13 Mei 2013 Dag 114 van die vyfde jaar - Geskiedenis

13 Mei 2013 Dag 114 van die vyfde jaar - Geskiedenis

10:00 PRESIDENT hou 'n bilaterale vergadering met premier Cameron van die Verenigde Koninkryk
Ovaal kantoor

11:15 hou die PRESIDENT en premier Cameron van die Verenigde Koninkryk 'n gesamentlike perskonferensie
Roostuin

13:55 vertrek die PRESIDENT uit die Withuis op pad na die Joint Base Andrews
South Lawn

14:10 vertrek die PRESIDENT van die Joint Base Andrews

15:05 Die PRESIDENT arriveer in New York
John F. Kennedy Internasionale Lughawe

16:30 lewer die PRESIDENT opmerkings tydens 'n DNC -geleentheid
Privaat woning, New York

18:05 Die PRESIDENT lewer opmerkings tydens 'n DNC -geleentheid
Privaat woning, New York

20:40 Die PRESIDENT lewer opmerkings tydens 'n DCCC/DSCC -geleentheid
Die Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York

21:30 Oproeptyd in die stad

22:00 vertrek die PRESIDENT uit New York
John F. Kennedy Internasionale Lughawe
Open pers

22:50 Die PRESIDENT arriveer Joint Base Andrews

23:05 Die PRESIDENT arriveer in die Withuis
South Lawn


Ervaar die krag van 'n antieke tradisie

Dit verenig ons liefde vir die aarde met ons liefde vir kreatiwiteit en die kunste.

Deur die opwindende nuwe ontwikkelings in die moderne druïdisme vloei die krag van 'n antieke tradisie: die liefde vir land, see en lug – die liefde vir die aarde ons huis. Sien hierdie onlangse artikel oor ons in Die New Statesman.

Meer oor die orde van bards Ovates & Druids

OBOD - The Order of Bards Ovates & amp Druids - is 'n raaiselskool, 'n gemeenskap regoor die wêreld, wat die natuur liefhet en 'n magiese, geestelike manier wil volg wat die natuurlike wêreld in al sy skoonheid respekteer en beskerm. Lede werk met geestelike leerstellings wat die inspirasie van die ou druïede en die ou verhale kombineer met hedendaagse geleerdheid en insigte in die verhouding tussen mense en die wêreld van plante en diere, sterre en klippe. Op hierdie webwerf vind u honderde artikels oor Druidry en Druid Lore, Nature Spirituality, Gods & amp Goddesses, bydraes van lede en nog baie meer.


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Die amptelike top 40 grootste liedjies van 2019

Die grootste 40 liedjies van die Verenigde Koninkryk van 2019 is onthul, en Lewis Capaldi neem die nommer 1 -plek in met iemand wat u liefgehad het.

Die groot uitbreekbaan van die Skotse sanger-liedjieskrywer, wat sewe weke op nommer 1 deurgebring het gedurende Maart/April, het 'n reuse-verkope van 2,33 miljoen in 2019 behaal, volgens die data van Official Charts Company. Someone You Loved is ook die jaar se mees gestroomde liedjie, met 228 miljoen klankstrome soos Spotify, Apple Music en Deezer.

Die nuus kom toe die musiekbedryf die BPI onthul het dat musiekverbruik in die Verenigde Koninkryk vir die vyfde agtereenvolgende jaar gestyg het, met 114 miljard musiekstrome wat in 2019 aangemeld is - 'n styging van 3 000% teenoor 2012.

Nog drie Lewis Capaldi-liedjies eindig binne die top 40 van die jaareinde: Top 5 treffer Hold Me While You Wait op 14, Bruises op 25 en Grace op 27. Sien Lewis Capaldi se amptelike geskiedenis van die Britse grafiek volledig.

Nog 'n deurbraakster in 2019, die Amerikaanse rapper en sanger Lil Nas X, behaal 'n tweede plek met Old Town Road op 1,75 miljoen kaartverkope. Die hip-hop-ontmoet-country-snit, wat die eerste keer sukses behaal het as 'n virale treffer op Tik Tok, het twee weke op nommer 1 gedurende April/Mei deurgebring.

Ed Sheeran en Justin Bieber se I Don't Care - die hoofsingle van Ed's No.6 Collaborations Project -album - eindig derde op 1.43 miljoen kaartverkope, Billie Eilish's Bad Guy is vierde (1.34m), en Calvin Harris & amp Rag'n ' Bone Man's Giant - wat in Maart vyf weke op nommer 2 deurgebring het - is vyfde (1,29 m).

Nog agt nommer 1-liedjies in 2019 verskyn in die VK se amptelike Top 40-liedjies van die jaar, waarvan vier in die Top 10. Ava Max se Januarie-topper Sweet But Psycho is op 6 (1.25 m) Stormzy se Vossi Bop eindig op 7 (1.14m) Tones & amp I se 11-weke Chart-topper Dance Monkey-die langste nommer 1 van 'n vroulike kunstenaar ooit-is op 8 (1.12m) en Senorita van Shawn Mendes en Camila Cabello eindig die top 10 op 10 (1,07 m).


Tones & I met haar amptelike nommer 1 -enkelprys vir Dance Monkey.

Ander groot deurbrake hierdie jaar het gekom vir Mabel, wat die negende plek beklee met Don't Call Me Up, en die produksietrio Meduza, wat op 11 beland met Piece Of Your Heart ft. Goodboys. AJ Tracey's Ladbroke Grove (18), Dominic Fike's 3 Nights (24), NSG's Options ft. Tion Wayne (32), Russ & amp; Tion Wayne's Keisha & Becky (35), Regard's Ride It (38) en Young T & amp Bugsey's Strike A Pose (39) staan ​​ook in die top-40 aan die einde van die jaar.

Elders is ander optredes met veelvuldige inskrywings in die Top 40 Ariana Grande, met 7 ringe (16), Thank U Next (30) en Break up with You're Girlfriend I'm Bored (33) Ed Sheeran met I Don't Care (3), Beautiful People ft. Khalid (21) en Take Me Back To London ft Stormzy (23) terwyl Billie Eilish 'n tweede Top 40 -inskrywing behaal met Bury A Friend op 36.

Die amptelike top 40 grootste liedjies van 2019

POS TITEL KUNSTENAAR PEAK
1 IEMAND VIR wie jy lief was LEWIS CAPALDI 1
2 OU DORPPAD LIL NAS X 1
3 Ek gee NIE om nie ED SHEERAN & amp JUSTIN BIEBER 1
4 SLEGTE OU BILLIE EILISH 2
5 REUSE CALVIN HARRIS & amp RAG'N'BONE MAN 2
6 SOET MAAR PSYCHO AVA MAX 1
7 VOSSI BOP STORMZY 1
8 DANS AAP TONES & amp I 1
9 MOENIE MY OPROEP NIE MABEL 3
10 SENORITA SHAWN MENDES/CAMILA CABELLO 1
11 STUK VAN JOU HART MEDUZA FT GOODBOYS 2
12 SHOTGUN GEORGE EZRA 1
13 LIGGING DAVE FT BURNA SEUN 6
14 Hou my vas terwyl u wag LEWIS CAPALDI 4
15 SONNEBLOM POST MALONE FT SWAE LEE 3
16 7 RINGE ARIANA GRANDE 1
17 SJOE. POS MALONE 3
18 LADBROKE GROVE AJ TRACEY 3
19 NET ek en jy TOM WALKER 3
20 SKAKEL LADY GAGA & amp BRADLEY COOPER 1
21 MOOI MENSE ED SHEERAN FT KHALID 1
22 DANS MET 'N VREEMDE SAM SMITH & amp NORMANI 3
23 Neem my terug na Londen ED SHEERAN FT STORMZY 1
24 3 NAGTE DOMINIESE FIKE 3
25 BRUISES LEWIS CAPALDI 6
26 HOËR LIEFDE KYGO & amp WHITNEY HOUSTON 2
27 GENADE LEWIS CAPALDI 9
28 NIKS BREEK SOOS 'N HART NIE MARK RONSON FT MILEY CYRUS 2
29 SUIKER JONAS BROERS 4
30 DANKIE VOLGENDE ARIANA GRANDE 1
31 HOË VERWAGTINGE PANIEK BY DIE DISKO 12
32 OPSIES NSG FT TION WAYNE 7
33 Breek weg met u meisie, ek is verveeld ARIANA GRANDE 1
34 SOS AVICII FT ALOE BLACC 6
35 KEISHA & amp BECKY RUSS & amp TION WAYNE 7
36 BEGRAF 'N VRIEND BILLIE EILISH 6
37 GELUKKIG MARSHMELLO FT BASTILLE 2
38 RY DIT GROET 2
39 POSEER JONG T & amp BUGSEY FT AITCH 9
40 SONDER MY HALSEY 3

