Geskiedenis van sokker taktiek en speelvorming

Geskiedenis van sokker taktiek en speelvorming

Voetbaltaktieke is die strategieë wat die lede van die een kant gebruik om die doeltreffendste met hul teenstanders mee te ding. Hierdie taktiek word gewoonlik deur bestuurders of afrigters bedink. Byvoorbeeld, die regter-agterspeler kan aangesê word om die buitekant links te dwing om na regs te hardloop en hom sy swakker voet te laat gebruik.

Die belangrikste is dat taktiek verwys na die spelstelsel of spanvorming wat die bestuurder of afrigter gebruik. Die eerste sokkerspanne in die 19de eeu was geneig om 'n stelsel van agt voorspelers te speel, met 'n doelwagter, agterspeler en driekwart as verdedigers. In die 1870's het suksesvolle spanne 'n effens ander formasie gebruik wat sewe voorspelers, twee agterspelers en een heelagter ingesluit het. Gedurende hierdie tydperk is groot klem gelê op die dribbelvaardighede van individue.

In die 1880's het William Sudell en Tom Mitchell spelers uit Skotland begin koop en hul spanne, Preston North End en Blackburn Rovers, het baie suksesvol geword. Hierdie spelers het die sogenaamde 'Skotse styl' saamgebring, wat meer klem gelê het op aangee as dribbel.

Die eerste seisoen van die Football League het in September 1888 begin. William Sudell en sy Preston North End -span het die eerste kampioenskap gewen sonder om 'n enkele wedstryd te verloor en die naam "onoorwinlike" gekry. Preston het ook Wolverhampton Wanderers met 3-0 geklop om die FA Cup-eindstryd van 1889 te wen. In daardie seisoen het Sudell die 2-3-5-formasie gebruik (twee agterspelers, drie-half-agterspelers en vyf voorspelers).

Die sukses van Preston North End het ander klubs oorreed om die 2-3-5-formasie aan te neem. Hierdie stelsel oorheers sokker tot 1925 toe die FA besluit het om die onkantreël te verander. Die verandering het die aantal opposisiespelers wat 'n aanvaller tussen hom en die doellyn benodig, van drie na twee verminder.

Charlie Buchan, wat vir Arsenal gespeel het, het aan die bestuurder Herbert Chapman voorgestel dat die span hierdie wetswysiging moet benut om 'n nuwe spelformasie te skep. Die idee was dat die middelste helfte, eerder as die twee agterspelers, verantwoordelikheid moes neem vir die buitekantval. Die agterspelers het net voor die middelste helfte gespeel, terwyl een van die voorspelers terug in die middelveld gebring is. Die formasie is dus verander van 2-3-5 na 3-3-4. Dit het ook bekend gestaan ​​as die "WM" formasie.

Die stelsel het 'n teenaanvalspel ontwikkel. Dit het berus op die verbygaande vermoë van Alex James en doelskieters soos David Jack, Cliff Bastin, Jack Lambert en Ted Drake. Sukses was nie onmiddellik nie en eers in 1930 het Arsenal die FA Cup -eindstryd gewen.

Die daaropvolgende seisoen het Arsenal hul eerste First Division -kampioenskap ooit gewen. Alex James is 'n groot deel van die 1931-32-seisoen beseer, en dit was 'n belangrike faktor dat Arsenal die titel met twee punte aan Everton verloor het. James was op sy beste in die seisoen 1932-33. Arsenal het die eerste afdeling met vier punte gewen. Hulle het ook daardie seisoen 'n klubrekord van 118 doele in die liga aangeteken. Arsenal het ook die volgende seisoen die liga gewen en Huddersfield Town in die tweede plek verslaan. Teen hierdie tyd is die WM -formasie deur die meeste klubs in die Football League gebruik.

Herbert Chapman was een van die min bestuurders wat voor wedstryde by die besluitneming van taktiek betrokke geraak het. Jimmy Ruffell het tussen 1920 en 1937 vir West Ham United gespeel. Die span word bestuur deur Syd King, maar hy beweer dat dit Charlie Paynter was wat oor die span se taktiek besluit het: "Syd King was 'n goeie bestuurder. Maar hy het die hele dag verlaat. vandag se dinge aan ons afrigter Charlie Paynter. Dit was Charlie met wie die meeste van ons oor enigiets gepraat het. Syd King was meer daaroor om transaksies te doen om spelers vir West Ham te laat speel. "

Gelyke opmerkings is gemaak oor Joe Smith wat Blackpool bestuur het tussen 1935-1956. Stanley Matthews het aangevoer dat Smith: "Nooit 'n goeie taktikus of selfs 'n redelike een nie, hy was nietemin die beste bestuurder vir wie ek ooit die voorreg gehad het om voor te speel. Joe het die beste in my na vore gebring omdat hy my toegelaat het om my natuurlike spel te speel. Ek sal altyd dankbaar wees vir sy ondersteuning en geloof, veral as ek terugkyk na die oomblikke toe situasies my laat twyfel het aan myself en my eie vermoë ... Joe was 'n wonderlike sielkundige wat 'n gemiddelde speler kon laat glo en optree as 'n goeie speler, en 'n goeie speler as 'n baie goeie speler. Hy het 'n paar baie goeie spelers geteken, en dit is die moeilikste deel van 'n bestuurder se werk. Joe het dit keer op keer gedoen. Soos ek al voorheen gesê het, het 'n bestuurder nie hulle weet vir goeie spelers wat hulle moet doen. ”

Cyril Robinson het in die FA Cup -eindstryd van 1953 vir Blackpool teen Bolton Wanderers gespeel. Hy het later beweer dat Smith voor die wedstryd gesê het: "gaan daarheen en laat hulle klop". Volgens Stanley Matthews het hy gesê: "Gaan uit en geniet dit. Wees die spelers wat ek weet, en ons sal regkom."

Stan Mortensen het ook onder Joe Smith in Blackpool gespeel. Hy het ook toegegee dat Smith min tyd spandeer het oor taktiek, wat aan Harry Johnson, die kaptein, oorgelaat is: "Joe het 'n uitstekende deug onder al sy ander - en hulle is baie. Hy is omtrent die beste verloorder en wenner in sokker. As ons wen, is hy nooit in die lug nie en droom hy van kampioenskappe; en as ons verloor, is hy vinnig vertroostend en val nooit in die mond nie. Joe was so lank in die spel as speler en bestuurder dat hy weet Baie goed dat een nederlaag nie neerslag beteken nie, maar meer as een oorwinning dui op die wen van die beker of liga. "

Terwyl ek in Skotland was, het ek kennis gemaak met die Calthorpe Football Club, wat vroeër die tweede span van Queen's Park gespeel het. Daar was 'n paar baie billike spelers in die Calthorpe en ek het besluit toe ek in Birmingham aankom om by hulle aan te sluit. Maar een van my mede-werkers, George Uzzell, het Aston Villa vir my genoem as 'n klub wat vinnig na vore gekom het en my gevra om lid daarvan te word. Ek het 'n geruime tyd getwyfel, maar uiteindelik het my vriend my vertel dat 'n 'broer Scot', mnr. George Ramsay, die Villa -kaptein was, en dit het my besluit. Mnr. Ramsay was 'n Glasgow -man en het hom baie inspan om die Villa -span in die voorste posisie te bring. Hy was self 'n goeie regse voorspeler en is goed ondersteun deur W. B. Mason. Dus het ek na meneer Ramsay gegaan en ons het dadelik goeie vriende geword en dit bly tot vandag toe.

Mnr. Ramsay was feitlik die stigter van die Aston Villa Football Club. Hy het goeie onderrig in die spel gehad terwyl hy in Skotland was, en as lid van die Oxford Club het hy baie ervaring opgedoen en aan verskeie eersteklas wedstryde deelgeneem. 'N Kort rukkie voor hy vertrek het sy klub drie keer gelykop met die Glasgow Rangers vir die Scotch Cup. Hy was besig om sy doel te behou en vertel dat hy by die laaste geleentheid sy doel gered het ten koste van 'n gebreekte neus.

