Hoe kan pryse mettertyd vergelyk word?

Hoe kan pryse mettertyd vergelyk word?

Ek het pas 'n vraag gevra waar Tyler Durden in sy antwoord geskryf het dat papier duur was in Euclids.

Daarom wou ek die vraag stel:

Hoe het die prys van papier / papirus mettertyd ontwikkel?

Maar toe besef ek dat dit moontlik onmoontlik is om dit te beantwoord met 'n eenvoudige tyd-pryskaart, selfs al het u al die inligting.

Die vraag is dus: Hoe beoordeel historici of iets 'duur' is? Hoe word die prys van goedere in die streke / tye vergelyk? Bestaan ​​daar reeds 'vergelykingstabelle'?

Waaraan ek gedink het

Eerste poging: Vergelyking met ander goedere

Daar is beslis goedere wat nog in vergelykbare kwaliteit bestaan ​​(ek kan dink aan goud, skape, koeie, klip of grond), die verhouding kan anders wees. So eenvoudig bereken

  • n = aantal gram goud wat 'n mens vir 100 papirusrolle moes betaal
  • w = goudprys in Euro / gram
  • prys van papirus in vandag se waardes = n*w

is te eenvoudig. Maar uiteindelik kan 'n mens sulke pryse gee om 'n betekenisvolle indruk te gee?

Tweede probeerslag: Werkmag

Sodra ons muntstukke het, kan ons waarskynlik vergelyk wat mense vir 'n bestaan ​​het (per maand). U kan die inkomste sorteer en die boonste/onderste 25% afsny om 'n gemiddelde inkomste te kry. Dan kon 'n mens bereken

  • s = inkomste van die streek, ons wil hê dat iets vergelyk moet word met die metode hierbo beskryf in [ou geldeenheid / maand]
  • x = waarde van die goed uit streek / tyd van s in [ou geldeenheid]
  • t = die gemiddelde inkomste van vandag (op dieselfde manier bereken) in [nuwe geldeenheid/maand]
  • prys van papirus in vandag se waardes = (x/s)*t

Die groot poging van die ekonomiese geskiedenis om 'n uitstekende prys/loonreeks vir die kloosters, landbouarbeiders en moderne werkers in Suid -Engeland te produseer, het misluk. Dit laat ons met die reeks wat deur Measuring Worth gebruik word, maar die reeks is onbetroubaar:

1) Loonarbeid is eers in die 19de eeu veralgemeen, dit maak 'lone' en 'pryse' betekenisloos.

2) Reekskonstruksie veroorsaak groot probleme

3) Die afhanklikheid van die suid -Engelse kloosters as 'n rekordbron beteken 'n swak veralgemening selfs vir mense wat rekeninge ontvang; en kan nie regtig veralgemeen word na die omliggende plaaslike markte nie.

Daar is dus geen manier om met vertroue 'n loonprysreeks na 1700 te rekonstrueer nie.

Daar is beslis goedere wat nog in vergelykbare kwaliteit bestaan ​​(ek kan dink aan goud, skape, koeie, klip of grond), die verhouding kan anders wees.

Nee, dit was nie 'goed' in die verlede nie; die sosiale betekenis daarvan was heeltemal anders. Ons kan probeer om hul sosiale belangrikheid te evalueer deur die vorige ekonomiese en sosiale stelsel te verstaan ​​soos dit was, maar 'n vergelyking kan slegs gemaak word in terme van die evaluering en vergelyking van konkrete samelewings uit die verlede. Ons kan nie 'n skaap/koei -indeks beter as loon/prys bestuur nie.

Sodra ons muntstukke het, kan ons waarskynlik vergelyk wat mense het (per maand).

Lone was nie sosiaal bepaal voor 1790 nie, en dan slegs in Engeland. Loonarbeid, en die "loon" soos ons dit as die enigste bestaansgrondslag verstaan, is a baie baie nuwe ding.

Ten slotte, wat vergelyk ons? Papier vir persoonlike verbruik? Papier as 'n produksie -voorwerp in die produksiemetode? Papier as 'n toewyding van sosiale hulpbronne? Dit is baie verskillende tydsbetekenisse van sosiale waarde.


Ek het betrekking op die ekonomiese geskiedenis as 'n moderne sosiale historikus, maar die lees van Measuring Worth se bespreking van die probleme met die loon-/prysreekse na 1950 behoort illustratief te wees, net soos die geskiedenis van die Australiese C -reeksindeks wat beskikbaar is op die Australian Bureau of Statistics ' webwerf vir die Australiese CPI -indeks.


Om te verklaar dat ek nie 'n definitiewe antwoord het nie, maar met my antwoord kan ek u 'n bietjie nader aan die uiteindelike metode bring.

Dit is veral moeilik om 'n waarde terug in die tyd te skat as gevolg van die volgende faktore:

  • Daar was mettertyd verskillende monetêre stelsels (nie net geldeenhede nie). Byvoorbeeld, die silwer/goud-rugsteun van 1 kroon in die Oostenryk-Hongaarse ryk ter waarde van 0,3 gram goud in 1892, wat vandag ongeveer 9,5 euro is. Maar sedertdien het die Krone ineengestort, in Hongarye het die Pengő in duie gestort, in Oostenryk het die opgeblase Schilling dan oorgegaan na EUR. U kan enige inflasie sakrekenaar gebruik wat min of meer akkuraat is, maar ek is seker dat dit nie in die Middeleeue werk nie.

  • Goud en silwer is langer as geld vir geld gebruik. U kan dinge in goud en silwer meet, hierdie twee goedere was baie lank geld, en dit was skaars. Die meting sal nie presies wees nie, aangesien ander mense ook geskryf het: die historiese uitruil van goud na silwer was gewoonlik naby 1:15 tot 1:16. Mike Maloney het fyn navorsing gedoen oor goud en silwer. U kan na sy video's op YouTube kyk en sy boeke lees. Dit help beslis die meganika van 'n goud/silwer gebaseerde geldstelsel en die verhouding met die moderne geldstelsel. Wees versigtig met die vergelyking, in 1900 was daar minder as 2 miljard mense, en nie noemenswaardige gebruik van industriële goud nie, vandag is die ekstraksie hoër, maar duurder, ons het nou industriële gebruik van goud en binnekort sal ons 8 miljard hê mense.

  • Soos u gesê het: u kan dinge in arbeid meet. Die enigste algemene grondwaarde is die onopgevoede EN tweeledige harde arbeid, aangesien u in hierdie geval nie meer hoef te reken met die ekstra opleidingskoste, masjienkoste, ens nie ... Let daarop dat mense in die 19de eeu harder in sweetwinkels gewerk het. in Europa as die hedendaagse Europa, dus moet u eers die ekonomiese waarde van 'n normale werkdag van 8 uur vergelyk met 'n werksdag van 12 uur op die veld, wat nie in die winter gebeur het nie, aangesien hulle geen werk met die bevrore grond gehad het nie.
    Die produktiwiteit het toegeneem met die nuwe wetenskaplike ontdekkings, meer gevorderde masjinerie, ens ...

  • eiendom, grond ens ... dit is ook problematies om te vergelyk, aangesien die bevolking baie toegeneem het, maar die beskikbare gebied was byna dieselfde.

As ons hierdie metings in ag neem, kan u 'n sekere presisievergelyking kry, maar nooit baie akkuraat nie.
As ek 'n skatting sou moes maak, sou ek 'n gemiddelde van die volgende neem:

  1. Goudwaarde terug in die tyd in vergelyking met die Amerikaanse dollar van 1900 (ondersteun deur goud) en gebruik dan inflasie -aanpassing.
  2. Arbeidswaarde tussen die twee tydperke. Eerstens sou ek moes uitvind hoeveel ure 'n Romeinse boer in 'n gemiddelde jaar op die veld gewerk het en dit as basis gebruik in vergelyking met die hedendaagse werk.
  3. eiendom, grond, ens ...
  4. ander metodes (?)

Ek sou sê, hierdie soort vergelyking verg baie tyd om na elke tydperk navorsing te doen.