©2020 Amptelike kaarte maatskappy. Alle regte voorbehou.
Grafiek saamgestel op grond van verkope en streaming ekwivalente verkope vanaf Week 1 - Week 52, 2019.


St. Patrick 's Day 2021

Saint Patrick's Day is Woensdag 17 Maart! Wie was Saint Patrick? Waarom is klappers 'n simbool van hierdie dag? Geniet die geskiedenis, legendes en verhaal van St Patrick's Day.

Vier St Patrick's Day 2021!

Hierdie jaar word St. Patrick's Day gehou Woensdag, 17 Maart.

Alhoewel die vakansie oorspronklik begin het as 'n Christelike feesdag waarin die lewe van St. Patrick en die verspreiding van die Christendom na Ierland gevier is, is dit vandag 'n feestdag en 'n viering van alles wat Iers is. Moenie vergeet om groen te dra nie!

Wanneer is St Patrick's Day?

St Patrick's Day word elke jaar amptelik op 17 Maart gevier, hoewel vieringe moontlik nie tot hierdie datum beperk is nie. Die betekenis van 17 Maart is dat dit na bewering die datum is van die dood van Sint Patrick aan die einde van die 5de eeu (ongeveer 493 nC).

St Patrick's Day datums

*In die jare wanneer St. Patrick's Day op 'n Sondag of gedurende die Heilige Week val, hou die Almanak dit daar en beskou dit slegs as 'n sekulêre vakansie. Kerke mag dit egter na 'n ander datum vir die feesdag oordra. Of stede kan hul amptelike vieringsdatum verander.

Wie was die Heilige Patrick? Was Hy 'n regte persoon?

Saint Patrick is die beskermheilige en nasionale apostel van Ierland. Hy word erken dat hy die Christendom suksesvol in Ierland versprei het - vandaar die Christelike viering van sy lewe en naam.

Was daar werklik 'n St. Patrick?

Beslis. Daar is egter baie legendes oor hom wat meng met die waarheid. Het hy 'n groot rol gespeel in die verspreiding van die Christendom na Ierland? Ja, natuurlik. Het hy regtig al die slange uit Ierland verdryf? Waarskynlik nie, want slange was aanvanklik nie inheems aan Ierland nie!

Die impak van St. Patrick was in elk geval beduidend genoeg om ons hedendaagse vieringe te regverdig. Hier is 'n bietjie oor St. Patrick self.

'N Jong St. Patrick vind God

Die man wat uiteindelik St. Patrick sou word, is in die laat 4de eeu in Brittanje gebore (destyds deel van die Romeinse Ryk) as Maewyn Succat. Sy familie was Christelik, maar daar word gesê dat Maewyn self 'n ateïs was gedurende sy kinderjare.

Dit sou verander op 16 -jarige ouderdom (omstreeks 400 nC), toe Maewyn ontvoer is uit sy huis aan die weskus van Brittanje deur Ierse seerowers, wat hom na Ierland gebring het en hom gedwing het om as skaapwagter te werk. Na ses jaar het hy aan sy gevangenes ontsnap, byna 200 kilometer deur die Ierse landskap geloop en 'n skip oortuig om hom saam met hulle terug te bring na Brittanje. Hierdie aangrypende ervaring het beslis 'n uitwerking op Maewyn, wat oortuig was dat dit die Here was wat hom beskerm en hom veilig huis toe gebring het.


'N Gebrandskilderde glas -ontspanning van St Patrick met 'n klawer in Junction City, Ohio. Foto deur Nheyob/Wikimedia Commons.

Sint Patrick versprei die evangelie

By die tuiskoms het Maewyn sy oproep (in 'n droom) ontvang om die Evangelie te verkondig - in Ierland, van alle plekke! Hy het die volgende ongeveer 15 jaar in 'n klooster in Brittanje deurgebring en voorberei op sy sendingwerk. Toe hy priester word, word sy naam verander na Patricius, en hy keer terug na die land van sy gevangenes om sy leringe te begin.

Alhoewel sommige Christene destyds reeds in Ierland gewoon het, was die land grotendeels heidens, en dit was nie 'n maklike taak om 'n vreemde godsdiens te versprei nie. Patricius het van dorp tot dorp gereis om die leer van die Here te deel, en was suksesvol genoeg om uiteindelik baie kerke daar te vind.

Waarom hou die klawer verband met St Patrick's Day?

Ons dra 'n klawer op St Patrick's Day, want volgens die legende het St. Patrick sy drie blare gebruik om die Heilige Drie -eenheid in sy leerstellings te verduidelik. (Die Drie -eenheid is die Vader, die Seun en die Gees as drie goddelike persone wat een goddelike wese [God] is.) Die waarheid van die St. Patrick -legende is egter ter sprake, aangesien daar geen direkte rekord is dat die heilige het die klawer eintlik as 'n onderrigmiddel gebruik.

Let wel: Die simbool van St Patrick is 'n drieblaar klapper, nie 'n vierblaar klawer. Lank voordat die klawer geassosieer word met St Patrick's Day, word die vierblaar-klawer egter deur antieke Kelte beskou as 'n sjarme teen bose geeste. In die vroeë 1900's het O. H. Benson, 'n superintendent van die Iowa -skool, die idee gekry om 'n klawer te gebruik as die embleem van 'n nuutgestigte landbouklub vir kinders in sy omgewing. In 1911 is die vierblaarklawer gekies as die embleem vir die nasionale klubprogram, later 4-H genoem.

Meer feite oor Sint Patrick's Day, pret en folklore

  • Blou was die kleur wat oorspronklik met St. Patrick geassosieer is, maar groen word nou bevoordeel.
  • Die eerste St. Patrick's Day -parade in die Amerikaanse kolonies is op hierdie dag in 1762 in New York gehou.
  • St Patrick's Day is die tradisionele dag om ertjies te plant, selfs in die sneeu! Sien ons prettige video oor hoe om ertjies te plant.
  • Vandag word koolsaad ook gereeld geplant, en ou-tydse boere het geglo dat jy dit moes plant terwyl jy jou nagklere gedra het om dit goed te laat groei! Sien ons Koolgroeigids. Geen PJ's nodig nie!

'Op St Patrick's Day verskyn die warm kant van 'n klip,
en die breë gans begin lê. ”


Ierse Beesstoofpot. Foto deur Sumners Graphics Inc./Getty Images.

St Patrick's Day Resepte

Wil u iets spesiaals kook vir St Patrick's Day? U het nie die geluk van die Iere nodig nie! Kyk na ons lys met St. Patrick's -resepte vir koringvleis en kool, Ierse koeldrankbrood en meer idees as groen melk en bier!