Mnr. Ramsay was 'n groot speler en kon enige posisie inneem en goeie rekenskap van homself gee. Toe hy na Birmingham kom, vind hy voetbal hier in 'n baie agterlike toestand. Die vier vernaamste klubs was St. Mary's, Aston Unity, Calthorpe en die Birmingham. Op 'n dag het meneer Ramsay 'n paar seuns gesien wat saam speel in die groot openbare park wat na Parkweg, Aston kyk, en hy kyk na hulle met 'n mate van nuuskierigheid en vermaak. Hulle was verbind met die Villa Cross Wesleyan -kapel en het slegs die mees primitiewe idees van die spel. Ramsay beskryf hul spel as ''n stamp teen die man en 'n groot skop na die bal;' hulle was heeltemal onkundig oor dribbel en was blykbaar in die mees rudimentêre stadium van kennis - nogal 'jeugdig', soos mnr. Ramsay gesê het.

Toe hy 'n rukkie na die seuns gekyk het, het hy met 'n omstander gepraat en voorgestel dat hulle twee by die wedstryd moes aansluit. Toe roep hy na een van die spelers, William Weiss by die naam, en stel voor dat hy aan die een kant en sy toevallige kennis aan die ander kant mag speel. Toe sy breë Scotch na baie moeite verstaan ​​is, is die voorstel aanvaar en het Ramsay begin speel. Hy het gou getoon dat die wetenskap beter was as al hul groot skoppe en hy dribbel maklik die bal verby die manne wat nog nooit so 'n vertoning gesien het nie. Hulle was verbaas toe hulle sien hoe hy speel en toe alles verby is, omring hulle die speler wat die bal geslaan het.

Die invloed van Ramsay, destyds Hunter, het daartoe gelei dat Villa 'n ingewikkelde verbygaande spel ontwikkel het, 'n revolusionêre stap vir 'n Engelse klub in die laat 1870's. Dit was 'n speelstyl wat gebaseer was op die destydse wat in Skotland algemeen was, wat destyds in Skotland algemeen was en wat deur Queen's Park, die kant van Glasgow, aangevoer is. Hierdie soort gesofistikeerde spanwerk is selde in Engeland gebruik. In plaas daarvan sou individue probeer om die bal so ver as moontlik op hul eie te neem totdat hulle deur 'n teenstander gestop is.

Ons het van Nottingham na Birmingham gereis en die nodige klere vir opleiding gekry en dieselfde aand na Droitwich gegaan. Buite die stasie wag 'n rem op ons en op 'n pikdonker nag ry 'n tiental van ons deur die stil landpaaie na 'n klein plek op die rivier Severn, genaamd Holt Fleet.

Hier het ons om middernag aangekom, en toe ons moeg was vir die dag se inspanning en lomerig was, het ons in die bed geval. Die hotelverblyf in daardie dae by Holt Fleet was van 'n beperkte aard en die gasheer was nie gewoond daaraan dat sulke groot partytjies verblyf vra nie. Hy was nie voorbereid vir ons nie, en die eerste aand moes ons dit moeilik maak. Ses van ons het op 'n boonste solder geslaap waarin drie beddens neergesit is. Ek sê ons het geslaap, maar dit is nie heeltemal korrek nie. Ons is daar laat slaap, maar die pes wat snags bekruip, was teen ons.

Dit alles is natuurlik later herstel deur die gasvrye gasheer, wat sy uiterste bes gedoen het om ons gemaklik te maak. Maar u sal wonder waarom ons hierdie plek vir ons doel gekies het. Dit was nie ons ontdekking nie, maar dit is aanbeveel deur W. G. George, die kampioen myl-hardloper. Dit was sy gewoonte om, tydens opleiding, tussen Bromsgrove en Droitwich en Holt Fleet tussen hierdie twee plekke te loop. Die distrik is baie gunstig vir atlete. Daar is 'n mooi oop stuk land en daar is 'n rivier, wat elke boot bied om te vaar en te swem. Dan is die wandelinge oral heerlik en die pekelbad in Droitwich is natuurlik baie gerieflik.

Sedert ons daar was, het ander voetbalspanne die voordele daarvan beleef, veral die Wolverhampton Wanderers. Hier het ons 'n week by ons afrigter, Billy Gorman, gebly. Hy was 'n beroemde naelloper en het 'n spesiale voorgee gewen; en toe hy ophou om self aan openbare wedstryde deel te neem, het hy hom toegewy aan die opleiding van atlete en 'n hoofmaat.

Ons het elke oggend om agtuur vinnig opgestaan ​​en ontbyt geneem. Daarna het ons 'n uur of wat rondgeloop soos ons wil. Daarna trek ons ​​ons uniform aan en met toestemming, wat goedgunstiglik toegestaan ​​is deur Lord Dudley se opsiener, is ons toegelaat om die grond agter die hotel te gebruik vir naellope en hardloop. Dit was nuuskierig om die verskil waar te neem wat vinnig in sommige of ons fisiese vermoëns gemaak is. Daar was byvoorbeeld Dennis Hodgetts, wat ons stadige man genoem is. Tot op hierdie tydstip ontbreek hy inderdaad aan die gewenste kwaliteit van snelheid wat so goed op die veld dien. Maar na hierdie opleiding het hy wonderlik ontwikkel tot een van die vinnigste in die stel en is hy slegs uitgeblink deur Richard Davis (laat van die Walsall Swifts) wat die reputasie gehad het dat hy die vinnigste speler vir kort afstande was. Al die ander was baie vinnig: Albert Brown, Joey Simmonds, Jack Burton, Freddy Dawson, Howard Vaughton, Harry Yates en Albert Allen, maar die naelloop het hul vorm geweldig verbeter.

Wat my betref, het ek hardloop vir lang afstande, met Warner, ons doelwagter, wat nie 'n spesiale behoefte gehad het vir hierdie opleiding nie en Coulton, vir my metgeselle. Albert Allen, ek moet hier verduidelik, was ons reserweman wat bereid was om Dawson se plek in te neem indien nodig, want Freddy het sy knie ernstig seergemaak en ons was baie onseker of hy sou kon speel. Maar op die regte tyd het die hele span die vraag gestel en hulle besluit dat hy fiks is, dus was Allen nie nodig nie.

Wel, so het die oggend gegaan. Soms het die span agt of tien myl langs die heerlike bane geloop, onder leiding van een of twee van die lede van die komitee en ek, en dan het ons teruggegaan om te eet.

Na die ete is ons weer toegelaat om te kuier en dan is die span byeengeroep vir sokkeroefening, 'n heer aan 'n ander kant van die rivier het 'n geskikte stuk grond tot ons beskikking gestel. Hier het ons 'n uur en 'n half hard gewerk, ons in die hele wetenskap van die spel vervolmaak en elke truuk waaraan u kon dink, bemeester. Dit was sport, maar ons was baie ernstig en alhoewel ons dit geniet het, het ons geen moeite gespaar om alles wat ons moes leer, te leer nie.

Toe ons terugkeer, is ons deur die afrigter ingevryf en ondersoek en daarna gaan sit en tee drink. Na die maaltyd het ons gereeld anderhalf kilometer gestap; en teen tien elke aand was die Villa -span in die bed. So was ons opleiding daagliks.

Vir ontbyt het ons ham en eiers, of vis, en ons het tee of koffie gedrink. Ons het geen middagete gehad nie, behalwe miskien 'n glas bier as ons daaraan gewoond was. Vir aandete het ons vis, meestal, salm of lampreys. Ons gasheer het nie selde 'n vars gevangde salm ingebring nie en by een of twee geleenthede het ons dit geniet deur ook op visvang-ekspedisies te gaan. Soms het ons 'n bietjie braaivleis of skaapvleis en soms voëls; maar vis was die algemeenste aandete. Tee bestaan ​​uit tjops en steaks en ons gaan slaap sonder aandete.

Elke dag was natuurlik nie dieselfde nie en ons het klein avonture gehad wat 'n aangename variasie in die roetine gevorm het. Dit was vir ons 'n besondere plesier om ons ou ou afrigter, langs die oewer, langs die rivier te sien en geduldig te wag op die vis wat nooit gekom het nie, maar daar was geen gebrek aan afleiding in die nag nie. Kussingsgevegte was nogal aan die orde van die tyd, en aangesien die meeste van ons gewoond was aan die voordele van die stadslewe, was dit net natuurlik dat ons sou probeer om soveel vermaak as moontlik te vind op die rustige plek buite die wêreld. Op sommige van die nagte is ons in die hotel gehou deur die graafplukkers sonder werk, wat 'n eerlike sent verdien om hulself soos Rooi Indiërs aan te trek, vere in hul pette te steek, hul gesigte swart te maak en allerhande wild te doen. manewales, dans en sing.