As ek 'n metode moet gebruik, sou ek 'n kostedoeltreffende weergawe kies. Dit sou die eerste metode wees sedert die geskiedenis van goudgebruik vir geld. Neem die vergelyking tussen 'n vaste goudstandaard USD vanaf die begin van die 20ste eeu (kom ons sê 1900) en vergelyk dan die dollar met die moderne dollar -inflasie aangepas. Wees versigtig vir silwer, aangesien die goud-silwer verhouding lank vasgestel is, maar in die middel van die 19de eeu vrygestel is.

En 'n ekstra grafiek vir die goudprysgeskiedenis


Dit is 'n moeilike probleem om historiese pryse te verstaan, en selfs historici van die ekonomie gebruik metodes wat ek as onvoldoende sou beskou. Baie gepubliseerde ramings van antieke pryse en waarde is dikwels heeltemal verkeerd. Gereelde historici (nie ekonome nie) is nog erger in waardeberaming en stel selde moderne ekwivalente met 'n betekenisvolle akkuraatheid voor.

Daar is eintlik 'n baie eenvoudige manier om antieke waardes in verband te bring met moderne waardes, en dit is deur middel van goud. Dit is natuurlik 'n benaderde maatstaf, maar baie beter as die tipiese metodes wat ekonome sal vind.

Byvoorbeeld, in Pompeii, wat in 79 nC met as bedek was, word 'n brood op 2 genoem esels ('n as is 'n koperstuk). As u die goue ekwivalent (die aureus), dit beloop vandag ongeveer $ 1, wat interessant genoeg is oor wat 'n brood vandag kos (te koop). In die Koran word die prys van 'n skaap in goue dirhams genoem, wat $ 400 beloop, wat ongeveer is wat dit vandag vir 'n skaap kos.

Oor die algemeen is alles vandag goedkoper as in die verlede weens meganisasie, en die gevolge is nie gelyk nie. Byvoorbeeld, in die ou dae was silwer ongeveer 1/20 van die goudprys, maar deesdae is silwer slegs ongeveer 1/60 van die waarde van goud as gevolg van die Comstock -lode en ander faktore (soos die silwer wat verkry word uit kopermynbou). .

U kan ook geld met werk of lone verband hou. Met ander woorde, u kan sê: om 'n Romeinse tuniek te maak, het 'n ou kleermaker 3 uur geneem. As ons dit omskakel in 'n moderne loon van $ 20 per uur, is die tuniek $ 60 werd. Die waarde word dus bepaal en gesinkroniseer as 'n eenheid van 'n werker se tyd. U moet natuurlik onthou dat verskillende beskawings verskillende loonskale het. Werkers in antieke Rome sou byvoorbeeld baie meer verdien as dieselfde werker in die boonop in Brittanje, net soos vandag 'n werker in Manhatten meer sal maak as 'n ou in Nigerië.


Sulke ramings is eintlik gemaak.

Roger Bagnall in 'n onlangse boek skryf dat die prys van 'n vel papirus 'ongeveer 'n kwart tot 'n derde van die waarde van die kos vir 'n aktiewe volwassene vir 'n dag' was. Of, om dit meer bondig te stel, ''n vel papier het u soveel gekos as 'n hamburger'. (bl. 134).

'N Soortgelyke skatting (waarskynlik afkomstig van dieselfde bronne) word deur Quintus Cinna Cocceius uit 'n boek van Harris hier aangehaal:

Papirus is op groot skaal deur die elite gebruik, en alle welgestelde Romeine was vertroud daarmee. Maar ondanks 'n paar bewerings van die teendeel, moes dit nogal duur gewees het vir die beursies van die meeste mense, tans buite Egipte, wat die belangrikste bron van voorraad gebly het. Die prys by Tebtunis in die tydperk 45-49 blyk gewoonlik vier drachmas per rol te gewees het, en 'n enkele laken kan twee dollar kos- dit op 'n tydstip waarop geskoolde arbeid ongeveer ses obols per dag verdien, drie ongeskoolde. Die prys is analoog aan een van, byvoorbeeld, dertig tot vyf -en -dertig dollar vir 'n vel papier vandag. Die werklike prys van papirus sou baie hoër gewees het in Griekeland of Italië, om nie te praat van Spanje of Brittanje nie, as in Egipte.

Ook in 'n ander boek van Bagnall word die koste van 'n enkele evangelieboek in die sesde eeu geskat op 'n derde van 'n solidus wat hy vir vandag ongeveer $ 1000 in geld verdien. (Sien hier)


Meting van ekonomiese waarde oor tyd

Die meting van ekonomiese waarde oor tyd is die probleem om vorige pryse, koste, waardes en verhoudings van sosiale produksie te koppel aan die huidige. Om 'n aantal redes is dit teoreties en prakties moeilik om ekonome, historici en politieke ekonome in verband te bring met 'n vorige indikator met 'n huidige waarde -waarde. Dit het daartoe gelei dat die idee van tydreekse wat die moeite werd is, 'n mate bevraagteken het. Die gewilde vraag na metings van sosiale waarde oor tyd het egter die produksie van 'n aantal reekse veroorsaak.


Is jaarlikse opbrengste 'n goeie maatstaf?

Die jare waarin aandele beter as effekte presteer het, is in blou, en die jare wat effekte beter presteer het, is in oranje. Die kaart is 'n oseaan van blou. Dit wil voorkom asof belegging in aandele 'n maklike keuse is - waarom sou iemand in effekte belê? Soos dit blyk, is prestasie slegs een maatstaf vir suksesvolle belegging.

Hoe u belê, het baie te doen met die tyd wat u het voordat u die geld benodig. As u in die vroeë tot middelste deel van u loopbaan is en vir aftrede belê, is u tydshorison waarskynlik meer as 10 jaar. Aan die ander kant, as u 'n aktiewe handelaar is, is u binne enkele dae of weke op soek na wins.

Die volgende grafiek toon rollende 10-jaar-opbrengste van 1938-2019 vir die prestasie van aandele in vergelyking met effekte. Rolopbrengste van 10 jaar vir elke jaar verteenwoordig die geannualiseerde opbrengs vir die vorige 10 jaar. 1950 verteenwoordig byvoorbeeld die 10-jaarlikse opbrengs van 1940 tot 1950.

Let op die verskil: as u na 10-jaarresultate kyk, is dit 'gladder' as die jaarresultate, en effekte lyk aantrekliker. Let ook daarop dat die enigste negatiewe jare vir aandele gedurende enige van die 80 rollende 10-jaarperiodes 1938 tot 1940 is, wat die langdurige impak van die Groot Depressie weerspieël. Daar is 19 individuele negatiewe jare vir aandele in dieselfde tydperk, in vergelyking.

Dit illustreer ook hoe die balansering van u aandeelhouding met 'n mate van stabiliteit van die eienaarskap van effekte in 'n portefeulje 'n verskansing kan bied vir moontlike onstabiele skommelinge in aandeelpryse.


Dit was die jaar toe Apple twee weergawes van iPhones gelyktydig begin bekendstel het. Alhoewel iPhone 5c in wese 'n handelsmerk van die iPhone 5 was, maar met nuwe kleure, het die iPhone 5s die Touch ID bekendgestel en 'n effens opgeknapte voorkoms gehad.

Die prys van iPhone 5c begin by $ 99 vir die 16GB -variant en die iPhone 5s kos ongeveer $ 199 vir die 16GB -variant. Dit het na Indië gekom en 'n aanvangsprys van Rs 41,900 vir die iPhone 5c van 16 GB en 53,500 vir die iPhone 5s van 16 GB.


Hoe kan pryse mettertyd vergelyk word? - Geskiedenis

Sewe maniere om die relatiewe waarde van 'n Amerikaanse dollarbedrag te bereken - 1790 tot hede

Bepaling van die familielid die waarde van 'n bedrag geld in een jaar (die eerste jaar) in vergelyking met 'n ander (die gewenste jaar) is ingewikkelder as wat dit aanvanklik lyk. Daar is geen enkele "korrekte" maatstaf nie, en ekonomiese historici gebruik een of meer verskillende indekse, afhangende van die konteks van die vraag.