Grap van die maand

V: Waarom moet u nooit 'n vierblaarklawer stryk nie?
A: U wil nie u geluk druk nie!


'N Kort geskiedenis van enkelvoudige' hulle '

Enkelvoud hulle het die voornaamwoord van keuse geword om te vervang hy en sy in gevalle waar die geslag van die antesedent - die woord waarna die voornaamwoord verwys - onbekend, irrelevant of nie -binêr is, of waar geslag verberg moet word. Dit is die woord wat ons gebruik vir sinne soos Almal is lief vir sy ma.

Maar dit is niks nuuts nie. Die Oxford English Dictionary spore enkelvoud hulle terug na 1375, waar dit in die Middeleeuse romanse verskyn William en die weerwolf. Behalwe vir die ou styl van die gedig, die gebruik daarvan in enkelvoud hulle om na 'n naamlose persoon te verwys, lyk baie modern. Hier is die middel -Engelse weergawe: 'Hastely hiȝed weerklink. . . þei het so neeȝh. . . þere william & amp his worþi lef were liand i-fere. ’In moderne Engels is dit:‘Elke man haastig. . . tot hulle nader gekom. . . waar William en sy liefling saam gelê het. ’

Aangesien vorms in spraak kan bestaan ​​lank voordat hulle neergeskryf word, is dit waarskynlik enkelvoud hulle was selfs voor die laat veertiende eeu algemeen. Dit maak 'n ou vorm nog ouer.

In die agtiende eeu het grammatikas die enkelvoud begin waarsku hulle was 'n fout omdat 'n meervoudige voornaamwoord nie 'n enkelvoudige antesedent kan aanneem nie. Hulle het daardie enkelvoud duidelik vergeet jy was 'n meervoudige voornaamwoord wat ook enkelvoud geword het. Jy het eeue lank as 'n beleefde enkelvoud gefunksioneer, maar in die sewentiende eeu enkelvoud jy vervang jy, jou, en jou, behalwe vir 'n mate van dialekgebruik. Die verandering het 'n mate van weerstand gebied. In 1660 skryf George Fox, die stigter van Quakerism, 'n hele boek met die etiket vir almal wat enkelvoud gebruik jy 'n idioot of 'n dwaas. En agtiende-eeuse grammatikane soos Robert Lowth en Lindley Murray het studente gereeld getoets u as enkelvoud, jy as meervoud, ondanks die feit dat studente enkelvoud gebruik het jy toe hul onderwysers nie soek nie, en onderwysers enkelvoud gebruik het jy toe hul studente nie kyk nie. Almal wat gesê het u en jou is beskou as 'n dwaas en 'n idioot, of 'n kwaker, of ten minste hopeloos verouderd.

Enkelvoud jy het normaal en onmerkbaar geword. Die koninklike is ook merkwaardig ons en, in lande sonder 'n monargie, die hoofartikel ons: eerste-persoon meervoude wat gereeld as enkelvoud gebruik word en niemand noem iemand 'n idioot en 'n dwaas nie. En enkelvoud hulle is ook goed op pad om normaal en onmerkbaar te wees. Teen die einde van die twintigste eeu het taalowerhede die vorm begin goedkeur. Die Nuwe Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) aanvaar nie net enkelvoud nie hulle, hulle gebruik ook die vorm in hul definisies. En die Nuwe Oxford American Dictionary (Derde uitgawe, 2010), roep enkelvoud hulle 'Algemeen aanvaar' met onbepaalde tyd, en 'nou algemeen maar minder algemeen aanvaar' met definitiewe selfstandige naamwoorde, veral in formele kontekste.

Nie almal is mal oor enkelvoud nie hulle. Die gerespekteerde Chicago Manual of Style verwerp steeds enkelvoud hulle vir formele skryfwerk, en net die ander dag het 'n onderwyser vir my gesê dat hy steeds studente wat dit gebruik, regstel almalhul in hul koerante, hoewel hy waarskynlik enkelvoud gebruik hulle as sy studente nie kyk nie. Verlede herfs is 'n transgender Florida-onderwyser uit hul vyfde klas verwyder om hul studente te vra om na hulle te verwys met die geslagsneutrale enkelvoud hulle. En twee jaar gelede, nadat die Diversiteitskantoor aan die Universiteit van Tennessee voorgestel het dat onderwysers hul studente vra: 'Wat is u voornaamwoord?', Omdat sommige studente 'n nie -binaire voornaamwoord uitgevind, soos kyk of iets meer konvensioneel, soos enkelvoud hulle, die wetgewer van die staat Tennessee het 'n wet aanvaar wat die gebruik van belastingbetalers vir geslagsneutrale voornaamwoorde verbied, ondanks die feit dat niemand weet hoeveel 'n voornaamwoord eintlik kos nie.

Dit is geen verrassing dat Tennessee, die staat wat die leer van evolusie in 1925 verbied het, ook nie daarin kon slaag om die evolusie van Engels honderd jaar later te stop nie, omdat die stryd teen enkelvoud hulle was reeds verlore toe die kritici van die agtiende eeu daarteen beswaar begin maak het. In 1794 het 'n bydraer tot die Nuwe Bedford Medley mansvlakte aan drie vroue wat die enkelvoud hulle wat hulle in 'n vroeëre opstel in die koerant gebruik het, was grammatikaal verkeerd en eer hulle nie hulself of die vroulike geslag in die algemeen nie. 'Waarop hulle eerlik antwoord dat hulle enkelvoud gebruik hulle doelbewus omdat 'ons die geslag wou verberg', en hulle daag hul kritikus uit om 'n nuwe voornaamwoord uit te vind as hulle polities gelaaide gebruik van enkelvoud het hulle ontstel hom so. Meer onlangs het 'n kollega wat andersins konserwatief is, vir my gesê dat hulle enkelvoudig is hulle nuttig 'as u praat oor wat sekere mense in my veld sê oor ander mense in my veld as 'n manier om die identiteit van my bron te verberg.'

Voormalige hoofredakteur van die OED Robert Burchfield, in Die New Fowler's Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1996), verwerp besware teen enkelvoud hulle as nie ondersteun deur die historiese rekord nie. Burchfield merk op dat die konstruksie 'ongemerk verbygaan' deur sprekers van standaard Engels sowel as deur kopieredakteurs, en hy kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat hierdie neiging 'onomkeerbaar' is. Mense wat inklusief wil wees of respek vir ander se voorkeure wil hê, gebruik enkelvoud hulle. En mense wat nie inklusief wil wees nie, of wat ander mense se voornaamwoordkeuses nie respekteer nie, gebruik enkelvoud hulle ook. Selfs mense wat beswaar maak teen enkelvoud hulle as 'n grammatikale fout dit self gebruik as hulle nie soek nie, 'n seker teken dat almal wat beswaar maak teen enkelvoud hulle is, indien nie 'n dwaas of 'n idioot nie, ten minste hopeloos verouderd.

Die menings en ander inligting in die OED -blogposte en kommentaar weerspieël nie noodwendig die menings of standpunte van Oxford University Press nie.


Is daar iets aan 'n regsgeding wat Donald Trump daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n 13-jarige meisie verkrag het met Bill Clinton se biljoenêr Sex Buddy?

Asof Donald Trump nie genoeg regsprobleme en slegte juju het nie, het hy nou nog 'n hoofpyn: 'n regsgeding wat gister by die federale hof in New York aanhangig gemaak is, het hom (saam met die miljardêr Jeffrey Epstein) daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n 13 -jarige meisie verkrag het in 1994 by 'n partytjie by Epstein se plek. Die bewerings is taamlik onstuimig, en dit klink na soortgelyke aanklagte van minderjarige seks-slawerny teen Epstein. Die regsgeding self gaan waarskynlik nie baie ver nie, maar dit blyk 'n herhaling van 'n geding wat voorheen in Kalifornië geweier is. Die verjaringstydperk is lankal op, wat vereis dat die “Jane Doe” -aanklaer kreatiewe argumente moet lewer waarom sy dit nou moet kan aanvoer.