Regte taktiek, ek stem saam, begin in die kleedkamer wanneer klubbeamptes die spelers 'n idee kan gee van die algemene metodes, swakhede en sterkte van die opposisie. Dit is dan dat nie een nie, maar verskeie planne gemaak word, of gemaak moet word, sodat die opposisie op sy swakste punt aangeval kan word en ondersoeke gemaak kan word waar ander swakhede vermoed word.

Mobiliteit is die geheim van enige span se sukses, en dit beteken dat die kaptein op enige gegewe tydstip sy plan moet oorskakel na 'n ander taktiese beweging waaroor elke lid van die span bespreek en ooreengekom het.

Ek kan byvoorbeeld nie saamstem dat een van vorentoe, wat nog te sê van twee, altyd effens agter in sy aanvallende kollegas moet wees nie. Dit is nie altyd moontlik nie. Ek stem saam dat solank as wat die ander vier vorder en resultate lewer, die metode kan voortgaan, maar as daar nie resultate is nie, moet stappe geneem word om dit reg te stel, en dit kan lei tot 'n aanval op al vyf .

Die taktiese planne en planne van 'n span moet altyd vloeibaar wees, en 'n kaptein en sy span moet altyd gereed wees om dit aan die gang te kry. 'N Besluit van die verdediging om 'n aanval teen te werk, moet self weer deur 'n ander plan gekant word. Positiewe optrede is altyd die beste beleid wat enige span kan volg: 'n energieke en veelsydige aanval is die weg na oorwinning. 'N Negatiewe beleid om nederlaag te vermy, wat dikwels aangeneem word, veral deur 'n "weg" -klub, is nie 'n gelukkige oplossing vir die probleme van 'n span nie.

Arsenal het die afgelope seisoene 'n eie metode gehad, en eerlikwaar glo ek dit nie vir 'n oomblik nie. Hoe gereeld het u gehoor dat hulle gekonsentreer het op die verdediging vir lang tye om hul teenstanders goed op die veld te lok, en dan word die bal skielik oorgeskakel na hul tot dusver ledige voorspelers wat dan niks anders gehad het om te jaag as om die bal in die net te sit nie. .

Daar was meer as die ou Arsenal -metode. Laat ons besef dat hulle 'n span sterre was, en hul voorspelers het nie so 'n groot oop ruimte nodig om 'n beweging te maak wat resultate sou lewer nie. Baie is die verdedigers in Engeland se eerste afdeling wat duiselig was om Arsenal -voorspelers te keer van die woord 'go'.

Ek sal nie hê dat die Arsenal -metodes reggestel is nie. Ek is daarvan oortuig dat by hulle, meer as by die meeste spanne, die vloeibaarheid van die span die belangrikste was: die volledige begrip tussen al die spelers, die wete dat elke man op 'n sekere tyd op 'n sekere plek sou wees volgens die manier waarop speel verloop het. Tans skryf Arsenal 'n slegte spel; hulle sal weer opstaan.

Gesprekke en besprekings in die kleedkamer is inderdaad baie belangrik. Spelers vergelyk notas uit vorige ondervinding. Die span se agente sal waarskynlik die opposisie in 'n onlangse wedstryd dopgehou het. Dit kan geen kwaad wees om twee en twee bymekaar te sit en 'n antwoord te kry in die vorm van 'n plan wat waarskynlik die opposisie sal uitoorlê nie.

Maar dit sou beslis verkeerd wees om vir die spelers te sê: "Dit is hoe u hierdie spesifieke spel sal speel; hou by die plan." Wat gesê kan word, is: "Dit is 'n waarskynlike manier om goed te begin, probeer dit 'n rukkie en as die resultate goed is, gaan dan voort."

Daar is 'n metode daarin, solank die kaptein oorbly om te besluit of die metode die regte is as hy sien hoe dit in aksie werk. Daar moet stand-by-planne wees en daar moet natuurlik altyd menings oorweeg word wat gereed is om in werking te tree.

Syd King was 'n goeie bestuurder. Syd King was meer daaroor om transaksies te doen om spelers by West Ham te laat speel. Maar hy was goed daarmee. Hy het ons na die beker -eindstryd gehaal en West Ham in 1923 bevorder, sodat u nie veel meer as dit kan vra nie.


Football Tactics basics: Die 4-3-3 formasie word verduidelik

Die 4-3-3 word in drie lyne op die veld uiteengesit-'n tipiese verdediging van twee middel- en twee agterspelers, drie sentrale middelveldspelers wat 'n driehoek kan vorm en drie aanvallers, een sentrale en twee wat op die flanke.

Beeld van soccer-training-guide.com

Die sleutel tot hierdie formasie is die wye voorspelers wat die enigste sentrale aanvaller flank. Hierdie spelers is veelsydige aanvallende spelers met tempo en skietvermoë, wat hul spoed op die vleuels gebruik voordat hulle na die doel toe sny. Cristiano Ronaldo is die uitstekende voorbeeld. Die enigste aanvaller self is moontlik 'n kragtige doelman of iemand wat diep val om verdedigers weg te sleep en ruimte vir die breë vorentoe te laat, in die beroemde 'False 9' -styl van Lionel Messi.

Hierdie stakers word bygestaan ​​deur ten minste twee van die sentrale middelveldspelers. Die sentrale middelvelders vorm 'n stywe driehoek in die middel van die veld en val dikwels in die rolle van 'skepper-vernietiger-verbyganger' om aan te val, te verdedig en besit te behou. Sommige middelveldspelers kombineer al hierdie elemente, maar 'n gebalanseerde middelveld is die sleutel tot die vorming.

Met 'n kompakte sentrale middelveld kan die agterspelers ook aansluit by die aanval en baie ruimte gebruik as gevolg van die hoë posisie van die breë voorspelers.

Die 4-3-3 is waarskynlik die mees oorweldigende van alle moderne formasies. Daar is 'n rede waarom baie van die mees dominante kant van Europese voetbal - Chelsea, Real Madrid, Barcelona - dit gebruik. Dit is die partye wat elke week 'n oorwinning verwag, met genoeg aanvallende krag om die span te oorkom wat vasbeslote is om met 'n loslootjie weg te gaan.

In besit laat die 4-3-3 ten minste 7 spelers toe om aan te val, aangesien die breë voorspelers die verdediging druk, kom die agterspelers agter hulle aan en twee van die sentrale middelveldspelers stoot vorentoe.

Die besondere kwaliteit van 'n goeie 4-3-3 is egter die verwurgende kwaliteit wat dit meebring. Dit kom uit die kombinasie van twee elemente, 'n drie -sentrale middelveld wat die besit kan oorheers deur verbygaande driehoeke en drie aanvallers wat hoog op die veld kan druk. Teenstanders vind dit moeilik om die bal te kry en dit is moeilik om dit te behou. Middelveldspelers kan nie die bal in die hande kry nie en word vinnig onder druk geplaas. Die verdedigers word gekonfronteer met drie mans wat hulle druk en daar is geen maklike balle teen die vleuels as die agterspelers opskop nie.

'N Volle funksionele aanvallende 4-3-3 is soos die gety teen 'n sandkasteel-dit kan 'n rukkie neem, maar dit sal uiteindelik deur die verdediging breek. En daar was nog nooit 'n 4-3-3 wat beter funksioneer as die Barcelona-span van 2008-09 onder Pep Guardiola in sy eerste seisoen nie, drievoudige wenners wat Manchester United in die eindstryd van die Champions League en Real Madrid in die liga oorheers het.

Die ander kant is dat 'n 4-3-3 wat die bal nie kan behou terwyl hy aanval nie, baie kwesbaar is. Die enigste spelers wat in die verdediging agterbly, is die middelskoppe en die verdedigende middelveldspeler. Dit skep 'n baie gevaarlike situasie op die toonbank, aangesien teenoorstaande breë spelers genoeg ruimte het om in te breek. Enigiets minder as 'n sterk verdedigende middelveldspeler, wat fisiek sterk is, uitstekende posisie het, baie pas en akkurate aangee kan die sentrale verdedigers baie blootstel. Een verkeerde plek en die teenstander het 'n gevaarlike toonbank.

