmen with little political experience. Their challenges were many. They needed to restart the democratic process, pay a crushing inherited national debt, revive a stalled economy, and reinstitute normal governmental services and organizations. The unemployment rate was more than 30%. Every former member of the Marxist civil law enforcement agencies was either discredited or in jail. Grenadian police, coast guard, even prison guard organizations had to be rebuilt from scratch. Thus, the CPF, supported and equipped by the United States, maintained law and order, acting as agents of the government of Grenada. Ashore, the CPF and U. S. Army commands worked together and dispersed combined squads and patrols throughout Grenada. At sea, a small CPF coast guard contingent was based in the main harbor, St. Georges, while a U. S. Navy task unit patrolled offshore.

The Navy had two primary missions. The first was to prevent the escape of wanted Marxist fugitives or the infiltration of subversives, weapons, or any other military contraband. The second was to demonstrate a continuing U. S. commitment by a naval presence. Reassuring Grenadians of their continued security was vital to creating a stable government and a functioning economy.

The U. S. Coast Guard was the logical service to fulfill these missions. As an armed service, it could deploy quickly and integrate fully into the joint command structure. As the nation’s seagoing police, it had developed great expertise in coastal surveillance and interdiction in the fight against illegal drug traffic. And its image as a humanitarian organization with a history of protecting lives and property at sea made its arrival less politically sensitive to both sender and recipient.

A squadron of four cutters, three 95-foot patrol craft (WPBs) and one support unit, was chosen. These were manned by a little more than 100 men and women. All four vessels were chosen from the Seventh Coast Guard District in Florida because of their proximity to the operating area and their familiarity with Caribbean waters, vessel types, and traffic patterns. The squadron commander was assigned from the Atlantic Area staff.

WPBs are seaworthy, fast, well armed, and small enough to steam along the coast, yet large enough to self-deploy across the Caribbean. Since their routine patrols include drug interdiction, law enforcement, and search and rescue missions, their 15-member crews are well versed in interception, boarding, searching, and seizing procedures. The WPBs chosen were the USCGC Cape Fox (WPB-95316), USCGC Cape Gull (WPB-95304), and USCGC Cape Shoalwater (WPB-95324).

Planning for the worst case, no support from ashore, a support cutter was included, in this case the USCGC Sagebrush (WLB-399). The 180-foot seagoing buoy tender (WLB) was an excellent choice. Designed and built more than 40 years ago to resupply offshore lighthouses, WLBs can carry a large amount of fuel, water, and provisions. Capabilities integral to a WLB not found in a WPB are a heavy lift cargo boom, a large forward cargo deck, a machine shop, welding facilities, and electronics repair.

Additional WPB support was included by embarking a special support team of senior enlisteds in supply, electronics, and engineering rates and WPB spare parts on the Sagebrush. This team was drawn on short notice from a WPB shoreside support group, an experimental concept at Coast Guard Base, Miami Beach. The group was part of a multi-crew, multi-hull program. Designed to exact the maximum underway time from hulls without exhausting crews, the program used three crews to man two hulls. The support group provided additional maintenance during the hull’s short in-port periods.

It later proved logistically useful when the WPBs in Grenada were relieved. A crew could be flown to the island to relieve on scene without having to sail the hull home. The routine evolution took less than 24 hours.

For operational security, the crews of the chosen cutters were told only to make ready for a long deployment. Only the cutters’ commanding officers (COs) knew the actual plans. Similar procedures were routine to conceal patrol intentions from drug smugglers. Once underway, the cutters maintained strict electronic emission control. En route, the WPBs refueled from a Coast Guard high-endurance cutter on patrol in the Windward Passage. All the cutters rendezvoused at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, for final provisioning.

On my way to Roosevelt Roads, I called on both the operational and support commanders. The operational guidance I received was succinct. Essentially, it was to continue the ongoing work, coordinate with and support the CPF in developing a Grenadian coast guard, and promote good will.

Just before sailing from Roosevelt Roads, I briefed the cutters’ crews on their destination and mission. My verbal orders from Commander, Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, were simple: ”Go there and do good things!”

The squadron arrived off Grenada the afternoon of 7 December, relieving the Navy units, which turned north for a well-earned rest. Arrival meetings, resupply of the WPBs from the WLB, situation and intelligence briefings by the Army, and an orientation flight for COs followed rapidly. (The helicopter flight was particularly useful and became a standard arrival event for new COs and executive officers.) Available charts were old and poorly scaled. But from above, the shoals, channels, and reefs stood out clearly in the tropical waters. After the flight, the first cutters began patrolling.