Dit gesê, daar is geen verjaring in die politiek nie. Is daar iets hieraan? Ons weet aan die een kant dat daar elke veldtogseisoen nare waarhede oor politieke figure kom. As 'n drie-getroude toegelate egbreker, wek Trump se geskiedenis nie veel vertroue op hierdie gebied nie, van spog met beddegoed getroude vroue tot sy kommentaar aan Howard Stern oor die kyk van Paris Hilton se seksband tot sy vreemde gewoonte om kommentaar te lewer op die seksappèl. van sy eie dogter tot die omhelsing van die veroordeelde verkragter Mike Tyson om Bill Clinton self te verdedig in sy seksskandale in die 1990's, net om 'n paar voorbeelde te noem. Ons weet daarenteen dat valse seksskandale omtrent almal volg wat die nasionale vlak in die politiek bereik. Ek glo onmiddellik dat Mitt Romney die enigste 25ste genomineerde party was wat die afgelope 25 jaar nog nooit in die pers probeer het om 'n seksskandaalverhaal oor hom te koop nie. Kiesers het meestal die voordeel van die twyfel aan Ted Cruz en Marco Rubio gegee toe dun seksverhale in die voorverkiesing teen hulle uitgevoer is. Trump se groot rykdom en morsige openbare persoonlike lewe maak hom 'n groot teiken vir hierdie soort dinge. Soms moet ons net kyk na die feite wat ons het en ons oordeel gebruik.

Trump se destydse verklaring oor die oorspronklike regsgeding was 'n blote ontkenning, wat tot die vraag gestrek het of die eiser selfs bestaan: 'Die bewerings is nie net kategories onwaar nie, maar walglik op die hoogste vlak en duidelik omskryf om media -aandag te vra of, miskien is hulle bloot polities gemotiveerd. Daar is absoluut geen meriete aan hierdie bewerings nie. Tydperk. ” By gebrek aan geloofwaardige bewyse van die teendeel, moet ons hom glo. Die verloop van 'n lang tyd, die verskyning van die saak eers as Trump besig is met 'n hoë profiel-veldtog en die skynbare gebrek aan stawing buite die woord van die aanklaer, is alles teen die geloof in die aanklag.

Maar dit is glad nie onwaarskynlik om te dink nie Epstein moontlik seks gehad het met 'n 13 -jarige op een van sy partytjies, miskien met geweld - sy rekord in hierdie verband is lank en taai, en word lankal deur die Republikeine tereg aangehaal as 'n rede waarom Bill Clinton moes geweet het om te stuur weg van Epstein se "Lolita Express", wat hy na bewering ongeveer 26 keer gevlieg het. Die media moet Trump nie oor hierdie soort dinge roem nie, tensy hulle bereid is om dieselfde aan Bill Clinton te doen. Maar Trump se bande met Epstein is diep en nare genoeg om (ten minste) hierdie aanvallyn op die Clintons uit te skakel - insluitend dat Epstein die vyfde wysiging op die vraag pleit: 'Het u ooit met Donald Trump gesels in die teenwoordigheid van vroue onder die 18 jaar oud? ” Trump self het eenkeer aan New York Magazine gesê:

'Ek ken Jeff al vyftien jaar. Fantastiese ou, ”bulder Trump uit 'n luidsprekerfoon. 'Hy is baie lekker om saam te wees. Daar word selfs gesê dat hy net so lief is vir mooi vroue soos ek, en dat baie van hulle aan die jonger kant is. Geen twyfel daaroor nie - Jeffrey geniet sy sosiale lewe. ”

Met ander woorde, sonder enige ondersteunende bewyse, moet ons nie veel aandagtig wees in die opspraakwekkende en laat bewering dat Trump self aan die verkragting van 'n jong tiener deelneem nie. Maar dit is nie so maklik om dieselfde aanklag as vir Jeffrey Epstein van die hand te wys nie-of die groot moontlikheid dat Trump, soos Clinton, moontlik nader was aan Epstein se nou berugte seksuele misbruik as wat hy laat staan ​​het.


Die antieke Griekse kalender

Die Atheense kalender is die bekendste en mees intensief bestudeer, en ek sal dit dus as 'n model gebruik. Die Atheense maande was Hekatombion, Metageitnion, Boedromion, Pyanepsion, Maimakterion, Poseidon, Gamelion, Anthesterion, Elaphebolion, Munychion, Thargelion en Skirophorion. (Vir 'n lys van die bekende maandname in ander Griekse gebiede, sien Ginzel, deel 2, pp. 335-6). Die tussenkalfmaand kom gewoonlik na Poseidon, en word tweede Poseidon genoem. Hekatombion, en dus die begin van die jaar, het in die somer geval. Ander Griekse streke het hul jaar op verskillende tye begin (byvoorbeeld Sparta, Masedonië in die herfs, Delos in die winter).

Vir die historikus wat geneig is tot netjiese ordelikheid, is die betreurenswaardige feit dat die Atheners eenvoudig nie bereid was om by 'n heeltemal gereelde kalender te hou nie, wat die heropbou bemoeilik. Hulle onreëlmatigheid was nie die gevolg van 'n gebrek aan astronomiese kennis nie. In 432 vC het die Atheense sterrekundige Meton sy siklus van 19 jaar ingestel en gereelde tussenkalke vasgestel (of Meton hierdie siklus uit Babilonië gekry het of dit self ontdek het, is nie bekend nie). Vanaf daardie tydstip het 'n klein groepie Griekse sterrekundiges die Metoniese siklus in hul berekeninge gebruik, maar dit moet as 'n sterrekundige se ideale kalender beskou word. Oorvloedige epigrafiese bewyse toon aan dat die spesifieke korreksies in die burgerlike kalender, terwyl die archons ongeveer die korrekte aantal tussenkalfmaande oor die lang termyn ingevoeg het, ietwat willekeurig was, soos die archons dit goedvind. Hierdie onreëlmatigheid beïnvloed nie regtig die langtermynwerk van die kalender nie, maar dit maak dinge baie verwarrend as u 'n presiese datum vir 'n gebeurtenis probeer vasstel.

Dit lyk asof die Atheners 'n taamlik toevallige houding teenoor hul kalender gehad het. Dit blyk dat hulle nie 'n gewone formule of deurlopende direkte waarneming gebruik het om die lengte van die maande te bepaal nie. Heel waarskynlik volg hulle 'n algemene reël van afwisselende maande (29 en 30 dae lank), onderhewig aan periodieke regstelling deur waarneming.

Benewens hierdie kalender, wat die feeskalender genoem is, het Atheners 'n tweede kalender vir die politieke jaar gehandhaaf. Hierdie 'versoenbare' jaar het die jaar verdeel in 'prytanies', een vir elk van die 'phylai', die onderafdelings van Atheense burgers. Die aantal phylai, en dus die aantal prytanies, wissel oor tyd. Tot 307 vC was daar 10 filums.

Daarna wissel die getal tussen 11 en 13 (gewoonlik 12). Nog meer verwarrend, hoewel die versoenings- en feesjare in die 4de eeu vC ewe lank dieselfde lengte was, was dit nie vroeër of later gereeld die geval nie. Dit is dus baie moeilik om dokumente wat deur Prytany gedateer is, aan 'n bepaalde ekwivalent in die Juliaanse kalender toe te ken, hoewel ons gewoonlik veilig is om 'n geskatte datum toe te ken. Aangesien die prytany geen rol speel in my argument vir die opstel van 'n basiese chronologie nie, gaan ek nie hier op die ingewikkeldhede in nie. Die verwysings wat hieronder aangehaal word, gaan egter in op die gedagte-detail besonderhede oor die probleem.