Die 4-3-3 verg ook baie dissipline van sy wye spelers. Die potensiaal om blootgestel te word deur wye voorspelers wat nie kan terugspoor nie, is enorm. Heelagters wat 'n aanval aanval, moet die krag hê om 90 minute terug te jaag en te verdedig. Indien nie, sal teenstanders teen breë spelers oproer op die flanke kry.

Hoewel die naam van Paul Lambert deesdae modder om Villa Park is, was Villans optimisties oor die toekoms van die span. Die gevoel was die sterkste aan die einde van die 2012-13 seisoen, toe die algehele aanval van Abgonlahor, Benteke en Weimann gekombineer het om Villa uit die relegasiesone te verdryf. Die hoogtepunt was die sege van 6-1 oor Sunderland.

Ongelukkig, behalwe die voorste drie, was daar regtig nie die nodige materiaal om 'n stabiele span met verdedigende middelveldspelers in Yacouba Sylla en Karim El-Ahmadi en die voortgesette gebrek aan kwaliteit agterspelers te maak nie. Die probleem het tot hierdie seisoen voortgeduur, waar die twee verliese teen Arsenal en die blootstelling van Carlos Sánchez die kwesbaarheid van 'n 4-3-3 toon met 'n gebrek aan druk en 'n topverdedigende middelveldspeler.

Die 4-3-3 en Villa op die oomblik

Tim Sherwood het nie veel neiging getoon om die 4-3-3 te gebruik nie, en het blykbaar Benteke as 'n eensame aanvaller of in 'n paar met Abgonlahor verkies, en Andi Weimann was grotendeels beperk tot die bank. Dit is slegs gebruik in die eerste FA Cup -wedstryd teen West Brom toe Scott Sinclair en Charles N'Zogbia tot wydverspreide wye voorspelers aan weerskante van Gabby Abgonlahor gemaak is en amper deurgedruk het.

Die sleutelposisies van heelagter en verdedigende middelveldspeler word nog in hierdie Villa-span uitgewerk, so dit is onwaarskynlik dat ons hierdie formasie binnekort in Claret en Blue sal sien.

Meer artikels in die 7500toHolte Football Tactics Basics -reeks kan hier gevind word:


Historiese gebruik van die buitekante

Die eerste 90 jaar van taktiek het 'n algemene taktiese struktuur gevolg: hoë doelwitte oor die voorlyn en die oorblywende spelers wat die middel wegneem. Soos Wilson opgemerk het, was sokker in die vroeë dae hoogs geïndividualiseer. Dribbelvermoë was die kenmerk van 'n uitstekende speler, en 'n fisiese benadering was gelyk aan taaiheid. Vroeë verliese vir die Engelse het daartoe gelei dat Skotland die verbygaande kant van die spel ontwikkel het, maar beide benaderings pas binne die 2-3-5 piramideformasie.

Soos u op die onderstaande afbeelding kan sien, het die basiese struktuur van die piramide groter aanvalswydte moontlik gemaak terwyl dit beskerm was teen sentrale teenaanvalle. Die vaardige voorspelers is gedek deur middelvelders of middelskakels. Aangesien besit verloor is en spanne hul verdedigende derde ingeskakel het, het die middelskakels by die agterspelers aangesluit om numeries rekenskap te gee van die voorspelers van die opposisie.

In die 1920's het die legendariese afrigter Herbert Chapman die W-M-formasie bekendgestel. Die W-M, 'n variasie van die 2-3-5, het die voorwaartse lyn in lae gelê en 'n element van sentrale dominansie en triangulasie bygevoeg. Hierdie 2-3-3-2 verseker dat verlies aan besit die gevolg is dat die opposisie nog 'n verdedigingslinie moet uitvee. Chapman is bekend daarvoor dat hy resultate bo styl plaas, maar hoewel hierdie taktiekontwikkeling meer pragmaties en defensief was, begin dit 'n meer verdedigende, pragmatiese, resultaatsgebaseerde benadering tot die sport, 'n neiging wat nog 'n paar dekades sou voortduur een. Die vordering sluit in een, dan 'n tweede, in die middelste helfte, wat tussen die agterspelers val vir verdere verdediging.

Na die M-M het baie spanne trouens na 'n 4-2-4 beweeg. Histories was dit die volgende belangrike evolusie van taktiek. Die middelste helfte het nou die rolle aangeneem wat voorheen aan die agterspelers toegewys is, wat die middelskakels heeltemal terug gemaak het. Ongeag of die middel-agterspelers plat was of in 'n sweeper/stopper-opstelling was, word die agterspelers van die verlede meer as verdedigende dekking beskou.

In my soeke na die moderne buitekant, het ek 'n aantal historiese wedstryde ontleed. Die ondersoek na buite-agterspelers wat die beste lyste van alle tye gemaak het, het my na die volgende wedstryde gelei.

  • Inter Milan vs Celtic (25 Mei 1967)
  • Brasilië vs Italië (21 Junie 1970)
  • Ajax vs Juventus (30 Mei 1973)
  • Italië vs Brasilië (5 Julie 1982)
  • AC Milan vs Real Madrid (19 April 1989)
  • AC Milan vs Barcelona (18 Mei 1994)

Met die uitsondering van Cruyff se Ajax, het die eerste drie wedstryde min rotasies gehad, wat gekies het vir 'n meer takties rigiede benadering. Terwyl die Brasilië- en Ajax -spanne van die sewentigerjare hul tyd ver vooruit was, was dit duidelik dat dit die eerste dae van 'n rewolusie was. Lynbreekpassings, posisionele triangulasie en intense druk was die grondslag van hul benadering. Boonop het Brasilië se gebruik van Carlos Alberto en Everaldo gesien dat die agterspelers aanvalsverantwoordelikhede op die veld aangeneem het.

Die sukses van die aanval op buite-rug het 'n paradigmaskuif veroorsaak. In plaas daarvan om die reklame in 'n oorbelaste middelveld te dwing, het spanne die agterspelers amper as 'n bykomende middelveldspeler gebruik. Namate die spel ontwikkel het, het agterspelers meer betrokke geraak by die aanval, wat ons spelers soos Roberto Carlos, Javier Zanetti, Philipp Lahm, Dani Alves en Marcelo gegee het. Nou sien ons nog 'n vordering, wat eintlik 'n terugkeer is na ons voetbalwortels.

Geïnspireer deur die totaalvoetbal van Michels en Cruyff, dui Juego de Posición van Barcelona en die hernuwing van Ajax op 'n evolusionêre vooruitgang in aanvallende voetbal. Na die petri-geregte van Cruyff, Ajax en Barcelona, ​​sien ons hoe sy studente en hul direkte mededingers die fundamentele taktiese beginsels van die 2-3-5 piramide aanpas by die moderne spel. Met 'n basiese begrip van die geskiedenis van die piramide en die ontwikkeling van die moderne buitebane, is dit tyd om noukeurig na die manifestasies en variasies van die 2-3-5 in die spel te kyk. In plaas van om 'n oorsig van elke span te gee, sal ons die taktiese teorie ondersoek wat hierdie nuwe toepassing van die piramide aandryf, 'n paar van die voorste spanne ter wêreld wys en 'n paar van die taktiese nuanses wat die klubs onderskei, aandui.


Brasilië, 1970 en die mooiste sokker in die geskiedenis

Voetbal is nie 'n gebrek aan verskynsels nie. Daar was fenomenale spelers, fenomenale truuks, doele, aangee, toneelstukke en ons het dit alles gesien. Fenomenale spanne het deur die geskiedenis stadions volgepak, wat massas in duisende (en die miljoene wat ingeskakel het) in groot ontsag oor hul vermoë gelaat het. Of dit nou 'n dummy, 'n elastiek of 'n doel uit die middelste sirkel is, dit is selde dat hierdie heldhaftige fantasie-heldinne hulle verbaas.