Throughout the first month, we maintained two cutters on patrol. Our employment objectives were twofold. First, we wanted to intimidate potential contraband smugglers by displaying a high profile and intensive boarding tactics. Grenada is the southernmost island of the Leeward Island chain-a natural stepping stone from South America to the north. Smuggling is a generations-old way of life for many. We were neither legally empowered nor charged with stopping this traditional smuggling of whiskey, cigarettes, etc. (much to the relief of more than one smuggler stopped by a cutter).

We did, however, check every boat we could for military contraband or fugitives. We pointedly announced what type of contraband we sought. Apparently, this word spread quickly through the grapevine. Until then, intelligence reports of military contraband smuggling were routine. After we started these tactics, the reports dried up. We never did uncover any contraband, which was a disappointment to several crew members. They had hoped to add to the rows of marijuana leaves painted on their stack a Cuban cigar, signifying a Grenada contraband bust.

Our second objective was to gather intelligence and demonstrate presence by frequent visits to small coastal towns. Since the smuggling peaked at night, as did the patrol intensity, the afternoons were used for these visits. Routinely, one of the two cutters would anchor off a town around noon. The small boat would take a party of three or four crew members to meet with the mayor, the fishermen, and the local CPF and military police squad, if any. The receptions were uniformly and enthusiastically pro-United States, bolstering our morale as much as theirs.

Our crews, new to the country, were often incredulous when they first heard of the warm welcome extended by the average Grenadian. For example, a landing party on its first visit to a small coastal town was spontaneously mobbed at the beach by a good portion of the village. They would not let the crew members inland until they had heard five choruses of “Happy Birthday, Papa Reagan” – it was the week of the President’s birthday. In another incident, a sailor returned from his trip to a bakery shaking his head in disbelief. The woman behind the counter had thanked him for personally saving her life.

Every couple weeks, the Coast Guard conducted search and rescue operations for boats overdue into port. These operations sometimes involved coordinated air-sea search with an Army helicopter. Operations with the military police were conducted as deemed appropriate by intelligence information. Usually, our role would be to help insert a force (which prevented warning by helicopter noise) and then stand by off the surf to prevent any escape to sea.

As the holidays approached, morale remained high. The busy pace helped. Some of the crews played Santa, distributing donated toys from the United States to some of the outer islands. A Coast Guard cutter full of “Berts” and “Ernies” was uniquely a Grenadian experience.

All our operations soon dovetailed so that joint operations with the Army and U. S. Embassy could be conducted. Daily meetings were held at the embassy and the Army compound to report the current operations, plans, intelligence, and political and economic evaluations. Courses of action were discussed and agreed upon. For example, during mid-December, there were significant Army force reductions. This generated a surprising amount of unrest and public concern among the Grenadians. Rumors were rife of a U. S. withdrawal and a return to power of the Marxists. Thus, we altered our helicopter flight and cutter patrol routines to put them in sight of as many Grenadians as possible.

The single biggest factor in the success of the U. S. efforts in Grenada was the rapport and mutual respect among the Coastguardsmen, the Army personnel, and the embassy staff. This link was key not only in operations but in day-to-day support activities. The embassy had the only hard-copy message traffic facilities therefore, it served all the U. S. organizations on the island. In turn, cutters ferried State Department staff to outer islands, and State Department supplies were often carried on the Coast Guard’s logistic flight. The Army provided many support services to the Coast Guard: Autovon telephones, mail, medical, exchange, movies, truck loans, and barbershop facilities. It was soon apparent that we were better served by putting the members of the WPB support team ashore. They were able to get at these facilities and services, work the logistics, and be available all day, every day. This had the added benefit of reduced crowding on the Sagebrush and freed her to patrol without taking the WPB support with her. Thus, the WLB entered the patrol rotation, proving another facet of this class’s use.

The single biggest headache of routine business was logistics. Limited communications and inexperience with unsupported deployments outside the continental United States were the major problems. Also, the small cutters were accustomed to independent resupply at their home ports, thus the class-compatibility of parts was poor. Initially, the documentation of what parts had been ordered by our support command and at what priority was lacking. The logistics flights’ cargo manifests were incomplete and the cargo poorly marked. Local sources for baked goods, fresh produce, and fruit eased the provisioning needs. The extra frozen and dry stores previously loaded on the WLB would last for weeks. Fuel was available from the local Texaco distributor.

Communications were limited and awkward. The embassy’s communication center was a temporary installation. A small staff operated old equipment. The alternatives were secure voice satellite to the operational commander and two Autovon lines at the Army compound. VHF-FM was used extensively ashore and afloat since the island telephone system was down 98% of the time. Predictably, the Army and Coast Guard FM systems were incompatible. We installed one of our transceivers in their communications center and borrowed their backpack FMs so the cutters could talk to the military police across the surf line. FM and high frequency were used to communicate to the cutters on patrol from the shore station.