Gewone rekords van Griekse stadstate is gedateer volgens die gelyknamige jaar van die persoon aan die bewind, of dit nou die aartsbiskop, koning, priester van Hera, ens. Vir Athene is ons lys van aartsfees uit die 4de eeu. BCE tot die latere 1ste eeu. CE is voltooi vir 'n paar jaar, wat 'n groot hulp is om ons chronologie te verifieer. Regionale gelyknamige jare is egter ongemaklik vir historici wat die verskillende gebiede probeer korreleer, 'n probleem wat nie minder duidelik vir die ou Griekse historici is as vir ons nie. Die oplossing wat vir hulle voor die hand liggend was, was om die tyd te bereken met die tussenposes tussen die Olimpiade, benewens die gee van gelyknamige jare.

Dat die Olimpiese Spele elke vier jaar gehou is, is welbekend, maar 'n paar bewyse vir die bewering is nie verkeerd nie. Ou skrywers verwys almal na die Olimpiese Spele as 'n tydperk van 5 jaar (in Grieks, pentaeterikoi, Latyn quinquennales). Dit lyk miskien vreemd, maar Grieke en Romeine tel meestal die meeste inklusief, dit wil sê:

wat ons 'n interval van vier jaar sou noem. NB: ons manier van tel impliseer 'n nul begin, 'n konsep wat beide Grieke en Romeine ontbreek het. Aangesien die Griekse kalenders almal effens verskil het, wonder u miskien hoe almal dit reggekry het om betyds by die wedstryde uit te kom. Die Pindar -geleerde beweer dat die fees vir die vroeë Olimpiade afwisselend na 49 of 50 maande gehou is, wat in wese gelykstaande is aan vier jaar in 'n lunisolêre kalender. Hierdie skema is heeltemal sinvol, want ongeag watter spesifieke tussenkalfmaande die verskillende stede gedoen het of nie besluit het om op te neem nie, hulle kan almal eenvoudig na 49 of 50 terugtel. Dit impliseer ook terloops dat 'n reël van 8 jaar = 99 maande is gebruik om hierdie interval te bepaal (hoewel nie dat elke Griekse stad hierdie formule vir hul eie tussenkalings gebruik het nie).

Aangesien die Olimpiade 'n somerfees was, is dit uiteindelik gekorreleer met die Attiese (Atheense) kalender, sodat dit op Hekatombion 1 kon begin, wat 'n sekere ooreenkoms kan impliseer oor wanneer interkalasies bygevoeg moet word, of bloot dui op Atheense kulturele oorheersing.

Antieke historici dateer volgens die Olimpiade deur die nommer van die Olimpiade en die jaar binne die siklus 1-4 te gee (die Olimpiade self is op jaar 1 gehou). Boonop is lyste met Olimpiese wenners bygehou, en die 3de eeu. BCE skrywer Timaios het 'n sinchroniese lys saamgestel waarin Olimpiese wenners, Atheense aartsbogen, Spartaanse konings en die priesters van Hera uit Argos vergelyk is.

Olimpiade 1,1 stem ooreen met 776 vC. Ons hoef eintlik nie te glo dat 'n werklike fees op hierdie datum gehou is nie, maar as Griekse historici later skryf, dateer hulle hul eie gebeure en gebruik dit as die tydperk. Ons kan 'n presiese korrelasie met die algemene era uit verskillende bronne vestig, maar die mees definitiewe kom uit 'n gedeelte in Diodorus, waar hy die jaar van 'n totale sonsverduistering dateer na die bewind van die Atheense aartsbiskop Hieromnemon, wat hy ook gee as Ol. 117,3. Die enigste astronomies moontlike datum vir hierdie gebeurtenis is 15 Augustus 310 vC, wat ons tyd vasstel.

Een ding om op te let met die berekening deur die Olimpiade, is dat skrywers die begin van die jaar volgens hul plaaslike byeenkoms (lente, somer, winter of herfs) bereken het. Byvoorbeeld Ol. 1,1 stem ooreen met Val, 777 - Herfs 776 vC deur Masedoniese afrekening. Bisantynse skrywers wat die Olimpiade gebruik, neem die jaar om op 1 September te begin.


Die bom het Japan nie verslaan nie en Stalin het nie

Die Amerikaanse gebruik van kernwapens teen Japan tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was al lank onderwerp van emosionele debat. Aanvanklik het min die president Truman se besluit om twee atoombomme op Hiroshima en Nagasaki te laat val, bevraagteken. Maar in 1965 het historikus Gar Alperovitz aangevoer dat hoewel die bomme die oorlog onmiddellik beëindig het, die leiers van Japan in elk geval wou oorgee en dit waarskynlik sou gedoen het voor die Amerikaanse inval wat op 1 November beplan is. was dus onnodig. As die bombardemente nie nodig was om die oorlog te wen nie, was dit duidelik dat bombardemente op Hiroshima en Nagasaki verkeerd was. In die 48 jaar sedertdien het baie ander by die stryd aangesluit: sommige weerspieël Alperovitz en veroordeel die bombardemente, terwyl ander sterk aansluit dat die bombardemente moreel, noodsaaklik en lewensreddend was.

Beide denkrigtings veronderstel egter dat die bombardement van Hiroshima en Nagasaki met nuwe, kragtiger wapens Japan op 9 Augustus gedwing het om oor te gee. het dit in wese gewerk? Die ortodokse siening is dat dit natuurlik gewerk het. Die Verenigde State het Hiroshima op 6 Augustus en Nagasaki op 9 Augustus gebombardeer toe die Japannese uiteindelik toegegee het aan die dreigement van verdere kernbombardemente en hulle oorgegee het. Die ondersteuning vir hierdie vertelling strek diep. Maar daar is drie groot probleme, en saam ondermyn dit die tradisionele interpretasie van die Japannese oorgawe aansienlik.

Die Amerikaanse gebruik van kernwapens teen Japan tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog was al lank onderwerp van emosionele debat. Aanvanklik het min die president Truman se besluit om twee atoombomme op Hiroshima en Nagasaki te laat val, bevraagteken. Maar in 1965 het historikus Gar Alperovitz aangevoer dat hoewel die bomme die oorlog onmiddellik beëindig het, die leiers van Japan in elk geval wou oorgee en dit waarskynlik sou gedoen het voor die Amerikaanse inval wat op 1 November beplan is. was dus onnodig. As die bombardemente nie nodig was om die oorlog te wen nie, was dit duidelik dat bombardemente op Hiroshima en Nagasaki verkeerd was. In die 48 jaar sedertdien het baie ander tot die stryd toegetree: sommige eggo Alperovitz en veroordeel die bombardemente, ander sluit sterk aan dat die bombardemente moreel, noodsaaklik en lewensreddend was.

Beide denkrigtings aanvaar egter dat die bombardement van Hiroshima en Nagasaki met nuwe, kragtiger wapens Japan daartoe gedwing het om oor te gee op 9 Augustus. het dit in wese gewerk? Die ortodokse siening is dat dit natuurlik gewerk het. The United States bombed Hiroshima on Aug. 6 and Nagasaki on Aug. 9, when the Japanese finally succumbed to the threat of further nuclear bombardment and surrendered. The support for this narrative runs deep. But there are three major problems with it, and, taken together, they significantly undermine the traditional interpretation of the Japanese surrender.