Maar terwyl aanhangers steeds hul afgode drapeer in superlatiewe wat andersins geskik is vir koninklikes, indien nie die gode self nie, is daar 'n presedent wat so 'n voetbalmagnaat verneder: die legendariese Brasiliaanse kant van 1970.

Agt jaar tevore, in die Estadio Nacional in Santiago, Chili, het Brasilië sy tweede agtereenvolgende Wêreldbeker gevier nadat Tsjeggo-Slowakye met 3-1 in die eindstryd verslaan het. Die vieringe het dae lank nie teruggetree nie, en die sterre Garrincha en Pelé, ondanks laasgenoemde wat die grootste deel van die toernooi deur 'n besering misgeloop het, is nou as nasionale ikone aangewys. Die ekstase het helder uitgebrand. Die feeste op straat het oorgegee aan die grimmiger realiteite van die tyd.

In 1961, te midde van groot verwarring, het João Goulart die amp van president in Brasilië aangeneem. Hy was voorheen die vise -president, maar toe die huidige leier, Jânio Quadros, uit die presidentskap bedank, word Goulart bevorder om die land te lei. Sy daaropvolgende hervormings het die publiek baie gepolariseer.

Goulart wou sekere nywerhede nasionaliseer om 'n sterker binnelandse ekonomie op te bou en die ekonomiese breuk tussen Brasilië en die VSA te verminder. Uit vrees dat die hervormings die eerste stappe was om by die Kommunistiese Blok aan te sluit, het baie Brasiliane en die parlement hul steun teruggetrek. Beïnvloeders het hom 'n kommunis genoem en die oproep tot 'n staatsgreep begin.

Op 1 April 1964, met rebelle troepe wat reeds in Rio de Janeiro was, het Goulart gedink om die moeite van 'n burgeroorlog te spaar en na Uruguay gevlug. Tien dae daarna is die stafhoof van die Brasiliaanse leër, maarskalk Castelo Branco, deur die kongres tot president verkies.

Die staatsgreep het Goulart en sy omstrede hervormings tot groot voordeel van Brasilië gedryf, maar het dit in nog dieper politieke onrus gedompel. Castelo Branco het die mag van die presidensie aansienlik uitgebrei. Enige posbekleër kan die grondwet na sy of haar smaak verander en enige politieke figuur afdank. Branco se opvolger, generaal Artur da Costa e Silva, het 'n nuwe wet onderteken wat die Kongres effektief ontbind, sensuur afgedwing het en die president se bevoegdhede verder vergelyk het met die van 'n diktator. Costa e Silva is weens sy gesondheid nie die res van sy termyn uitgedien nie, deur generaal Emílio Garrastazú Médici vervang.

Aangaande die amp in 1969, het Médici die slagspreuk van die Brasiliaanse militêre regime van harte aangeneem, “Brasil: ame-o ou deixe-o ”(Brasilië: love it or leave it). Na jare van stygende inflasie, stadige ekonomiese groei en sosiale onrus, het Médici probeer om die klimaat te verander, maar hy vind dit goed. Onder sy ampstermyn het onderdrukking en marteling hoogty gevier. Joernaliste is swaar gesensor en andersdenkendes, valslik beskuldig of nie, is sonder verhoor opgesluit. Om te sê dat daar sosiale ongemak was onder Médici se diktatuur, sou die vriendelikste manier wees om dit uit te druk. To quell the masses, Médici found his alternative bread and circuses: football.

No political regime is wholly supported by its populace. Brazilians, however, revere the national team. To some locals, football means life. To many others, it means much, much more. Médici wanted his government to be seen in tandem with the national team – footballing success would mean political success. It was a means of controlling the discontent mob, but his heavy involvement in football was rather forced nor welcome.

He sanctioned the building of numerous new stadiums throughout the nation. High on personal pride, Médici continued to interfere directly with the sport, commandeering team selection at Flamengo before attempting to do the same with the Seleção. Although the propaganda effectively screened his regime’s atrocities, there was a tad bit more resistance than Médici had grown used to.

With the 1970 World Cup mere months away, Brazil were looking promising. They had won all their games in the qualifying rounds despite the manager, João Saldanha, failing to accommodate all the star names in his line-up. Most controversially and to much of Brazil’s dismay, Saldanha saw no logic in starting both of Brazil’s deadliest attackers, Pelé and Tostão (humorously nicknamed the ‘White Pelé’). He also neglected Rivellino and Médici’s personal favourite striker, Dario. Médici voiced his desire to see Dario involved in the team, to which Saldanha allegedly replied, “I do not mess with his cabinet, he will not mess with my team.”

Unsurprisingly, Médici fired Saldanha. He was replaced by a member of Brazil’s 1958 and 1962 World Cup winning squads, Mário Zagallo . Médici subsequently took a step back from the inner dealings of the Seleção, opting to propagate from afar in lieu of man management. Brazil, living pessimistically enough, had now lost all hope for their national team as well, while Zagallo quietly went about his ways.

Zagallo had one main initiative: to field Brazil’s best under one tactic. Brazil had a plethora of number 10s – Rivellino, a slick dribbler with an atomic left foot, Jairzinho, a fast dribbler with the strength and incision to pass any man, Gérson, a midfield maestro with the passing range to hit any tree, and the aforementioned Pelé and Tostão. Zagallo used the 4-2-4 formation Brazil played at the 1962 World Cup as the blueprint tactic for this team.

In goal stood Félix, Carlos Alberto – the captain of the side – Piazza, Brito and Everaldo made up the back four, Clodoaldo and Gérson operated as the midfield pivot, Jairzinho and Rivellino occupied the right and left flanks respectively, and Pelé and Tostão were the striking partnership. There were, however, a number of tactical tweaks.

Pelé played slightly deeper than Tostão. He was the pivotal playmaker, the closest to a classic number 10. Tostão, wearing the famous number 9, resembled more of a false 9. He roamed across the front line, often dropping deep to contribute to the build-up play and destabilise the opponent’s defence. With the centre-backs following Tostão’s runs, space would be created for Pelé or Jairzinho, the latter cutting inside from the right.

Rivelino was a more unorthodox winger. He would drift into the centre, consequently creating a three-man midfield with Clodoaldo and Gérson, or taking up more attacking positions near Pelé. Carlos Alberto was instructed to bomb down the right flank when Brazil were in possession, leaving Piazza, Brito and Everaldo to cover for the whole team. Piazza was actually a midfielder Zagallo insisted on him playing in defence to help with Brazil’s build-up play.

It is easy to forget that such tactical tweaks were radical innovations at the time. In terms of tactics and team identity, not much existed beyond the Catenaccio of the Italians – a rather new tactic within itself. Tostão’s false 9 runs were first introduced just a bit more than a decade prior, when the Hungarians humbled the English 6-3 in 1953. But Brazil did not adopt an identity from Zagallo’s tactics – those were mere instructions. Die Seleção played with Brazil’s ever-present joga bonito mentality. The zest to ‘play beautifully’ is far more accredited to Saldanha. “Brazilian football,” Saldanha believed, “is a thing played to music.”

This samba rhythm did not stem from any vast technical or athletic superiority, rather the expressive art of capoeira. Cruelly exploited under the governing regime, Brazilian slaves developed this dance-martial arts hybrid. Capoeira focused on free bodily movement, which the slaves were otherwise denied. It was the perfect antithesis. Each practitioner, finally able to freely express, felt euphoric.

Capoeira became a tool of resistance – a dance, a movement that liberated one from the ails of the oppressing society. And in the 1930s, when black Brazilian players no longer had to powder their faces just to play football, this resistance-through-expression mentality truly became joga bonito.

Thus, with mere weeks to go until the World Cup in Mexico, a sudden managerial change, and a nation suffering under oppression once more, meant the capoeira mentality held more prevalence than ever. Brazil looked to their 23 travelling players for some sort of escape. Few fans, albeit reluctantly, rooted against the Seleção, hoping their shortcomings would embarrass Médici enough to leave office. But to the nation as a whole, Zagallo’s men were to be an indicator of the future – if Pelé and co could succeed in such times, then Brazil could too. Luckily, they were enchanting.

Drawn in a group against the world champions, England, the European champions, Czechoslovakia, and Europe’s newest sensation, Romania, Brazil’s chances were rated slim. Just four years prior, Portugal knocked Brazil out of the 1966 World Cup, evidently showing that Brazil could not cope with the European physicality.