'N Indeks soos die verbruikersprysindeks word gemeet as die prys van 'n & bondel & goedere en dienste wat 'n verteenwoordigende groep koop of verdien. Mettertyd verander die bundel, byvoorbeeld, waens word vervang met motors, en nuwe goedere en dienste word uitgevind, soos selfone en hartoorplantings.

Hierdie oorwegings stop nie die bekoring van hierdie vergelykings of selfs die noodsaaklikheid daarvan nie. Sulke vergelykings kan byvoorbeeld van kritieke belang wees om die geskikte vergoedingsvlakke te bepaal in 'n uitgestelde regsaak. Die konteks van die vraag kan egter lei tot 'n ander maatstaf as die werklike prys (reële loon, of werklike koste), gemeet aan die verbruikersprysindeks (VPI), wat heeltemal te gereeld gebruik word sonder om na te dink oor die gevolge daarvan.

As u dus oor die (relatiewe) waarde van 'n item praat, moet dit so wees gekategoriseer as 'n handelsware, 'n projek of 'n waarneming van vergoeding of rykdom. Dan (en slegs dan) moet dit gemeet word relatief tot goed gedefinieerde indekse van ekonomiese aktiwiteit wat die item in perspektief plaas. Hierdie proses sal spesifieke definisies van relatiewe waarde genereer wat afhang van die gebruikte indeks en die tipe item wat dit is.

Vir meer bespreking oor hoe om die beste definisie te kies, kyk na die keuse van die beste maatstaf van relatiewe waarde, die tutoriale, of raadpleeg die opstel Measures of Worth.

Die sewe indekse wat gebruik word

Definisies van relatiewe waarde

Die definisies van relatiewe waarde wat hier aangebied word, word bereken volgens die verhouding van die verandering in die indekse hierbo gelys. U aanvanklike bedrag word vermenigvuldig met die waargenome waarde van elke indeks van die gewenste jaar gedeel deur die waargenome waarde vanaf die eerste jaar. Die beste maatstaf van die relatiewe waarde oor tyd hang af van die tipe ding wat u wil vergelyk. (klik op elkeen om sy definisie te kry.)

As jy kyk na 'n Handelsware, dan is die beste maatreëls:

Werklike prys word gemeet as die relatiewe koste van 'n (vaste met verloop van tyd) bondel goedere en dienste, soos kos, skuiling, klere, ens., wat 'n gemiddelde huishouding sou koop. In teorie verander die grootte van hierdie bundel nie mettertyd nie, maar in die praktyk word die samestelling daarvan aangepas. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die VPI.

Relatiewe waarde in verbruik word gemeet as die relatiewe koste van die hoeveelheid goedere en dienste, soos kos, skuiling, klere, ens., wat 'n gemiddelde huishouding sou koop. Histories het hierdie bondel groter geword namate huishoudings mettertyd meer gekoop het. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die waarde van die verbruikersbundel, wat eers na 1900 beskikbaar is.

Arbeidswaarde word gemeet as die veelvoud van die gemiddelde loon wat 'n werker moet gebruik om die goedere te koop. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik een van die loonindekse.

Inkomste Waarde word gemeet as die veelvoud van die gemiddelde inkomste wat nodig sou wees om 'n goedere te koop. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die indeks van BBP per capita.

Ekonomiese aandeel is die waarde van 'n goedere in 'n spesifieke tydperk gedeel deur BBP, dit is die deel van die totale produksie. Dit is handig om die relatiewe waarde van totale verbruiksitems, soos al die motors wat in 'n jaar vervaardig is, te meet.

As jy kyk na 'n Inkomste of rykdom, dan is die beste maatreëls:

Werklike loon of regte rykdom meet die koopkrag van 'n inkomste of rykdom aan die relatiewe vermoë daarvan om 'n (vaste met verloop van tyd) bondel goedere en dienste soos voedsel, skuiling, klere, ens te koop. Hierdie bundel verander (in teorie) nie oor tyd nie. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die VPI.

Huishoudelike koopkrag word gemeet as die relatiewe koste van 'n bondel goedere en dienste, soos kos, skuiling, klere, ens., wat 'n gemiddelde huishouding sou koop. Hierdie bondel het groter geword namate huishoudings mettertyd meer gekoop het. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die waarde van die verbruikersbundel, wat eers na 1900 beskikbaar is.

Relatiewe arbeidsverdienste meet 'n hoeveelheid inkomste of welvaart relatief tot die loon van die gemiddelde werker. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik een van die loonindekse.

Relatiewe inkomste meet 'n hoeveelheid inkomste of rykdom relatief tot die BBP per capita. In vergelyking met ander inkomste of rykdom, toon dit die ekonomiese status of relatiewe & quotprestige waarde & quot; die eienaars van hierdie inkomste of rykdom as gevolg van hul rang in die inkomsteverdeling. Hierdie maatreël gebruik die BBP per capita.

Relatiewe uitset Die verhouding van inkomste, vergoeding of rykdom tot BBP gee 'n idee van die deel van die ekonomie wat dit verteenwoordig, die hoeveelheid wat ons noem die relatiewe produksie wat dit beveel. Baie glo dat die rykes toegang het tot politieke gunste wat die gemiddelde persoon geweier word. In hierdie opsig is hul inkomste en rykdom relatief tot die produksie van die ekonomie 'n maatstaf vir hulle ekonomiese mag.

As jy kyk na 'n Projek, dan is die beste maatreëls:

Werklike koste van 'n projek word gemeet deur die koste daarvan te vergelyk met die koste -indeks van alle produksie in die ekonomie. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die BBP -deflator.

Huishoudelike koste is die koste van 'n projek relatief tot die bedrag wat die gemiddelde huishouding jaarliks ​​aan verbruikersgoedere en -dienste bestee. Die projek kan van toepassing wees op die onderneming/regering, 'n persoon/huishouding of op 'n instelling sonder winsbejag. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die waarde van die verbruikersbundel, wat eers na 1900 beskikbaar is.

Arbeidskoste van 'n projek word gemeet as 'n veelvoud van die gemiddelde loon van die werkers wat gebruik kan word om die projek te bou. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik een van die loonindekse.

Ekonomiese koste van 'n projek word gemeet as die koste van die projek as 'n persentasie van die produksie van die ekonomie. Hierdie maatreël dui die geleentheidskoste aan in terme van die totale produksie van die ekonomie. Dit kan geïnterpreteer word as die belangrikheid van die item vir die samelewing as geheel. Hierdie maatstaf gebruik die deel van die BBP.

Hier is 'n paar voorbeelde

George Washington is 'n salaris van $ 25,000 per jaar van 1789 tot 1797 betaal as die eerste president van die Verenigde State. Die huidige salaris van die president is nou $ 400,000, gekombineer met 'n uitgawesrekening van $ 119,000, 'n ruim pensioen en verskeie ander voordele. Het die vergoeding verbeter?

Deur 'n vergelyking met die CPI vir 1790 te maak, toon dat $ 25,000 vandag ongeveer $ 720,000 ooreenstem, sodat huidige presidente nie 'n gelyke bevel oor verbruikersgoedere het as die vader van die land nie. (Natuurlik moes Washington per perdewa ry, nie met helikopters of Air Force One nie.)

As die salaris van Washington vergelyk word met 'n ongeskoolde werker, of die maatstaf van gemiddelde inkomste, BBP per capita, is die vergelykbare getalle $ 15 tot $ 37 miljoen. Toegegee, dit sou hom nie vandag in die geledere van die top 25 bestuurders plaas wat meer as $ 200 miljoen verdien nie. Dit sou egter baie keer meer wees as wat enige verkose amptenaar in hierdie land is betaal vandag. Ten slotte, om die 'ekonomiese krag' van sy loon aan te toon, sien ons dat sy salaris as 'n deel van die BBP hom gelykstaande sou wees aan $ 2,8 miljard.