The first problem with the traditional interpretation is timing. And it is a serious problem. The traditional interpretation has a simple timeline: The U.S. Army Air Force bombs Hiroshima with a nuclear weapon on Aug. 6, three days later they bomb Nagasaki with another, and on the next day the Japanese signal their intention to surrender.* One can hardly blame American newspapers for running headlines like: “Peace in the Pacific: Our Bomb Did It!”

When the story of Hiroshima is told in most American histories, the day of the bombing — Aug. 6 — serves as the narrative climax. All the elements of the story point forward to that moment: the decision to build a bomb, the secret research at Los Alamos, the first impressive test, and the final culmination at Hiroshima. It is told, in other words, as a story about the Bomb. But you can’t analyze Japan’s decision to surrender objectively in the context of the story of the Bomb. Casting it as “the story of the Bomb” already presumes that the Bomb’s role is central.

Viewed from the Japanese perspective, the most important day in that second week of August wasn’t Aug. 6 but Aug. 9. That was the day that the Supreme Council met — for the first time in the war — to discuss unconditional surrender. The Supreme Council was a group of six top members of the government — a sort of inner cabinet — that effectively ruled Japan in 1945. Japan’s leaders had not seriously considered surrendering prior to that day. Unconditional surrender (what the Allies were demanding) was a bitter pill to swallow. The United States and Great Britain were already convening war crimes trials in Europe. What if they decided to put the emperor — who was believed to be divine — on trial? What if they got rid of the emperor and changed the form of government entirely? Even though the situation was bad in the summer of 1945, the leaders of Japan were not willing to consider giving up their traditions, their beliefs, or their way of life. Until Aug. 9. What could have happened that caused them to so suddenly and decisively change their minds? What made them sit down to seriously discuss surrender for the first time after 14 years of war?

It could not have been Nagasaki. The bombing of Nagasaki occurred in the late morning of Aug. 9, after the Supreme Council had already begun meeting to discuss surrender, and word of the bombing only reached Japan’s leaders in the early afternoon — after the meeting of the Supreme Council had been adjourned in deadlock and the full cabinet had been called to take up the discussion. Based on timing alone, Nagasaki can’t have been what motivated them.

Hiroshima isn’t a very good candidate either. It came 74 hours — more than three days — earlier. What kind of crisis takes three days to unfold? The hallmark of a crisis is a sense of impending disaster and the overwhelming desire to take action now. How could Japan’s leaders have felt that Hiroshima touched off a crisis and yet not meet to talk about the problem for three days?

President John F. Kennedy was sitting up in bed reading the morning papers at about 8:45 a.m. on Oct. 16, 1962, when McGeorge Bundy, his national security advisor, came in to inform him that the Soviet Union was secretly putting nuclear missiles in Cuba. Within two hours and forty-five minutes a special committee had been created, its members selected, contacted, brought to the White House, and were seated around the cabinet table to discuss what should be done.

President Harry Truman was vacationing in Independence, Missouri, on June 25, 1950, when North Korea sent its troops across the 38th parallel, invading South Korea. Secretary of State Acheson called Truman that Saturday morning to give him the news. Within 24 hours, Truman had flown halfway across the United States and was seated at Blair House (the White House was undergoing renovations) with his top military and political advisors talking about what to do.

Even Gen. George Brinton McClellan — the Union commander of the Army of the Potomac in 1863 during the American Civil War, of whom President Lincoln said sadly, “He’s got the slows” — wasted only 12 hours when he was given a captured copy of Gen. Robert E. Lee’s orders for the invasion of Maryland.

These leaders responded — as leaders in any country would — to the imperative call that a crisis creates. They each took decisive steps in a short period of time. How can we square this sort of behavior with the actions of Japan’s leaders? If Hiroshima really touched off a crisis that eventually forced the Japanese to surrender after fighting for 14 years, why did it take them three days to sit down to discuss it?

One might argue that the delay is perfectly logical. Perhaps they only came to realize the importance of the bombing slowly. Perhaps they didn’t know it was a nuclear weapon and when they did realize it and understood the terrible effects such a weapon could have, they naturally concluded they had to surrender. Unfortunately, this explanation doesn’t square with the evidence.

First, Hiroshima’s governor reported to Tokyo on the very day Hiroshima was bombed that about a third of the population had been killed in the attack and that two thirds of the city had been destroyed. This information didn’t change over the next several days. So the outcome — the end result of the bombing — was clear from the beginning. Japan’s leaders knew roughly the outcome of the attack on the first day, yet they still did not act.

Second, the preliminary report prepared by the Army team that investigated the Hiroshima bombing, the one that gave details about what had happened there, was not delivered until Aug. 10. It didn’t reach Tokyo, in other words, until after the decision to surrender had already been taken. Although their verbal report was delivered (to the military) on Aug. 8, the details of the bombing were not available until two days later. The decision to surrender was therefore not based on a deep appreciation of the horror at Hiroshima.

Third, the Japanese military understood, at least in a rough way, what nuclear weapons were. Japan had a nuclear weapons program. Several of the military men mention the fact that it was a nuclear weapon that destroyed Hiroshima in their diaries. Gen. Anami Korechika, minster of war, even went to consult with the head of the Japanese nuclear weapons program on the night of Aug. 7. The idea that Japan’s leaders didn’t know about nuclear weapons doesn’t hold up.

Finally, one other fact about timing creates a striking problem. On Aug. 8, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori went to Premier Suzuki Kantaro and asked that the Supreme Council be convened to discuss the bombing of Hiroshima, but its members declined. So the crisis didn’t grow day by day until it finally burst into full bloom on Aug. 9. Any explanation of the actions of Japan’s leaders that relies on the “shock” of the bombing of Hiroshima has to account for the fact that they considered a meeting to discuss the bombing on Aug. 8, made a judgment that it was too unimportant, and then suddenly decided to meet to discuss surrender the very next day. Either they succumbed to some sort of group schizophrenia, or some other event was the real motivation to discuss surrender.

Historically, the use of the Bomb may seem like the most important discrete event of the war. From the contemporary Japanese perspective, however, it might not have been so easy to distinguish the Bomb from other events. It is, after all, difficult to distinguish a single drop of rain in the midst of a hurricane.

In the summer of 1945, the U.S. Army Air Force carried out one of the most intense campaigns of city destruction in the history of the world. Sixty-eight cities in Japan were attacked and all of them were either partially or completely destroyed. An estimated 1.7 million people were made homeless, 300,000 were killed, and 750,000 were wounded. Sixty-six of these raids were carried out with conventional bombs, two with atomic bombs. The destruction caused by conventional attacks was huge. Night after night, all summer long, cities would go up in smoke. In the midst of this cascade of destruction, it would not be surprising if this or that individual attack failed to make much of an impression — even if it was carried out with a remarkable new type of weapon.

A B-29 bomber flying from the Mariana Islands could carry — depending on the location of the target and the altitude of attack — somewhere between 16,000 and 20,000 pounds of bombs. A typical raid consisted of 500 bombers. This means that the typical conventional raid was dropping 4 to 5 kilotons of bombs on each city. (A kiloton is a thousand tons and is the standard measure of the explosive power of a nuclear weapon. The Hiroshima bomb measured 16.5 kilotons, the Nagasaki bomb 20 kilotons.) Given that many bombs spread the destruction evenly (and therefore more effectively), while a single, more powerful bomb wastes much of its power at the center of the explosion — re-bouncing the rubble, as it were — it could be argued that some of the conventional raids approached the destruction of the two atomic bombings.

The first of the conventional raids, a night attack on Tokyo on March 9-10, 1945, remains the single most destructive attack on a city in the history of war. Something like 16 square miles of the city were burned out. An estimated 120,000 Japanese lost their lives — the single highest death toll of any bombing attack on a city.