To reduce report volume, we developed standard report formats and codes. These codes and a communications plan, which included preset frequency shifts, increased operational security over the uncovered circuits. Portable FMs became part of the uniform ashore. The Army compound, the embassy, our shore station, and the cutter moorings were located on separate parts of the island and thus required us to drive from one to the other. Consequently, the seemingly trivial matter of who had what car and was going where could get out of hand quickly if everybody was not in touch by portable radio.

The United States was acting in support of the CPF which, in turn, was acting as an agent of the government of Grenada. Thus, our legal authority to act as if the waters and vessels of the area were under U. S. control, and not Grenadian, was delegated to us from the CPF. The CPF was equipped and trained under the U. S. Security Assistance Program administered on Grenada by an ad hoc Security Assistance Control Team (SACT). Emphasis had been on the CPF shore units, which were the bulk of the force and had the more pressing needs. In addition, rapid turnover in the CPF coast guard contingents between Jamaican and Barbados personnel hindered the force in getting SACT assistance and using it effectively.

The patrol craft available to the CPF were five British-built former Grenadian Coast Guard boats ranging from 30- to 55-feet long and from two to ten years old. Their material conditions varied from poor to completely unsalvageable. No preventative maintenance had been done for years. They literally ran on baling wire and bubble gum fixes because of a history of underfunding and ”make do” maintenance. There were no spare parts, tools, safety, firefighting, or emergency equipment. The one functional radio was moved around to whichever boat was running. That the CPF managed occasional patrols near the harbor was remarkable.

As operations permitted, we supported the CPF with assistance in training and maintenance. CPF personnel embarked on day trips in the WPBs to obtain practical experience. They proved good sailors who learned rapidly, and the program was expanded to include longer trips as bunk space permitted. The amount of this training varied as the CPF contingents changed and their needs changed.

Maintenance of the CPF boats began. The WLB brought each of the former Grenadian boats alongside one at a time. What could be done with low-cost consumables was done. What could not was put on a work list. This list was used also to make up orders of parts needed. Managing this effort, arranging funding through SACT, and pushing to recruit and train a truly Grenadian Coast Guard was a full-time endeavor. We recommended a “sailor” element be assigned to SACT, with our support team continuing to assist as needed. This occurred in mid-January 1984 with the assignment of a Coast Guard lieutenant commander from the security assistance office of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. Under his focused effort, much greater progress occurred.

With time, coastal trade increased. This was a good sign for the economy, but the WLB found it difficult to get a berth at the only pier in St. George’s. The WPBs did not have this problem, mooring at the yacht club. As we became increasingly accustomed to the traffic and the waters, gathered more intelligence through our visits, and the country continued to stabilize, we reduced the patrolling force to one cutter. This allowed us to send one WPB home. At about this time, I was relieved by Commander J. Morris, also of the Atlantic Area staff, so that I could attend a long-planned-for school. The second WPB relieved crews in country (as part of the experimental multicrew concept discussed earlier). Then, the third WPB was relieved by a new cutter, the USCGC Cape York (WPB-95332). Also, a relief WLB, the USCGC Gentian (WLB-290), arrived with a fresh load of provisions and supplies.

About then, I returned to duty in Grenada. At the harbor master’s request, the WLB overhauled and reset St. George’s buoys and serviced the range dayshapes. With the revival of the economy, limited civilian machine shop services became available. Thus, the remaining link keeping the WLB in country became the stored provisions on board. After a little judicious trading with the Army, we arranged dry storage in their compound and space for a portable freezer box that was deck-loaded on board the WLB. The stores were transferred ashore and the WLB headed north. With this final and significant force reduction, we were down to two WPBs and about 25 people in country. The C-130 logistics flights could then be decreased to once every three weeks.

Once again, it was Commander Morris’s turn in country, and I left Grenada for the last time. Soon thereafter, a project we had both promoted came to fruition. Two standard 20-foot shipping containers, one fitted as an engineering workshop/storeroom, were delivered and set up near the WPB moorings. They proved ideal as support team work spaces. Continuing the reduction in force, Commander Morris departed in May 1984, with the small remaining contingent folding into a reorganized joint U. S. command on the island.

For the first time in years, the Coast Guard deployed a squadron of cutters in a joint military operation outside the United States and unsupported by immediately available Navy logistics. The Coast Guard may have to do so again, probably on short notice, possibly further away. If so, we should remember:


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