Die Erie -kanaal is tussen 1817 en 1825 gebou vir 'n prys van $ 7 miljoen. Hierdie waterweg word beskou as een van die belangrikste beleggings in die negentiende eeu, aangesien dit die Midde -Weste oopgemaak het vir handel en migrasie. Hoe vergelyk die koste met wat dit vandag sou kos?

Deur die BBP -deflator vir 1825 te gebruik, toon dit dat dit $ 187 miljoen sou beloop, nie meer as die koste van 'n paar kilometer se snelweg Interstate vandag nie. As u die ongeskoolde loonmaatreël gebruik, beloop dit $ 2,3 miljard. Vanuit 'n historiese oogpunt is dit moontlik die beste maatstaf, aangesien die meeste koste van die bou van die kanaal waarskynlik ongeskoolde arbeid was. Die gebruik van die indeks vir vervaardigingswerkers gee ons 'n baie hoër koste van $ 4,7 miljard.
As die BBP per capita gebruik word, is die koste naby $ 6,2 miljard, en as 'n deel van die BBP, beloop dit byna $ 182 miljard. Ter vergelyking is die huidige begroting van die Amerikaanse departement van vervoer $ 70 miljard.

As gevolg van die onbestendigheid van pryse in daardie tydperk, sou ons die berekening van die BBP -deflator ongeveer 22% minder gewees het as ons 1817 in plaas van 1825 gekies het, en die ander maatreëls verskil ook van dieselfde grootte. Dit is 'n goeie voorbeeld van hoe 'byna' hierdie vergelykings is.

Slawerny in die Verenigde State was 'n instelling wat 'n groot impak op die ekonomiese, politieke en sosiale struktuur van die land gehad het. Die gemiddelde prys van 'n slaaf in 1860 was $ 800 en die ekonomiese omvang van die prys in vandag se waardes wissel van $ 19,000 tot $ 336,000, afhangende van die gebruikte indeks.

In daardie jaar woon daar na raming vier miljoen slawe in die Suide, en die totale markwaarde is na raming meer as $ 3 miljard. Dit stem vandag ooreen met $ 10 biljoen (as 'n deel van die BBP).

Vir 'n bespreking van hierdie kwessies, sien Slawing in 2016 -dollars meet.

  • Die Burgeroorlog was een van die verwoestendste gebeurtenisse in die geskiedenis van die Verenigde State. Dit duur van 1861 tot 1865 en het na raming 'n direkte koste van ongeveer $ 6,7 miljard ter waarde van 1860 dollar. As hierdie getal in dollars van vandag geëvalueer word met behulp van die BBP-deflator, sou dit $ 160 miljard wees, minder as 'n kwart van die huidige departement van verdediging. Dit sou onvanpas wees, net soos die gebruik van die loon- of inkomste -indekse. Die enigste maatstaf vir 'n besteding van hierdie grootte is om die deel van die BBP te gebruik, aangesien die oorlog die produksie van die hele land beïnvloed het. Dus is die relatiewe waarde van $ 6,7 miljard van 1860 vandag $ 32,7 triljoen, of meer as 150% van ons huidige BBP.

Die $ 6,7 miljard hou nie in ag dat die oorlog die ekonomie ontwrig het en 'n impak van laer produksie in die toekoms gehad het nie. Sommige ekonomiese historici het hierdie bykomende of indirekte koste geraam op nog $ 7,3 miljard, gemeet in 1860 dollar. Dit beteken dat die koste van die oorlog (as 'n deel van die produksie van die ekonomie) byna $ 68 triljoen was, gemeet in huidige dollars.

Die Model T Ford kos $ 850 in 1908, maar teen 1925 het die prys tot $ 290 gedaal. Hoe vergelyk ons ​​hierdie waardes? As u die twee jaar wil vergelyk, sou u sien dat met behulp van die VPI, die BBP -deflator of die verbruikersbundel $ 850 in 1908 gelykstaande is aan 'n waarde tussen $ 1,485 en $ 1,670 in 1925. Deur die loonindeks te gebruik, sien ons dat die arbeidskoste (van die motor van 1908 in 1925 se lone) was $ 2,094 en met behulp van die BBP per capita -indeks was dit $ 1,957. In 1925 was die $ 290 dus minder as 20% van die koste in 1908 met behulp van die prysindekse en slegs 11 tot 14% met die loonindekse en 15% met die BBP per capita.

As ons die koste van die Model T wou oorweeg met behulp van vandag se pryse, sou ons vind dat die koste van $ 850 in 1908 $ 23,400 is in die huidige pryse met behulp van die VPI, $ 16,700 met behulp van die BBP -deflator, ongeveer $ 44,700 met die verbruikersbundel, $ 101,800 met die ongeskoolde loon , $ 168,900 met behulp van die vervaardigingsvergoeding en $ 147,400 as u die BBP per capita vergelyk. Op hierdie stadium was die Ford 'n luukse vir die meeste almal.

Die $ 290 in 1925, aan die ander kant, sou slegs $ 4,100 wees in die huidige pryse met behulp van die VPI, $ 3,300 met behulp van die BBP -deflator, $ 7,500 met die verbruikersbundel, $ 14,100 met die ongeskoolde loon, $ 18,700 met die vervaardigingsvergoeding en $ 21,800 met die vergelyking van die BBP per capita. Teen daardie tyd was die Ford 'n motor wat almal bekostigbaar was.

Liefie Ruth het op 10 Maart 1930 'n kontrak met die American League Base Ball Club van New York (The Yankees) om vir die volgende twee jaar bofbal te speel teen 'n jaarlikse salaris van $ 80,000. In 2019 was die VPI 16 keer groter as in 1931, en die BBP -deflator was 13 keer groter. Dit beteken dat as ons belangstel in Ruth se koopkrag van behuising of maaltye, dat hy vandag ongeveer $ 1,290,000 gelykstaande was.

In 2019 bestee die gemiddelde verbruikerseenheid ongeveer 32 keer in dollars meer as wat dit 82 jaar tevore bestee het. As ons Ruth se verdienste dus wil vergelyk met die indeks van wat die gemiddelde huishouding koop, sou dit vandag meer as $ 2,530,000 wees. Die relatiewe koste van arbeid is 48 keer (ongeskoolde) en 63 keer (vervaardigingsproduksiewerkers) hoër in 2019 as in 1931. As ons sy loon wou vergelyk met wat iemand wat worsbroodjies verkoop, sou kon sê, is sy & quotrelatiewe loon & quot vier tot vyf miljoen.

BBP per capita en BBP is 95 en 250 keer groter in 2019 as in 1931. Dus sou Ruth se verdienste relatief tot die gemiddelde produksie $ 7 600 000 vandag wees. Ten slotte, as 'n aandeel in die BBP, sou Ruth se & quotoutput & quot daardie jaar $ 20,000,000 in vandag se geld wees.

Om 'n man op die maan te sit: in Maart 1966) het NASA aan die Kongres gesê die "uitloopkoste" van die Apollo-program (om mans op die maan te sit) sal na raming $ 22.718 miljard beloop vir die 13-jarige program wat ses suksesvolle missies behaal het om ruimtevaarders tussen Julie 1969 op die maan te sit en Desember 1972. (http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-4009/keyev4.htm) Volgens Steve Garber, NASA History Web Curator, was die finale koste tussen $ 20 en $ 25 miljard .

Hoeveel sou dit vandag wees? As ons die VPI gebruik, sou dit $ 171 miljard wees, maar dit sou nie 'n baie goeie maatstaf wees nie, aangesien die VPI nie die koste van vuurpyle en lanseerplate weerspieël nie. Die gebruik van die verbruikersbundel sou ook nie relevant wees nie. Die gebruik van die breër BBP -deflator bied 'n huidige koste van $ 134 miljard. 'N Alternatief sou wees om die produksiewerkindeks in huidige terme as 'n rowwe maatstaf van die arbeidskoste te gebruik, en dit is $ 234 miljard. Deur die BBP per capita te gebruik, meet ons die koste in terme van die gemiddelde produk en kry ons 'n aantal $ 326 miljard. Ten slotte, 'n manier om die koste van die gemeenskap in ag te neem, die beste maatstaf is die koste as 'n persentasie van die BBP, en die getal is $ 540 miljard. Hierdie bedrag oor dertien jaar beloop $ 40 miljard per jaar. Ter vergelyking is die NASA -begroting vir die huidige boekjaar ongeveer $ 19 miljard.