We often imagine, because of the way the story is told, that the bombing of Hiroshima was far worse. We imagine that the number of people killed was off the charts. But if you graph the number of people killed in all 68 cities bombed in the summer of 1945, you find that Hiroshima was second in terms of civilian deaths. If you chart the number of square miles destroyed, you find that Hiroshima was fourth. If you chart the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima was 17th. Hiroshima was clearly within the parameters of the conventional attacks carried out that summer.

From our perspective, Hiroshima seems singular, extraordinary. But if you put yourself in the shoes of Japan’s leaders in the three weeks leading up to the attack on Hiroshima, the picture is considerably different. If you were one of the key members of Japan’s government in late July and early August, your experience of city bombing would have been something like this: On the morning of July 17, you would have been greeted by reports that during the night four cities had been attacked: Oita, Hiratsuka, Numazu, and Kuwana. Of these, Oita and Hiratsuka were more than 50 percent destroyed. Kuwana was more than 75 percent destroyed and Numazu was hit even more severely, with something like 90 percent of the city burned to the ground.

Three days later you have woken to find that three more cities had been attacked. Fukui was more than 80 percent destroyed. A week later and three more cities have been attacked during the night. Two days later and six more cities were attacked in one night, including Ichinomiya, which was 75 percent destroyed. On Aug. 2, you would have arrived at the office to reports that four more cities have been attacked. And the reports would have included the information that Toyama (roughly the size of Chattanooga, Tennessee in 1945), had been 99.5 percent destroyed. Virtually the entire city had been leveled. Four days later and four more cities have been attacked. On Aug. 6, only one city, Hiroshima, was attacked but reports say that the damage was great and a new type bomb was used. How much would this one new attack have stood out against the background of city destruction that had been going on for weeks?

In the three weeks prior to Hiroshima, 26 cities were attacked by the U.S. Army Air Force. Of these, eight — or almost a third — were as completely or more completely destroyed than Hiroshima (in terms of the percentage of the city destroyed). The fact that Japan had 68 cities destroyed in the summer of 1945 poses a serious challenge for people who want to make the bombing of Hiroshima the cause of Japan’s surrender. The question is: If they surrendered because a city was destroyed, why didn’t they surrender when those other 66 cities were destroyed?

If Japan’s leaders were going to surrender because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, you would expect to find that they cared about the bombing of cities in general, that the city attacks put pressure on them to surrender. But this doesn’t appear to be so. Two days after the bombing of Tokyo, retired Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro expressed a sentiment that was apparently widely held among Japanese high-ranking officials at the time. Shidehara opined that “the people would gradually get used to being bombed daily. In time their unity and resolve would grow stronger.” In a letter to a friend he said it was important for citizens to endure the suffering because “even if hundreds of thousands of noncombatants are killed, injured, or starved, even if millions of buildings are destroyed or burned,” additional time was needed for diplomacy. It is worth remembering that Shidehara was a moderate.

At the highest levels of government — in the Supreme Council — attitudes were apparently the same. Although the Supreme Council discussed the importance of the Soviet Union remaining neutral, they didn’t have a full-dress discussion about the impact of city bombing. In the records that have been preserved, city bombing doesn’t even get mentioned during Supreme Council discussions except on two occasions: once in passing in May 1945 and once during the wide-ranging discussion on the night of Aug. 9. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to make a case that Japan’s leaders thought that city bombing — compared to the other pressing matters involved in running a war — had much significance at all.

Gen. Anami on Aug. 13 remarked that the atomic bombings were no more menacing than the fire-bombing that Japan had endured for months. If Hiroshima and Nagasaki were no worse than the fire bombings, and if Japan’s leaders did not consider them important enough to discuss in depth, how can Hiroshima and Nagasaki have coerced them to surrender?

Strategic significance

If the Japanese were not concerned with city bombing in general or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in particular, what were they concerned with? The answer
is simple: the Soviet Union.

The Japanese were in a relatively difficult strategic situation. They were nearing the end of a war they were losing. Conditions were bad. The Army, however, was still strong and well-supplied. Nearly 4 million men were under arms and 1.2 million of those were guarding Japan’s home islands.

Even the most hard-line leaders in Japan’s government knew that the war could not go on. The question was not whether to continue, but how to bring the war to a close under the best terms possible. The Allies (the United States, Great Britain, and others — the Soviet Union, remember, was still neutral) were demanding “unconditional surrender.” Japan’s leaders hoped that they might be able to figure out a way to avoid war crimes trials, keep their form of government, and keep some of the territories they’d conquered: Korea, Vietnam, Burma, parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, a large portion of eastern China, and numerous islands in the Pacific.

They had two plans for getting better surrender terms they had, in other words, two strategic options. The first was diplomatic. Japan had signed a five-year neutrality pact with the Soviets in April of 1941, which would expire in 1946. A group consisting mostly of civilian leaders and led by Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori hoped that Stalin might be convinced to mediate a settlement between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Japan on the other. Even though this plan was a long shot, it reflected sound strategic thinking. After all, it would be in the Soviet Union’s interest to make sure that the terms of the settlement were not too favorable to the United States: any increase in U.S. influence and power in Asia would mean a decrease in Russian power and influence.

The second plan was military, and most of its proponents, led by the Army Minister Anami Korechika, were military men. They hoped to use Imperial Army ground troops to inflict high casualties on U.S. forces when they invaded. If they succeeded, they felt, they might be able to get the United States to offer better terms. This strategy was also a long shot. The United States seemed deeply committed to unconditional surrender. But since there was, in fact, concern in U.S. military circles that the casualties in an invasion would be prohibitive, the Japanese high command’s strategy was not entirely off the mark.

One way to gauge whether it was the bombing of Hiroshima or the invasion and declaration of war by the Soviet Union that caused Japan’s surrender is to compare the way in which these two events affected the strategic situation. After Hiroshima was bombed on Aug. 6, both options were still alive. It would still have been possible to ask Stalin to mediate (and Takagi’s diary entries from Aug. 8 show that at least some of Japan’s leaders were still thinking about the effort to get Stalin involved). It would also still have been possible to try to fight one last decisive battle and inflict heavy casualties. The destruction of Hiroshima had done nothing to reduce the preparedness of the troops dug in on the beaches of Japan’s home islands. There was now one fewer city behind them, but they were still dug in, they still had ammunition, and their military strength had not been diminished in any important way. Bombing Hiroshima did not foreclose either of Japan’s strategic options.

The impact of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island was quite different, however. Once the Soviet Union had declared war, Stalin could no longer act as a mediator — he was now a belligerent. So the diplomatic option was wiped out by the Soviet move. The effect on the military situation was equally dramatic. Most of Japan’s best troops had been shifted to the southern part of the home islands. Japan’s military had correctly guessed that the likely first target of an American invasion would be the southernmost island of Kyushu. The once proud Kwangtung army in Manchuria, for example, was a shell of its former self because its best units had been shifted away to defend Japan itself. When the Russians invaded Manchuria, they sliced through what had once been an elite army and many Russian units only stopped when they ran out of gas. The Soviet 16th Army — 100,000 strong — launched an invasion of the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Their orders were to mop up Japanese resistance there, and then — within 10 to 14 days — be prepared to invade Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s home islands. The Japanese force tasked with defending Hokkaido, the 5th Area Army, was under strength at two divisions and two brigades, and was in fortified positions on the east side of the island. The Soviet plan of attack called for an invasion of Hokkaido from the west.

It didn’t take a military genius to see that, while it might be possible to fight a decisive battle against one great power invading from one direction, it would not be possible to fight off two great powers attacking from two different directions. The Soviet invasion invalidated the military’s decisive battle strategy, just as it invalidated the diplomatic strategy. At a single stroke, all of Japan’s options evaporated. The Soviet invasion was strategically decisive — it foreclosed both of Japan’s options — while the bombing of Hiroshima (which foreclosed neither) was not.