It was on 3 June in Guadalajara, Mexico that Brazil faced Czechoslovakia in their opener of the World Cup. Televised to the entire world in colour for the very first time, everyone tensely watched on. Pelé, absent from this same fixture in the final of the 1962 World Cup, kicked the game off. En so, die Seleção dazzled as the world marvelled.

Brazil moved fast. They did not focus on hogging the ball nor defending deep. When in possession, they would swiftly play out the back and look for vertical passes to their attacking quartet. In truth, the team could play a myriad of styles but focused on quick combination play and instinctive movement. Pelé would often dummy the ball, leaving the pass for Tostão and continuing his own run into the box. Rivellino would fool opponents with his trickery, whilst Jairzinho posed a direct threat on the right. The world, seeing such sharp movements and trickery for the first time, could not help but watch.

Czechoslovakia scored first, but Rivellino soon equalised with a thunderous free-kick. Before half-time, Pelé audaciously attempted a shot from the centre circle. He missed by centimetres, but the crowd cheered as loud as ever. Brazil looked to be even stronger after the break, with Pelé nonchalantly finishing a team move. Gérson soon found Jairzinho with an over-the-top pass, and the number 7 thumped the ball into the net. The Brazilian joga bonito was on display from the very start but, despite winning 4-1, there was cause for concern. Gérson had gotten injured.

Gérson tied all strings together. His orchestration helped the team gel. Brazil felt confident to play the quick and simple passes around and through Gérson. But he was out until the remainder of the group stage, and a difficult game against England beckoned. The game was decisive. The winner would likely top the group and play in Guadalajara until the final, in lieu of Mexico’s more demanding altitudes.

Gérson’s absence was strongly felt. Brazil struggled to pass the ball around as effortlessly as before. The attacking quartet now faced the challenge of breaking down Bobby Moore’s solid defence. Carlos Alberto in his later years admitted that it was the hardest game of the whole tournament – but a game Brazil nonetheless won.

They managed to bypass England’s defence a number of times but met great resistance in Gordon Banks. In what looked a sure goal, Brazil went from their own third to the six-yard box in two passes and four touches, but Banks’s stretching arm miraculously kept out Pelé’s header in what many refer to as the save of the century. Eventually, when outnumbered six to three in England’s own penalty box, Tostão found Pelé with a cross, who laid it off to Jairzinho for the winger’s second goal in as many games. It was a physical, demanding game but Brazil had passed their hardest test without their most crucial cog. Qualification was now guaranteed.

In their final group stage game against Romania, joga bonito was a different animal. Still without Gérson and with Rivellino rested, Brazil wanted to ensure their victory early on. They carved holes in the Romanian defence. Pelé and Jairzinho put Brazil 2-0 in a blitz before even half an hour was played. The Romanian goalkeeper, Stere Adamache, was even subbed off for someone fresher and more confident. But Brazil’s lax defensive structure and insistence on playing out the back was proving problematic, as Romania soon capitalised on a misplaced pass.

After half-time, Pelé restored the two-goal lead with a predatory finish from inside the box. The ball had gotten there after an inventive flick from Tostão. Brazil was expressing itself and coasting, the world riveted by their football. Hope was trickling its way back into Brazilian life.

In the quarter-finals, Brazil faced their first South American opponents, Peru. Gérson and Rivellino had returned to the side. With Guadalajara watching, Brazil proved that in football, greatness and flexibility are synonymous. For 90 minutes, they did everything. They could create chances in all forms, be it a short corner, a pass over the defence, overlapping runs from the full-backs – Brazil terrorised Peru with undefendable flicks and tricks.

Rivellino scored the first with a deft, powerful finish to the bottom corner from the edge of the box. Tostão scored the second after a short one-two from the corner with Rivellino and a near-post finish. With a simple tap into an open net after Pelé had chipped the ball over the onrushing keeper, Tostão scored another. To cap off the spectacle, Jairzinho rounded the Peruvian goalkeeper and slotted the fourth into an empty net. The game finished 4-2 but the two Peruvian goals were more flukish than anything.

Such was the gusto that the Seleção felt for football, they simply wanted to play, to entertain, and to do so together. From their carefree attitude stemmed their tactical flexibility. Where the Europeans would position their players with meticulous instruction, Zagallo would license them to freely roam. No player in Brazil’s attacking quartet, bar Jairzinho, had a defined position.

Tostão, in lieu of leading the line, could either drop deep to join the midfield or pick up the ball on the left wing. When one player would leave his position, another would compensate. In the absence of a leading man, Pelé would push forward becoming the sole focal point of the attack. In such times, Rivellino would adopt the mantle of having dictatorial freedom in the centre. He could accompany Gérson in the midfield pivot, link up with Jairzinho on the right, or play right underneath the striker – be it Tostão or Pelé.

Such free movement greatly destabilised Brazil’s opponents. What was the right-back to do if Rivelino is casually strolling on the other flank? How were the centre-backs to react of Tostão was playing in midfield? Follow him out of position and you leave free space for Pelé to exploit. In a game of little options and no leeway, Brazil’s opponents could just watch. As these 11 spectators trembled in fear, millions of others gasped at the canary shirts wreaking havoc on their televisions. Hitherto the semi-finals, it seemed little could object Brazil’s free-flowing, attacking football.

South American rivalries are a fiery bunch. Each nation takes great pride in its footballing achievements. The fans, holding little direct influence on any result, succumb to two chief vices: pessimism and hyperbole.

Brazil were to face Uruguay in the semi-finals. Such a fixture had been played out once before at the World Cup, in the final of the 1950 edition. Uruguay had won that game, and at Brazil’s iconic Maracaña. Naturally, Brazilian fans were expecting a repeat. There was little cause to feel hopeful or optimistic about Brazil’s future in any regard given the ongoing political crisis. Many thought that nothing would go their nation’s way. Their fears were soon realised.

Uruguay had started the semi-final on the front foot. In a tactical tweak of their own, Uruguay assigned players to shadow Pelé and Gérson’s every movement. Pelé could shake his marker off easily, but with Gérson rarely in free space, Brazil suffered. A free-roaming tactic could only be applied on the basis of a vital, anchoring cog.

The same players that tormented defences all summer could no longer find one another with a pass. Uruguay, as aggressive as ever, seized their chance. They took an early 1-0 lead as the ball rolled slowly past the planted feet of the non-reacting Félix – a man embodying a nation. With time, however, Brazil grew into the game.

Their moves were penetrative, but Uruguay still looked unlikely to concede. But Gérson’s influence on a football match came in many forms. With half-time looming, he told Everaldo to start making attacking runs from deep. It only took the left-back one try. He ran into the penalty box and volleyed in Tostão’s cross. It was Brazil’s most crucial goal of the tournament. Now tied at 1-1, they knew that in the second half Uruguay would have to eventually open up to score. It was no longer a game of catch up.

The second half saw a different Brazil, a hungrier Brazil. Pelé was the first to come tantalisingly close. A dangerous diagonal pass on the edge of the penalty box called for two takers, Pelé and the onrushing Uruguay goalkeeper. With the latter at full stretch, Pelé let the ball roll, escaping him and Mazurkiewicz. Now alone in the penalty box with only one Uruguayan defender on the goal line, Pelé ran onto the loose ball but unfortunately shot it wide in the most iconic goal that never was. It was a taste of what was to come from Brazil.

Jairzinho turned the game. Tostão, from deep, played him a wonderful pass that left the Brazilian with one defender and the goalkeeper in his sight. He outpaced his man and slotted the ball into the bottom corner. Rivelino then secured the 3-1 victory with yet another strike from the edge of the box. Die Seleção had laid Brazil’s fears to rest. The past was to hold no bearing on the present. A country at its lowest point and facing an opponent to whom it felt inferior to most, was now en route to the World Cup final. Life in Brazil no longer felt so dire.

June 21 saw a mouthwatering clash at the Estadio Azteca as Brazil’s joga bonito took on Italy’s catenaccio. Free, attacking football took on defensively astute, ruthless counter-attacking football. Zagallo expected the Italians to man-mark his players as the Uruguayans did before. To counter their measure, he instructed his men to keep possession and constantly pass the ball around to exhaust the Italians. It worked to perfection.