Die "regte" prys van petrol: Petrol het in 1929 22 sent per liter gekos vergeleke met ongeveer $ 2,75 vandag.* Hoe het die relatiewe koste vir die aankoop van gas die afgelope 90 jaar verander? Hier word twee tabelle weergegee wat die jaarlikse "werklike" koste bereken met behulp van ons sewe indekse, een in 2019 dollar, en die ander in 1929 dollar. Alhoewel die twee tabelle dieselfde tendense toon, gee dit 'n ander perspektief.

Deur die tabel van 2019 en die VPI en die BBP -deflator te gebruik, sien ons dat petrol in 2012 redelik duur was en dat dit die goedkoopste was in 1998. In 2019 is die werklike prys met behulp van hierdie twee metings 30% tot 50% hoër as die dekade van die 1990's. (Let daarop dat die 2020 -prys moontlik die laagste is wat ons nog ooit gesien het.)

Deur na die deel van die verbruikersbundel en die BBP per capita te kyk, is die verhaal 'n bietjie anders. In 1931 was die 'werklike' prys van petrol $ 2,85 met behulp van die VPI, maar 'n liter gas haal soveel uit wat die gemiddelde verbruiker bestee het as $ 6,86 in 2019. En as 'n deel van die BBP per capita was gas selfs in die vroeëre dae duurder, aangesien dit meer as $ 17,89 in 1931 en selfs $ 6,74 in 1960 was.

Die ander tabel vertel die verhaal op 'n ander manier. Kom ons kyk na die relatiewe koste van 'n werknemer om 1929 dollar op te vul. In daardie jaar het die 21 sent wat dit vir 'n liter gas kos, 'n sekere deel van die werkersloon geneem. Die interessante vraag is: het die koste as 'n aandeel of persent van die werknemer se loon mettertyd gestyg of verminder? Die tabel toon dat hierdie koste vir die twee loontariewe en die prys van petrol in ander jare gedaal het. Aangesien die lone vinniger gestyg het as die petrolprys, bestee 'n ongeskoolde werker teen 2019 minder as 'n vyfde soveel, as 'n persent van die lone, vir 'n liter petrol as die werker van 1929. Vir 'n produksiewerker is dit 'n bietjie meer as 'n kwart. Die tabel toon dat die $ 2,64 wat 'n werker in 2019 betaal het, vergelykbaar kan wees met slegs 3 tot 5 sent (in 1929 se pryse en kwotasie en die loon.)

As ons die BBP per capita gebruik, het die koste vinniger gedaal. As ons na die tabel kyk, toon dit dat 'n liter petrol vandag ongeveer 3 sent per liter kos (in 1929 se pryse) as dit gemeet word as 'n 'aandeel' van die BBP per capita. Dit is omdat 21 sent in 1929 0,44% van die BBP per capita was, terwyl $ 2,45 in 2019 0,004% was.

Ten slotte, as ons die koste as 'n aandeel in die BBP vergelyk, sien ons dat dit vir 2019 (in 1929 -pryse) ongeveer 1 sent is. Dit beteken dat 'n liter petrol in 1929 meer as 21 keer groter was as 'n deel van die produksie as vandag.

Die prys is vir gewone loodvaste petrol tot 1990 en daarna vir gewone loodvrye petrol.
Bron: Vir 1929 tot 2011: Feit #741: 20 Augustus 2012 Historiese petrolpryse, 1929-2011.
Vir 2012 tot hede, tabel 5.4, verskillende Jaarlikse Energieoorsig, Energie -inligtingsadministrasie.

Aanhaling

Samuel H. Williamson, & quot; Sewe maniere om die relatiewe waarde van 'n Amerikaanse dollarbedrag te bereken, 1790 tot hede, & quot MeasuringWorth,
URL: www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/

Laat ons weet of en hoe hierdie bespreking u gehelp het om ons vergelykers te gebruik.


Inflasie word gemeet aan 'n mandjie goedere. Dit is 'n simptoom van wat op markte aangaan. Sommige produkte styg mettertyd in prys. Sommige gaan mettertyd agteruit. Sommige bly dieselfde prys, maar verander hul spesifikasie.

Dit kyk dus na die verkeerde kant van die mikroskoop om te vra waarom inflasie nie motorpryse beïnvloed het nie. Motorpryse is deel van inflasie. Veranderinge in motorpryse beïnvloed inflasie.

Die oorsaaklike verband andersom is baie swak. Inflasie plaas druk op lone. As dit veroorsaak dat lone styg, verskuif die kostekurwe en verander ewewigspryse. Maar vir motors is loonkoste 'n baie klein deel van die totale motorvervaardigingskoste. En die mark vir arbeiders in die bedryf het 'n krimpende vraag en 'n ooraanbod, sodat die opwaartse druk baie swak is.

Die inflasie wat motorvervaardigers ondervind, verskil baie van die inflasie wat die publiek ondervind. Ons het 'n wêreldwye finansiële krisis en 'n supersiklus in goedere beleef. 'N Algemene inflasiemaatreël is 'n baie swak maatstaf vir insetkoste-inflasie vir motorvervaardigers.

You also didn't look at car prices in general but rather just the Toyota Camry. For example a 2001 BMW M3 was

$46,000 while a 2018 BMW M3 is

Most cars have increased in price over the last 20 years, but some manufacturers will always have a cheap car in their lineup .

Specifically treating car prices, well, the prices are determined globally and not necessarily in dollars

In the last 20 years:

Car manufacturers move factories across borders to save costs, China and India have become major market player both as major manufacturers and as a major consumers

As a result of these causes, an additional major impact was added, which is the exchange currencies' exchange rates.

For the last 10 years:

Following the global economic crisis, interest rates dropped to practically zero worldwide, trying, among other things, to encourage local exports, in what was called a "currency war".

The last major impact, that I can add, might sound trivial, but it's there: the technology improvements implemented in car factories over the past 20 years, must have dropped the cost of manufacturing, for the same vehicles. meaning: either vehicles cost remained similar but cars got better, so products are not that comparable.

Vehicle manufacturing in the same place, over time got cheaper.

You're not considering that today's $23,000 car might not be the same car as the one from 20 years ago, or that the costs of its manufacture might not be the same.

While the "basket of goods" another answerer referred to has simple items in it like rice, soap, tee-shirts and hammers, a car is a very poor item to measure inflation with, because of its complexity. Hundreds of parts and indeed hundreds of different types of materials go into it. Many dozens of different raw commodities are involved. Scores of different kinds of worker inputs are involved, with probably thousands of different individual contributors adding value along the way before you get your car.

Today's $23,000 car is probably made with cheaper materials. A 20-year-old Camry today probably feels cheap-o compared to a brand-new one, but, op daardie stadium, a brand-new Camry at that price point 20 years ago probably felt reasonably decent compared to other Camrys at lower trim levels and other cars at lower price points. Today's $23K Camry on the other hand feels cheap-o compared to the premium trim Camry and compared to other cars at higher price points with more premium materials.

That's one factor. Another is, today's cars are produced with 20 years' worth of production efficiency improvements. So even with the 20 years worth of technology improvements which make today's Camry a more advanced car than the 20-year-old one, it's still cheaper because cheaper ways to automate production have been found.

Products like this are really really bad things to use to judge inflation. Today's iphones cost about the same as those from 10 years ago too (in nominal dollars), but they're clearly way way more phone for your money. Something today with five million times the computing power of something which took a Congressional appropriation 60 years ago costs a five-millionth as much as that dinosaurian system.

Certain things work against the inflationary trend, on the surface, but really tell you nothing whatsoever about inflation.