The Soviet declaration of war also changed the calculation of how much time was left for maneuver. Japanese intelligence was predicting that U.S. forces might not invade for months. Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be in Japan proper in as little as 10 days. The Soviet invasion made a decision on ending the war extremely time sensitive.

And Japan’s leaders had reached this conclusion some months earlier. In a meeting of the Supreme Council in June 1945, they said that Soviet entry into the war “would determine the fate of the Empire.” Army Deputy Chief of Staff Kawabe said, in that same meeting, “The absolute maintenance of peace in our relations with the Soviet Union is imperative for the continuation of the war.”

Japan’s leaders consistently displayed disinterest in the city bombing that was wrecking their cities. And while this may have been wrong when the bombing began in March of 1945, by the time Hiroshima was hit, they were certainly right to see city bombing as an unimportant sideshow, in terms of strategic impact. When Truman famously threatened to visit a “rain of ruin” on Japanese cities if Japan did not surrender, few people in the United States realized that there was very little left to destroy. By Aug. 7, when Truman’s threat was made, only 10 cities larger than 100,000 people remained that had not already been bombed. Once Nagasaki was attacked on Aug. 9, only nine cities were left. Four of those were on the northernmost island of Hokkaido, which was difficult to bomb because of the distance from Tinian Island where American planes were based. Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, had been removed from the target list by Secretary of War Henry Stimson because of its religious and symbolic importance. So despite the fearsome sound of Truman’s threat, after Nagasaki was bombed only four major cities remained which could readily have been hit with atomic weapons.

The thoroughness and extent of the U.S. Army Air Force’s campaign of city bombing can be gauged by the fact that they had run through so many of Japan’s cities that they were reduced to bombing “cities” of 30,000 people or fewer. In the modern world, 30,000 is no more than a large town.

Of course it would always have been possible to re-bomb cities that had already been bombed with firebombs. But these cities were, on average, already 50 percent destroyed. Or the United States could have bombed smaller cities with atomic weapons. There were, however, only six smaller cities (with populations between 30,000 and 100,000) which had not already been bombed. Given that Japan had already had major bombing damage done to 68 cities, and had, for the most part, shrugged it off, it is perhaps not surprising that Japan’s leaders were unimpressed with the threat of further bombing. It was not strategically compelling.

Despite the existence of these three powerful objections, the traditional interpretation still retains a strong hold on many people’s thinking, particularly in the United States. There is real resistance to looking at the facts. But perhaps this should not be surprising. It is worth reminding ourselves how emotionally convenient the traditional explanation of Hiroshima is — both for Japan and the United States. Ideas can have persistence because they are true, but unfortunately, they can also persist because they are emotionally satisfying: They fill an important psychic need. For example, at the end of the war the traditional interpretation of Hiroshima helped Japan’s leaders achieve a number of important political aims, both domestic and international.

Put yourself in the shoes of the emperor. You’ve just led your country through a disastrous war. The economy is shattered. Eighty percent of your cities have been bombed and burned. The Army has been pummeled in a string of defeats. The Navy has been decimated and confined to port. Starvation is looming. The war, in short, has been a catastrophe and, worst of all, you’ve been lying to your people about how bad the situation really is. They will be shocked by news of surrender. So which would you rather do? Admit that you failed badly? Issue a statement that says that you miscalculated spectacularly, made repeated mistakes, and did enormous damage to the nation? Or would you rather blame the loss on an amazing scientific breakthrough that no one could have predicted? At a single stroke, blaming the loss of the war on the atomic bomb swept all the mistakes and misjudgments of the war under the rug. The Bomb was the perfect excuse for having lost the war. No need to apportion blame no court of enquiry need be held. Japan’s leaders were able to claim they had done their best. So, at the most general level the Bomb served to deflect blame from Japan’s leaders.

But attributing Japan’s defeat to the Bomb also served three other specific political purposes. First, it helped to preserve the legitimacy of the emperor. If the war was lost not because of mistakes but because of the enemy’s unexpected miracle weapon, then the institution of the emperor might continue to find support within Japan.

Second, it appealed to international sympathy. Japan had waged war aggressively, and with particular brutality toward conquered peoples. Its behavior was likely to be condemned by other nations. Being able to recast Japan as a victimized nation — one that had been unfairly bombed with a cruel and horrifying instrument of war — would help to offset some of the morally repugnant things Japan’s military had done. Drawing attention to the atomic bombings helped to paint Japan in a more sympathetic light and deflect support for harsh punishment.

Finally, saying that the Bomb won the war would please Japan’s American victors. The American occupation did not officially end in Japan until 1952, and during that time the United States had the power to change or remake Japanese society as they saw fit. During the early days of the occupation, many Japanese officials worried that the Americans intended to abolish the institution of the emperor. And they had another worry. Many of Japan’s top government officials knew that they might face war crimes trials (the war crimes trials against Germany’s leaders were already underway in Europe when Japan surrendered). Japanese historian Asada Sadao has said that in many of the postwar interviews “Japanese officials … were obviously anxious to please their American questioners.” If the Americans wanted to believe that the Bomb won the war, why disappoint them?

Attributing the end of the war to the atomic bomb served Japan’s interests in multiple ways. But it also served U.S. interests. If the Bomb won the war, then the perception of U.S. military power would be enhanced, U.S. diplomatic influence in Asia and around the world would increase, and U.S. security would be strengthened. The $2 billion spent to build it would not have been wasted. If, on the other hand, the Soviet entry into the war was what caused Japan to surrender, then the Soviets could claim that they were able to do in four days what the United States was unable to do in four years, and the perception of Soviet military power and Soviet diplomatic influence would be enhanced. And once the Cold War was underway, asserting that the Soviet entry had been the decisive factor would have been tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

It is troubling to consider, given the questions raised here, that the evidence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is at the heart of everything we think about nuclear weapons. This event is the bedrock of the case for the importance of nuclear weapons. It is crucial to their unique status, the notion that the normal rules do not apply to nuclear weapons. It is an important measure of nuclear threats: Truman’s threat to visit a “rain of ruin” on Japan was the first explicit nuclear threat. It is key to the aura of enormous power that surrounds the weapons and makes them so important in international relations.

But what are we to make of all those conclusions if the traditional story of Hiroshima is called into doubt? Hiroshima is the center, the point from which all other claims and assertions radiate out. Yet the story we have been telling ourselves seems pretty far removed from the facts. What are we to think about nuclear weapons if this enormous first accomplishment — the miracle of Japan’s sudden surrender — turns out to be a myth?


Capture and Trial

In the spring of 1430, King Charles VII ordered Joan to Compiègne to confront the Burgundian assault. During the battle, she was thrown off her horse and left outside the town’s gates. The Burgundians took her captive and held her for several months, negotiating with the English, who saw her as a valuable propaganda prize. Finally, the Burgundians exchanged Joan for 10,000 francs.

Charles VII was unsure what to do. Still not convinced of Joan’s divine inspiration, he distanced himself and made no attempt to have her released. Though Joan’s actions were against the English occupation army, she was turned over to church officials who insisted she be tried as a heretic. She was charged with 70 counts, including witchcraft, heresy and dressing like a man.

Initially, the trial was held in public, but it went private when Joan bettered her accusers. Between February 21 and March 24, 1431, she was interrogated nearly a dozen times by a tribunal, always keeping her humility and steadfast claim of innocence. Instead of being held in a church prison with nuns as guards, she was held in a military prison. Joan was threatened with rape and torture, though there is no record that either actually occurred. She protected herself by tying her soldiers’ clothes tightly together with dozens of cords. Frustrated they could not break her, the tribunal eventually used her military clothes against her, charging that she dressed like a man.


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