Throughout the game, Rivellino continuously moved central, with his marker following suit. Brazil focused on keeping the ball in areas where their players were in the numerical superiority. Clodoaldo, Gérson, Rivellino, Pelé and Tostão kept it circulating in the centre, essentially playing cat and mouse with the blue shirts. The aim was to draw out as many Italian markers from their defensive shape as possible, and then exploit the open spaces. But Brazil were rarely one dimensional.

Their first goal came from a throw-in. Taken short to Rivellino, he lofted it into the air towards Pelé. Brazil’s star man out-jumped his defender and headed the ball into the net, aptly scoring Brazil’s 100th goal in World Cup competitions. Brazil’s insistence on keeping possession and playing out the back once more cost them dear. The Italians capitalised on a misplaced pass within Brazil’s own defensive third and equalised before half-time.

After the break, Brazil didn’t change their approach instead, they upped a gear. Their passing now swifter and more purposeful, clear-cut chances were still hard to come by, but the Italians were growing shaky. Brazil had penned them into their own penalty box and two Italians markers would step out of line to greet any approaching Brazilian.

Jairzinho tried dribbling his way through. Losing out in a tackle, the ball landed to Gérson. He shuffled it slightly to the left, fired through the minuscule gap in Italy’s defence and into the net. Brazil had retaken the lead and Italy were forced to start pushing higher up the pitch.

Brazil had altered their tactics accordingly. Still circulating possession, they now searched for direct passes to its attacking quartet through the Italian lines of press. Such a ball was lofted from the middle third towards Pelé in the penalty box. He cushioned it down into Jairzinho’s path and the powerful winger scored his seventh goal of the World Cup.

The final was Brazil’s spectacle. Winning 3-1 and radiating confidence, Brazil kept the ball circulating as the Italians laboured behind. It came to Rivellino’s feet at the left corner of the penalty box. One Italian defender stood right ahead with another immediately behind. Rivellino stood his man up, and with the ball at his left foot, performed the elastico in one swift motion. The ball had went through Bertini’s legs and out again so cleanly it had to be magic. The world, seeing the trick for the very first time, could but marvel. The stadium now roaring, “Brazil! Brazil! Brazil!”. One more act of artistry was on its way.

The play started in Brazil’s own third. Tostão had chased the ball all the way back from attack. The final whistle now minutes away, Brazil pinged a few short passes together. The ball came to Clodoaldo’s feet and a screen of four blue shirts stood ahead. With a myriad of step-overs, his long legs tipped and toed their way through each oncoming challenge before passing the ball to Rivellino deep on the left flank.

Still in his own half, Rivelino played a long vertical pass to Jairzinho. The Italians were now heavily concentrated on the left, trying to dispossess the powerful winger. He passed the ball across the pitch to Pelé, who stood at the crown of the penalty box. The Italians, dazed and yet to catch up, could only watch. Pelé rolled the ball into the path of Carlos Alberto. The right flank of the pitch was entirely free. The right-back had galloped from defence into the Italian box and struck a first-time rocket to seal off a 4-1 win. The move encapsulated Brazil’s legendary football of 1970.

It was a team that made grown adults gawk. One that could do it all and make it look so effortless. But when a team that played a mere six games nearly half a century ago is considered the greatest of them all, any rational cynic would disregard the notion as romanticism. Brazil won all its plaudits on merit. It was the first nation to win all its games at the World Cup the first to have a player, Jairzinho, score in each game and the first nation to become a three-time world champion. Brazil did it in first-class style.

When Zagallo was appointed manager, he later admitted, he did not have to do much. The players had a perfect understanding and each was capable of winning matches single-handedly. Zagallo merely fixed the tactics and physically prepared them for Mexico’s high altitudes. Their brilliance was innate. None of the Brazilian players were playing in Europe and were largely unknown. As a result, when the world tuned in to see the famous yellow shirt and short blue shorts donned by 11 strangers, it fell in love for many a reason.

It was their story: an oppressive dictator presiding over a country in peril and a team gunning for glory to salvage some form of happiness for its despairing countrymen. It was their players: strong, fast, skilled, each capable of inventing a priorly unseen moment of magic. It was their football: quick, imaginative, and full of flair, Brazil set the precedent for a fluid and potent offence. Dit was joga bonito – the zest to play beautifully.


Total Football: A graphic history of the world's most iconic soccer tactics

The striking evolution of the world's most iconic football tactics: How they work, why they win - and the people that made them iconic. In the early days of football, it was simple: a goalkeeper, two defenders and the rest attacked. Now the game is all about strategy.

Innovative graphics and expert analyses guide you through the managers' decisions that led to new formations, the pure talent of footballers that defined each playing style, and the matches that propelled the winning tactics to legendary status. Sanjeev Shetty explores how each tactic works and the ways in which it guaranteed victory time and time again. From catenaccio to tiki taka, Pele to Messi and Cruyff to Guardiola, Total Football gives you a new understanding of how the beautiful game is played.

Sanjeev Shetty is a sports journalist with nearly twenty years' experience. He works for the BBC as a producer and reporter on their international services covering their sports news channels. Hy is die skrywer van No Middle Ground en Messigraphica. Sanj lives in Cheshire, UK with his family.


Football Tactics basics: The 4-4-2 formation explained

As 7500 to Holte's resident tactics obsessive, a guide to some of the formations and tactical concepts that I talk about each week may help. So this is the first of a series of tactical guides I'll be writing to explain some of those fundamentals.

This week we're starting with a guide to a formation, that English classic, the 4-4-2. It's characterised by four defenders (two centre-backs in the middle, full-backs on the left and right sides), four midfielders (two central midfielders, two wingers on the left and right sides) and two strikers. This is the ‘open' or ‘flat' 4-4-2 in which the midfielders are not placed in a narrow diamond shape but spread out in a line.

Image from soccer-training-guide.com

The chief benefit of the 4-4-2 is its simplicity. It provides a solid basic structure with defensive depth and attacking numbers, with clearly marked roles. Many English players have grown up playing this formation their entire lives and define their position as a defender, midfielder or striker due to its influence.

Without the ball, the four defenders and four midfielders can put eight men in front of the opposition, covering the entire width of the field. If the defence pushes up high with the midfield, the opposition can be strangled in their own half by a wall of players. With the ball, there are always options out wide and a strong presence up front to provide attacking options via long balls or crosses.

The real danger of the 4-4-2 is a pair of strikers who understand each other's game. The common example is a ‘big man-little man' combo, where a big striker is the target man for long balls and crosses, ready to knock the ball behind the defence or down into the box for his partner to latch onto. Christian Benteke and Gabby Abgonlahor have played this way for Aston Villa this season. But such combinations can exist between many different types of strikers. The best example in recent years was under Alex Ferguson at Manchester United in Andy Cole and the former Villa man Dwight Yorke - two good strikers who became terrifying when put together and drove United to their 1998-99 Treble.

The downside of the 4-4-2 is that its rigid positions can lead to a side being swamped by more flexible opponents. The obvious potential weakness is that by playing with two strikers you can be outnumbered in midfield. While one striker may be tasked with dropping back to help out, many strikers are not disciplined enough to do so effectively. If the wingers also prefer playing out by the sidelines of the pitch, the central midfielders can quickly be isolated against teams playing three or even four central midfielders.

That rigidity is caused by the 4-4-2's three lines of players which can allow opposition players to find pockets of space ‘between the lines', especially defence and midfield. A well-disciplined team will compress the space between defence and midfield so as to avoid this, but a poorly organized 4-4-2 can leave huge amounts of space in front of the defence and if the midfield cannot close down the passing lanes, teams can be ripped apart by opposition players lurking in those spaces.

Martin O'Neill´s Aston Villa

The example that most Villa fans will remember is under Martin O'Neill from 2007-2010. The key components of his 4-4-2 were the strikers and the wingers. Up front, Gabby Abgonlahor was paired with a big target man in the form of either John Carew or Emile Heskey. Width was provided by the team's standout performer Ashley Young and James Milner or Stewart Downing .

O'Neill also used powerful aerial centre-backs, either the outstanding Martin Laursen and Olof Mellberg or James Collins and Richard Dunne. The key central midfielders of his tenure were Gareth Barry and Stiliyan Petrov , with Milner also sometimes playing in the middle.