How can prices be compared over time? - Geskiedenis

For most of the past twenty years, the challenges confronting monetary policymakers centered on addressing the question of how inflation could be brought down with as little economic disruption as possible. Given the progress that has been made in reducing inflation, and the very solid economic performance that this low-inflation environment has helped to promote, a new set of issues is now emerging on the policy agenda. Of mounting importance is a deeper understanding of the economic characteristics of sustained price stability. We central bankers need also to better judge how to assess our performance in achieving and maintaining that objective in light of the uncertainties surrounding the accuracy of our measured price indexes.

In today's advanced economies, allocative decisions are primarily made by markets. Prices of goods and services set in those markets are central guides to the efficient allocation of resources in a market economy, along with interest rates and equity values. Prices are the signals through which tastes and technology affect the decisions of consumers and producers, directing resources toward their highest valued use. Of course, this signaling process, which involves individual prices, would work with or without government statistical agencies that measure aggregate price levels, and in this sense, price measurement probably is not fundamental for the overall efficiency of the market economy. Indeed, vibrant market economies existed long before government agencies were established to measure prices.

Nonetheless, in a modern monetary economy, accurate measurement of aggregate price levels is of considerable importance, increasingly so for central banks whose mandate is to maintain financial stability. Accurate price measures are necessary for understanding economic developments, not only involving inflation, but also involving real output and productivity. If the general price level is estimated to be rising more rapidly than is in fact the case, then we are simultaneously understating growth in real GDP and productivity, and real incomes and living standards are rising faster than our published data suggest.

Under these circumstances, policymakers must be cognizant of the shortcomings of our published price indexes to avoid actions based on inaccurate premises that will provoke undesired consequences. Clearly, central bankers need to be conscious of the problems of price measurement as we gauge policies designed to promote price stability and maximum sustainable economic growth. Moreover, many economic transactions, both private and public, are explicitly tied to movements in some published price index, most commonly a consumer price index and some transactions that are not explicitly tied to a published price index may, nevertheless, take such an index into account less formally. If the price index is not accurately measuring what the participants in such transactions believe it is measuring, then economic transactions will lead to suboptimal outcomes.

The remarkable progress that has been made by virtually all of the major industrial countries in achieving low rates of inflation in recent years has brought the issue of price measurement into especially sharp focus. For most purposes, biases of a few tenths in annual inflation rates do not matter when inflation is high. They do matter when, as now, inflation has become so low that policymakers need to consider at what point effective price stability has been reached. Indeed, some observers have begun to question whether deflation is now a possibility, and to assess the potential difficulties such a development might pose for the economy.

Even if deflation is not considered a significant near-term risk for the economy, the increasing discussion of it could be clearer in defining the circumstance. Regrettably, the term deflation is being used to describe several different states that are not necessarily depicting similar economic conditions. One use of the term refers to an ongoing fall in the prices of existing assets. Asset prices are inherently volatile, in part because expected returns from real assets can vary for a wide variety of reasons, some of which may be only tangentially related to the state of the economy and monetary policy. Nonetheless, a drop in the prices of existing assets can feed back onto real economic activity, not only by changing incentives to consume and invest, but also by impairing the health of financial intermediaries--as we experienced in the early 1990s and many Asian countries are learning now. But historically, it has been very rapid asset price declines--in equity and real estate, especially--that have held the potential to be a virulently negative force in the economy. I emphasize rapid declines because, in most circumstances, slowly deflating asset prices probably can be absorbed without the marked economic disruptions that frequently accompany sharp corrections. The severe economic contraction of the early 1930s, and the associated persistent declines in product prices, could probably not have occurred apart from the steep asset price deflation that started in 1929.

While asset price deflation can occur for a number of reasons, a persistent deflation in the prices of currently produced goods and services--just like a persistent increase in these prices--necessarily is, at its root, a monetary phenomenon. Just as changes in monetary conditions that involve a flight from money to goods cause inflation, the onset of deflation involves a flight from goods to money. Both rapid or variable inflation and deflation can lead to a state of fear and uncertainty that is associated with significant increases in risk premiums and corresponding shortfalls in economic activity.

Even a moderate rate of inflation can hamper economic performance, as I have emphasized many times before and although we do not have any recent experience, moderate rates of deflation would most probably lead to similar problems. Deflation, like inflation, would distort resource allocation and interfere with the economy's ability to reach its full potential. It would have these effects by making long-term planning difficult, obscuring the true movements of relative prices, and interacting adversely with institutions like the tax system that function on the basis on nominal values.

But deflation can be detrimental for reasons that go beyond those that are also associated with inflation. Nominal interest rates are bounded at zero, hence deflation raises the possibility of potentially significant increases in real interest rates. Some also argue that resistance to nominal wage cuts will impart an upward bias to real wages as price stability approaches or outright deflation occurs, leaving the economy with a potentially higher level of unemployment in equilibrium.

A deflation that took place in an environment of rapid productivity growth, however, might be largely immune from some of these special problems. For example, in the high-tech sector of our economy today, we observe falling prices together with rapid investment and high profitability. Although real interest rates may be quite high in terms of this sector's declining product prices, rapid productivity growth has ensured that real rates of return are higher still, and investment in this sector has been robust. In practice, firms' decisions depend on an evaluation of their nominal return on investment relative to their nominal cost of capital. In this sense, the choice of a specific, sometimes arbitrary, definition of real output and hence of price by government statisticians is essentially a descriptive issue, and not one that directly affects firms' investment decisions. This is an illustration of where even individual price measurement probably is not always of direct and fundamental importance for private sector behavior.

If such high-tech, high-productivity-growth firms produce an increasing share of output in the decades ahead, then, one could readily imagine the economy experiencing an overall product price deflation in which the problems associated with a zero constraint on nominal interest rates or nominal wage changes would seldom be binding. Nevertheless, even if we could ensure significantly more rapid productivity growth than we have seen recently, there are valid reasons for wishing to avoid ongoing declines in the general price level. If increases in both inflation and deflation raise risk premiums and retard growth, it follows that risk premiums are lowest at price stability. Furthermore, price stability, by reducing variation in uncertainty about the future, should also reduce variations in asset values.

But how are we to know when our objective of price stability has been achieved? In price measurement, a distinction must be made between the measurement of individual prices, on the one hand, and the aggregation of those prices into indexes of the overall price level on the other. The notion of what we mean by a general price level--or more relevantly, its change--is never unambiguously defined.

Issues of appropriate weighting in the aggregation process will presumably always bedevil us. But it is the measurement of individual prices, not their aggregation, that pose the most difficult conceptual issues. At first glance, observing and measuring prices might not appear especially daunting. But, in fact, the problem is deceptively complex. To be sure, the dollar value of most transactions is unambiguously exact, and, at least in principle, is amenable to highly accurate estimation by our statistical agencies. But dividing that nominal value change into components representing changes in real quantity versus price requires that one define a unit of output that is to remain constant in all transactions over time. Defining such a constant-quality unit of output, of course, is the central conceptual difficulty in price measurement.

Such a definition may be clear for unalloyed aluminum ingot of 99.7 percent or greater purity in wide use. Consequently, its price can be compared over time with a degree of precision adequate for virtually all producers and consumers of aluminum ingot. Similarly, the prices of a ton of cold rolled steel sheet, or of a linear yard of cotton broad woven fabric, can be reasonably compared over a period of years.

But when the characteristics of products and services are changing rapidly, defining the unit of output, and thereby adjusting an item's price for improvements in quality, can be exceptionally difficult. These problems are becoming pervasive in modern economies as high tech and service prices, which are generally more difficult to measure, become ever more prominent in aggregate price measures. One does not have to look only to the most advanced technology to recognize the difficulties that are faced. To take just a few examples, automobile tires, refrigerators, winter jackets, and tennis rackets have all changed in ways that make them surprisingly hard to compare to their counterparts of twenty or thirty years ago.

The continual introduction of new goods and services onto the markets creates special challenges for price measurement. In some cases, a new good may best be viewed as an improved version of an old good. But, in many cases, new products may deliver services that simply were not available before. When personal computers were first introduced, the benefits they brought households in terms of word processing services, financial calculations, organizational assistance, and the like, were truly unique. And, further in the past, think of the revolutionary changes that automobile ownership, or jet travel, brought to people's lives. In theory, economists understand how to value such innovations in practice, it is an enormous challenge to construct such an estimate with any precision.

The area of medical care, where technology is changing in ways that make techniques of only a decade ago seem archaic, provides some particularly striking illustrations of the difficulties involved in measuring quality-adjusted prices. Cures and preventive treatments have become available for previously untreatable diseases. Medical advances have led to new treatments that are more effective and that have increased the speed and comfort of recovery. In an area with such rapid technological change, what is the appropriate unit of output? Is it a procedure, a treatment, or a cure? How does one value the benefit to the patient when a condition that once required a complicated operation and a lengthy stay in the hospital now can be easily treated on an outpatient basis?

Although we may not be able to discern its details, the pace of change and the shift toward output that is difficult to measure are more likely to quicken than to slow down. How, then, will we measure inflation in the future if our measurement techniques become increasingly obsolete? We must keep in mind that, difficult as the problem seems, consistently measured prices do exist in principle. Embodied in all products is some unit of output, and hence of price, that is recognizable to those who buy and sell the product if not to the outside observer. A company that pays a sum of money for computer software knows what it is buying, and at least has an idea about its value relative to software it has purchased in the past, and relative to other possible uses for that sum of money in the present.

Furthermore, so long as people continue to exchange nominal interest rate debt instruments and contract for future payments in terms of dollars or other currencies, there must be a presumption about the future purchasing power of money no matter how complex individual products become. Market participants do have a sense of the aggregate price level and how they expect it to change over time, and these views must be embedded in the value of financial assets.

The emergence of inflation-indexed bonds, while providing us with useful information, does not solve the problem of ascertaining an economically meaningful measure of the general price level. By necessity, the total return on indexed bonds must be tied to forecasts of specific published price indexes, which may or may not reflect the market's judgment of the future purchasing power of money. To the extent they do not, of course, the implicit real interest rate is biased in the opposite direction. Moreover, we are, as yet, unable to separate compensation for inflation risk from compensation for expected inflation.

Eventually, financial markets may develop the instruments and associated analytical techniques for unearthing these implicit changes in the general price level with some precision. In those circumstances, then--at least for purposes of monetary policy--these measures could obviate the more traditional approaches to aggregate price measurement now employed. They may help us understand, for example, whether markets perceive the true change in aggregate prices to reflect fixed or variable weight indexes of the components, or whether arithmetic or logarithmic weighting of the components is more appropriate.

But, for the foreseeable future, we shall have to rely on our statistical agencies to produce the price data necessary to assess economic performance and to make economic policy. In that regard, assuming further advances in economic science and provided that our statistical agencies receive adequate resources, procedures should continue to improve. To be sure, progress will not be easy, for estimating the value of quality improvements is a painstaking process. It must be done methodically, item by item. But progress can be made.

In recent years, we have developed an improved ability to capture quality differences by pricing the underlying characteristics of complex products. With an increasingly wide range of product variants available to the public, product characteristics are now bundled together in an enormous variety of combinations. A "personal computer" is, in actuality, an amalgamation of computing speed, memory, networking capability, graphics capability, and so on. Computer manufacturers are moving toward build-to-order systems, in which any combination of these specifications and peripheral equipment is available to each individual buyer. Other examples abound. Advancements in computer-assisted design have reduced the costs of producing multiple varieties of small machine tools. And in services, witness the plethora of products now available from financial institutions, which have allowed a more complete disentangling and exchange of economic risks across participants around the world. Although hard data are scarce, there can be little doubt that products are tailor-made for the buyer to a larger extent than ever. Gone are the days when Henry Ford could say he would sell a car of any color "so long as it's black."

In such an environment, when product characteristics are bundled together in so many different combinations, defining the unit of output means unbundling these characteristics, and pricing each of them separately. The so-called hedonic technique is designed to do precisely that. This technique associates changes in a product's price with changes in product characteristics. It therefore allows a quality comparison when new products with improved characteristics are introduced. This approach has been especially useful in the pricing of computers. But hedonics are by no means a panacea. First of all, this technique obviously will be of no use in valuing the quality of an entirely new product that has fundamentally different characteristics from its predecessors. The benefits of cellular telephones, and the value they provide in terms of making calls from any location, cannot be measured from an examination of the attributes of standard telephones.

In addition, the measured characteristics may only be proxies for the overall performance that consumers ultimately value. In the case of computers, the buyer ultimately cares about the quality of services that computer will provide--word processing capabilities, database services, high-speed calculations, and so on. But, in many cases, the number of message instructions per second and the other easily measured characteristics may not be a wholly adequate proxy for the computer services that the individual buyer values. In these circumstances, the right approach, ultimately, may be to move toward directly pricing the services we obtain from our computers--that is, word processing services, database management services, and so on--rather than pricing separately the hardware and software.

The issues surrounding the appropriate measurement of computer prices also illustrate some of the difficulties of valuing goods and services when there are significant interactions among users of the products. New generations of computers sometimes require software that is incompatible with previous generations, and some users who have no need for the improved computing power nevertheless may feel compelled to purchase the new technology because they need to remain compatible with the bulk of users who are at the frontier. Even if our techniques allow us to accurately measure consumers' valuation of the increased speed and power of the new generation of computer, we may miss the negative influence on some consumers of this incompatibility. Therefore, even in the case of personal computers, where we have made such great strides in measuring quality changes, I suspect that important phenomena still may not be adequately captured by our published price indexes.

Despite the advances in price measurement that have been made over the years, there remains considerable room for improvement. As you know, a group of experts empaneled by the Senate Finance Committee--the Boskin commission--concluded that the consumer price index has overstated changes in the cost of living by roughly one percentage point per annum in recent years. About half of this bias owed to inadequate adjustment for quality improvement and the introduction of new goods, and about half reflected the manner in which the individual prices were aggregated. Researchers at the Federal Reserve and elsewhere have come up with similar figures. Although the estimates of bias owing to inadequate adjustment for quality improvements surely are the most uncertain aspect of this calculation, the preponderance of evidence is that, on average, such a bias in quality adjustment does exist.

The Boskin commission and most others estimating bias in the CPI have taken a microstatistical approach, estimating separately the magnitude of each category of potential bias. Recent work by staff economists at the Federal Reserve Board has added corroborating evidence of price mismeasurement, using a macroeconomic approach that is essentially independent of the microstatistical exercises. Specifically, employing disaggregated data from the national income and product accounts, this research finds that the measured growth of real output and productivity in the service sector is implausibly weak, given that the return to owners of businesses in that sector apparently has been well-maintained. Indeed, the published data indicate that the level of output per hour in a number of service-producing industries has been falling for more than two decades. It is simply not credible that firms in these industries have been becoming less and less efficient for more than twenty years. Much more reasonable is the view that prices have been mismeasured, and that the true quality-adjusted prices have been rising more slowly than the published price indexes. Properly measured, output and productivity trends in these service industries are doubtless considerably stronger than suggested by the published data. Assuming, for example, no change in the productivity levels for these industries in recent years would imply a price bias consistent with the Boskin commission findings.

A Commerce Department official once compared a nation's statistical system to a tailor, measuring the economy much as a tailor measures a person for a suit of clothes--with the difference that, unlike the tailor, the person we are measuring is running while we try to measure him. The only way the system can succeed, he said, is to be just as fast and twice as agile. That is the challenge that lies ahead, and it is, indeed, a large one.

There are, however, reasons for optimism. The information revolution, which lies behind so much of the rapid technological change that makes prices difficult to measure, will surely play an important role in helping our statistical agencies acquire the necessary speed and agility to better capture the changes taking place in our economies. Computers, for example, might some day allow our statistical agencies to tap into a great many economic transactions on a nearly real-time basis. Utilizing data from store checkout scanners, which the BLS is now investigating, may be an important first step in that direction. But the possibilities offered by information technology for the improvement of price measurement may turn out to be much broader in scope. Just as it is difficult to predict the ways in which technology will change our consumption over time, so is it difficult to predict how economic and statistical science will make creative use of the improved technology.


How Swansea house prices have changed over the last 25 years

Some people in Swansea may have been lucky enough to see the value of their home triple in the past 25 years.