This video of a 5-1 win against Bolton shows the shape of the Villa attack, balls flying in from the wings towards John Carew, supported by Gabby Abgonlahor. The reason this team was elevated beyond a typical 4-4-2 was the quality and versatility of Ashley Young and James Milner. Starting on the left wing, Ashley Young could cross with either foot, or cut in and score and was given complete freedom to switch wings as he wished -a winger on both sides of the pitch and a third striker at the same time. Milner was even more flexible, a winger, a third striker and a fine central midfielder as well.

Young and Milner's versatility led an overwhelming Villa counter-attack which overrode the possible defensive weaknesses of the formation itself and O'Neill's lack of a really good defensive midfielder or top full-backs - except occasionally such as the 7-1 loss to Chelsea.

The 4-4-2 and Villa right now

The 4-4-2 is very relevant at Villa right now due to Tim Sherwood taking over. Paul Lambert rarely used it, but it became strongly linked with Sherwood during his time at Tottenham when he brought Emmanuel Adebayor back into the team as a target man striker and got him scoring goals via this formation - though he insisted that "I don't know what you are saying about 4-4-2" when it was blamed for an FA Cup loss to Arsenal.

During his time at Villa we've seen this type of open 4-4-2 a few times - first in the glorious 4-0 win over Sunderland (which I analysed here if you want to relive it) but also in the losses against Swansea and Manchester United (analysis here and here for the more morbid). Sherwood has looked to use Benteke and Abgonlahor as a big man-little man pair and the pace of N'Zogbia and Sinclair on the wings, with the full-backs also given freedom to come up the field, especially Bacuna.

Against Sunderland it was hugely successful, their defenders unable to cope with the pace of the attack. However Swansea and Manchester United both used their superior numbers in midfield to dominate the game. Since then Sherwood has experimented instead with the ‘diamond' in midfield. We're unlikely to see the flat 4-4-2 again until Abgonlahor is fully fit, to reform the crucial striking partnership, but while good strikers and wingers are available, the 4-4-2 will always be an option when the side needs goals fast.

More articles in the 7500toHolte Football Tactics Basics series can be found here:


The Long Ball Game

This is a tactic which is often sneered at. Not particularly pleasing on the eye and requiring less of the more respected technical skills required, defensive-minded teams are often the ones who adopt a long ball strategy.

In essence, the idea of playing the long ball game is to send the ball forward from deep positions in the air towards a striker who takes the ball down and begins an attack.

To play this tactic successfully, the forward players need to be strong, capable of holding up the ball and good in the air. The long ball can also be used to play the ball into space for a fast attacking player to latch on to. You'll also need a couple of outstanding attacking midfielders who have the ability to join the attack and ensure the striker doesn't become isolated.

Long ball teams are often defensively minded in their approach. Their intention is get the ball as far away from their goal as possible, using physical players up top to dominate the opposition in the air.

Long ball football is often criticised as being ugly but it can produce moments of brilliance. Dennis Bergkamp’s goal for Holland against Argentina is replayed time and time again, as being one of the best in the 1998 World Cup. he goal was started by a long ball, sent by defender Frank de Boer over seven Argentine players, who were instantly cut out of the game. Bergkamp's technical ability was rightly praised - but it still needed a good old-fashioned hoof upfield to get the move going.

Sam Allardyce is perhaps English football's most well-known fan of a long-ball strategy. Using arguably the game's most physical front man, Kevin Davies, and a midfielder who knew where the back of the net was in Kevin Nolan, Allardyce oversaw a successful Bolton Wanderers team from 1999-2207.


4-4-2 Narrow

A stranger, more archaic version of the 4-4-2 is to bring the wingers inside and use a platform of four horizontal central midfielders.

I don't know of any clubs or international sides that use this formation to date (if you know any, please comment), but the shape is synonymous with the England side of 1992.

David Platt, Paul Ince, David Batty and Paul Gascoigne all needed to be in the same team, so then-manager Graham Taylor used this formation to incorporate all of the talent.

We haven't seen a libero in a long, long time, but I'm not ruling out its return.

Pep Guardiola has been applauded for tactical innovation, yet most of his brilliance came from working backward through the footballing timeline and bringing things back into fashion.

Franz Beckenbauer was a notable libero, of course, but my focus is on the 1973 Ajax team.

It was Barry Hulshoff who played the sweeping playmaker role for this team, though many don't know that, as they can't see past Johan Cruyff, Johan Neeskens and Ruud Krol.

This 1-3-3-3 was free-flowing, attack-minded and beautiful to watch. The way football is headed right now, it's not inexcusable to believe the libero could return.


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Good information and idea thanks

oh this is great work, thank you so much

We have played in this 3-5-2 formation for the last two games (Temple and Fordham) and I think it is the best formation to maximize our teams potential in the middle and offensively. I think we have been very disciplined defensively in this formation (both games have resulted in a shut out) and we are really starting to get used to the pressure cover relationships that exist across the field. This position allows us to get numbers forward (having that back post runner to follow up) and have better pressure on their backline with two forwards instead of one to force turnovers and cut the field in half. Obviously finishing is a key piece of this puzzle that we need to figure out and as coach Bill said “being mature enough to score.” Once we step up and get the first goal in the formation I think we will be successful in preserving the lead and then capitalizing again to score. In this formation, we should have Annika in the middle, Keefe (Bridget in this position when she is healthy) and Ally on the left side. All of these players are solid defensively and have good composure on the field. Across the midfield, Mary (or Maggie/ Becca) on the right, Lisa in the holding position (Libby as a sub) Abby and Kayla in the midfield (Mattie to sub in) and Myself on the left (sid subbing in). The starting lineup that we have had the last two games is just starting to get the flow and work well with each other/ understand each other’s strengths. Up top, I would start Ryelle and Courtney (Maggie first sub in, Grace next sub) because they have very different styles for playing the same position and I think they compliment each other well. Bottom line, getting a goal is our teams priority and this formation will help.


Variations of the 4-3-3 Formation:

As mentioned above, the 4-3-3 formation is very flexible depending on the personnel available to the coach.

While the defence largely lines up in the same way with only the instructions to the fullbacks varying depending on how comfortable they are attacking, it is the players in front of them that provide the most variation to the formation.

If facing an offensive team, the coach may include two defensive-minded players in the line up.

If up against a weak opponent, more attacking-minded midfielders can be used.

This is the beauty of the formation as the players themselves influence and drastically change its strong points depending on their capabilities.

With all the possible midfield line ups, the players still need to know how to work together and coordinate their play. This will always be the key.

Up front, the forwards again offer a number of different playing options depending on the players available…

If there is a target man up front, then the team will aim to play more into their feet for them to hold it up and will play higher crosses into the box to take advantage of their aerial prowess.

A speedier but smaller striker will instead make more runs in behind the defence and prefer to be on the end of lower crosses.

A creative false 9 will aim to influence the play with their dribbling ability and play-making skills by creating goalscoring opportunities out of seemingly nothing.

While a formation provides a team with structure, it is the players themselves who impact the result of the game through their individual playing styles and how they fit in and work with the rest of their team mates.

Teams must change their approach within the formation to get the best out of the players.

It would make no sense, for example, to keep playing balls in behind the defence if the striker was slow and not very mobile.

The great thing about 4-3-3 formation is that you can quickly change the attacking and defending outlook of the team with just one quick substitution.

For instance, a target man subbed for a speedy striker suddenly changes the whole game plan and forces the opposition to rethink their defensive strategy.

Afsluiting:

Attacking at heart, the 4-3-3 formation is a great choice depending on your personnel.

Reliant on hardworking players and athletic fullbacks, the formation also requires tricky wide forwards who can create a lot of goal scoring opportunities.

The team’s movement will create a lot of space in which to play while the energy and pressing of the team can impede the opposition from getting their passing game going and limit the space available to them.

In this formation, attack is the best form of defence and you need high energy players to make the best of it.

What is certain, though, is that you will have a lot of fun playing this formation

Less reliant on tactically astute players than the 3-4-3 formation, the 4-3-3 gives players the flexibility and structure needed for them to express themselves and play to the best of their abilities.


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