The Land Registry has published data on house prices in Wales for the last quarter of a century, with figures dating back to January, 1995.

And the average house price in Swansea has changed a lot over the past two-and-a-half decades.

Here&aposs how average house prices have compared over the years.

In 1995

For those buying in 1995, the average price of a home in Swansea was £44,365 .

The new earnings survey by the Office for National Statistics put average earnings across the UK for men at around £16,800, and at around £12,300 for women - potentially making homes in Swansea an affordable 2.6 to 3.6 times wages.

From 1995 to 2000, house prices rose by 21% to an average of £53,880 in January, 2000, but it was the next five years that really saw house prices soar.

Between 2000 and 2005, house prices in Swansea doubled to an average of £111,211 , an increase of 106%.

The average wage in Swansea that year, according to data the ONS began recording in 2002, was £17,498.

That made house prices in Swansea a much less affordable 6.4 times wages.

House prices across the UK rose rapidly before the financial crash in 2007, as banks made lending easier through things like 100%+, interest-only and buy to let mortgages and bigger salary multiples, and put much more money into property lending, driving up demand while housebuilding failed to keep pace.

The housing market crash that followed the financial crisis meant slower price growth in Swansea over the next five years - up 15% from 2005 to an average of £127,488 in 2010.

House price growth continued to struggle for the next five years - going up 3% between 2010 and 2015, to an average of £130,928 .

Today&aposs housing market

Recent years have seen slightly faster growth, up 16% from 2015 to an average of £152,423 in 2020.

That means that house prices in Swansea this January were 3.4 times higher than in 1995.

In 2019, which are the most recent figures available, the average wage in the area was £23,019, meaning homes are now 6.6 times higher than incomes.

Inside Wales&apos most expensive rental property that you can live in for £3k a month:


Food and inflation

The Office of National Statistics’ (ONS) Consumer Price Index (CPI) shows that between 1988 and 2005, the cost of food generally rose below the rate of inflation. In 2006, this changed and the cost of food rose above the rate of inflation, before dropping in 2013-14.

Since 2016, food prices have been on the rise again but at a lower rate than inflation (food prices went up 4.3%, whereas all inflation was 5.2%).

Graph showing how food prices have changed in the UK relative to the rising cost of all items (CPI)

Individual food groups give a more detailed picture of what’s been happening. The graph above shows that the price of fish has risen above the rate of inflation since 1988, while meat has risen at a rate lower than inflation.

This means it’s comparatively more expensive to buy fish and cheaper to buy meat than it was 30 years ago. Similarly, oils and fat have become more expensive, but vegetables have got cheaper.

Between 2010 and 2018 the cost of frozen prawns increased by 67% and fresh white fish fillets by 38%. In the same period, the cost of iceberg lettuce decreased by 33% and fresh boneless chicken breasts by 16%.


How America Spends Money: 100 Years in the Life of the Family Budget

You can learn a lot about somebody by looking through his receipts. Is he rich? Is she poor? Where does he shop? What does she value?

Alas, the U.S. economy doesn't come with a receipt. GDP tells us how much stuff we produce. GDI, or gross domestic income, tells us how much money we make. But these numbers don't tell us what the economy looks like from the viewpoint of a typical household.

Fortunately, we have something that's very close to an aggregate receipt for the American family going back more than a century: "100 Years of U.S. Consumer Spending", a report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

This is our story today: It is a story about how spending on food and clothing went from half the family budget in 1900 to less than a fifth in 2000.It is a story about how a nation that feels poor got so rich. Here's the big picture in one chart showing the share of family spending per category over the 20th century. The big story is that spending on food and clothes has fallen massively while spending on housing and services has gone up.

The year is 1900. The United States is a different country. We are near the end of the Millennium, but in the "warp and woof of life," we are living closer to the 1600s than the 2000s, as Brad DeLong memorably put it. A quarter of households have running water. Even fewer own the home they lived in. Fewer still have flush toilets. One-twelfth of households have gas or electric lights, one-twentieth have telephones, one-in-ninety own a car, and nobody owns a television.

So where are we spending all our money? Most of our income goes to the places where we work -- to the farm, to the textile mills, and to the house. The typical household haul in 1901 is about $750.

Families spend a whopping 80% of that on food, clothes, and homes.

In 1900, seen from perch of the Bureau of Labor Statistics -- which counts national jobs, income and spending -- the United States is like one big farm surrounded by a cluster of small factories. Almost half of the country works in agriculture. As for the budding services economy: There are more household servants than sales workers. As for the women's rights movement: More than twice as many households report income from children (22%) than wives (9%).

Over the next 100 years, the U.S. family got smaller, more reliant on working women and computers, less reliant on working children and farms, and, most importantly, much richer. About 68-times richer, in fact. Household income (unadjusted for inflation) doubled six times in the 20th century, or once every decade and a half, on average.

But to appreciate the transition in full, let's first meet it halfway.

The year is 1950. Compared to just five decades earlier, the United States is already a different country. The population has doubled to 150 million. The economy's share of farmers has fallen from 40% to 10%, thanks to the mechanization of the farm, led by the mighty tractor. At the same time, food has gotten much cheaper compared to wages, and its share of the family budget has declined from 43% to 30%.

Meanwhile, the "making-stuff" economy is at its apex. Nearly half of working men are craftsmen or operators. (The female labor participation rate is still below 20%.) Factory wages have grown by seven-fold since 1901, and they've nearly tripled since the Great Depression. Textile manufacturing has never been higher and will never be higher. The year 1950 is its exact peak. Apparel manufacturing would grow through the 1970s before collapsing in the last third of the decade. The U.S. was the making-stuff capital of the world, and our dominance probably felt indefinite.

Half a century later, factories, just like farms before them, would become the victims of American efficiency.

It's become fashionable to consider the 1950s a golden age in American economics. Employment was full. Wages were rising. Manufacturing was strong. But if you're the kind of person who likes clothes or food, then welcome to paradise.

In the last 50 years, food and apparel's share of family has fallen from 42% to 17% (and remember, we were near 60% in 1900) as we've found cheaper ways to eat and clothe ourselves. Food production got more efficient, and we offshored the making of clothes to other countries with cheaper labor. As a result, apparel's share of the pie, which hardly changed in the first half of the century, shrank in the second half by two-thirds.

So if the typical American family feels squeezed, what's squeezing us?

I have two answers: The first answer is housing and cars. Half of that orange "other" slice is transportation costs: mostly cars, gas, and public transit. A century ago, if you recall, 80% of families were renters and nobody owned a car. Today, more than 60% of families are home owners, and practically everybody owns a car.*

The other answer, which you can't see as clearly in this chart, is health care. Health-care spending makes up more than 16% of the U.S. economy, but only 6% of family spending, according to the CES. One reason for the gap is that most medical spending isn't out of our pockets. Employers pay workers' premiums and government foots the bill for the elderly and the low-income. Government spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid has quadrupled since the 1950s in the most meaningful measurement, which is share of GDP.

In short, health care costs are squeezing Americans. But the details of this squeeze elude the color-wheel above. We are paying for health care with taxes, borrowing, and compensation that goes to health benefits, rather than wages.

In 1900, the Bureau of Labor Statistics counted three categories as necessities: housing, food, and apparel. In the last 100 years, we've added to the list. Health care has become necessary. For most people, a car has become necessary. Even higher ed is a necessity for today's middle class.

We have new expectations for what our money should buy. We have earned (literally) the right to expect more from life in America.

Historical context shouldn't cheapen middle class suffering. Today's suffering is real. Unemployment is high. Wage growth is flat. We are squeezed by rising health care costs and scarcity of affordable housing in productive cities.

And yet, who can deny that we are richer? A century ago, we spent more than half our money on food and clothes. Today, we spend more than half of our money on housing and transportation. Our ambitions turned from bread and shirts to ownership and highways. We are all subtle victims of the expectations that 100 years of wealth have bought.

*Even for people who decide not to buy, higher rent costs driven by popular coastal cities, constrictive urban policies, and a shortage of multifamily homes also increase housing costs


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