Franz Neumann

Franz Neumann

Franz Neumann is op 23 Mei 1900 in Katowice, Silezië, gebore.

Neumann studeer aan die Universiteit van Frankfurt en was betrokke by die stigting van die Socialist Students Society. Hy ondersteun ook die mislukte Duitse Rewolusie in 1919.

Franz Neumann het in 1923 'n doktorsgraad verwerf met 'n tesis oor metode in die teorie van straf. Hy het by die Social Democratic Party (SPD) aangesluit en met ander linkse aktiviste soos Julian Gumperz, Paul Massing en Ruth Fischer verbind. Hy word advokaat en spesialiseer in die verdediging van die belange van vakbondlede.

Neumann het lid geword van wat bekend gestaan ​​het as die Frankfurt -skool. Ander lede was Georg Lukács, Eric Fromm, Paul Massing, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Otto Kirchheimer, Karl Korsch, Leo Löwenthal, Karl August Wittfogel en Friedrich Pollock. Daar is aangevoer deur Axel Honneth dat 'n aantal intellektuele in die 1920's probeer het om die marxisme aan te pas by die teoretiese en politieke behoeftes van die tyd. "Die werk daarvan is gebaseer op ekonomie, sielkunde en kulturele teorie, met die doel om vanuit 'n historiese perspektief te ontleed hoe 'n rasionele samelewing van die samelewing bereik kan word ... Die werk van filosoof Walter Benjamin vorm 'n analise van die onderlinge verband tussen mag en verbeelding; Franz Neumann en Otto Kirchheimer het ondersoek ingestel na die regskonsensuskultuur en sosiale beheer; terwyl Erich Fromm 'n psigoanalitiese ondersoek gedoen het na kommunikatiewe behoeftes en die moontlikheid van weerstand. " (1)

Adolf Hitler word op 30 Januarie 1933 tot kanselier van die Ryk aangestel. Die nuwe regering onderdruk onmiddellik politieke partye. Hitler stel nou 'n wetsontwerp voor wat hom diktatoriale magte sou gee. Neumann verklaar "dat politieke geregtigheid die swartste bladsy in die lewe van die Duitse Republiek is." (2) Neumann vlug na Engeland en studeer onder Harold Laski aan die London School of Economics. Hy behaal 'n tweede doktorsgraad met 'n studie van die opkoms en val van die historiese tydperk van die oppergesag van die reg.

In 1936 het hy by die Institute of Social Research aan die Columbia University in New York City aangesluit. (3) Tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het Neumann gepubliseer Behemoth: die struktuur en praktyk van die nasionale sosialisme (1942). Ian Kershaw die skrywer van Hitler 1889-1936 (1998) beskryf die boek as "een van die briljantste ontleders van die Nazi -verskynsel." (4) Neumann voer in die boek aan: "Charismatiese heerskappy is lankal verwaarloos en bespot, maar blykbaar het dit diep wortels en word dit 'n kragtige stimulus sodra die regte sielkundige en sosiale toestande vasgestel is. Die charismatiese mag van die leier is nie 'n blote fantasie nie - niemand kan twyfel dat miljoene daarin glo nie. ” (5)

In 1942 sluit Neumann aan by die Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as lid van sy Duitse afdeling. (6) Sy vriend, Paul Massing, 'n NKVD -spioen, het aan Moskou gerapporteer dat Neumann vir hom gesê het dat hy 'n studie van die Sowjet -ekonomie vir die OSS se Russiese departement opgestel het. (7) In April 1943 ontmoet Elizabeth Zarubina, 'n Sowjet -spioen in die Verenigde State, en die vrou van Vassily Zarubin Neumann: "(Zarubina) ontmoet vir die eerste keer (Neumann) wat belowe het om al die data aan ons deur te gee Volgens (Neumann) kry hy baie afskrifte van verslae van Amerikaanse ambassadeurs ... en het hy toegang tot materiaal wat na Duitsland verwys. " Neumann se kodenaam was "Ruff".

Franz Neumann het belowe om ten volle saam te werk tydens sy aanvanklike ontmoeting met Zarubina, nadat hy later dieselfde jaar 'n genaturaliseerde Amerikaanse burger geword het, blyk dit dat hy huiwerig was om geheime inligting deur te gee. Een memorandum wat vroeg in Januarie 1944 aan Moskou gestuur is, beskryf 'n gesprek tussen Neumann en sy vriende Paul en Hede Massing, waarin hulle 'hom direk uitvra oor die redes vir sy werkvermoë' en probeer vasstel of hy van plan verander het. Neumann het geantwoord: "Ek het nie van plan verander nie. As daar iets is wat regtig belangrik is, sal ek u dit sonder huiwering inlig." (8)

Franz Neumann is op 2 September 1954 dood in 'n motorongeluk in Visp, Switserland.

Een vlugtelingekonoom wat in die OSS se Duitse afdeling werk, Franz Neumann, is aanvanklik deur Heda Gumperz en haar man, Paul Massing, vir Sowjet -intelligensie gewerf. Die egpaar, soos Neumann, voormalige sosialiste in die pre-Hitler-Duitsland, het in die middel van die dertigerjare begin werk vir Moskou, sowel in Europa as in die Verenigde State, het tydens die suiwering gebreek, maar blykbaar gedurende die oorlogsjare steeds beskeie hulp verleen.

(1) Axel Honneth, Routledge -ensiklopedie van filosofie (2000) bladsy 292

(2) William L. Shirer, Die opkoms en ondergang van Nazi -Duitsland (1959) bladsy 85

(3) Allen Weinstein, The Hunted Wood: Soviet Spionage in America (1999) bladsy 249

(4) Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936 (1998) bladsy xxvi

(5) Franz Neumann, Behemoth: die struktuur en praktyk van die nasionale sosialisme (1942)

(6) Harvey Klehr en John Earl Haynes, Venona: Dekodering van Sowjet -spioenasie in Amerika (2000) bladsy 195

(7) Verona lêer 28734 bladsy 28

(8) Allen Weinstein, The Hunted Wood: Soviet Spionage in America (1999) bladsy 250


Neumann, Franz 1900-1954

Die in Duitsland gebore politieke teoretikus Franz Leopold Neumann was prominent in die groep van ballingskapgeleerdes wat die betwiste nalatenskap van die Duitse sosiale teorie na 1933 na die Amerikaanse sosiale en politieke wetenskap gebring het, veral in die studie van moderne demokratiese en diktatoriale state.

Neumann is gebore uit 'n Joodse gesin op 23 Mei 1900 in Kattowitz in Silezië (nou Katowice, Pole). Nadat hy sy doktorale proefskrif en sy kwalifikasie vir regspraktyk voltooi het, het hy by die vooraanstaande sosiaal -demokratiese arbeidsadvokaat, Hugo Sinzheimer (1875 – 1945), in Frankfurt geleer. In die laaste jare van die Weimar -republiek het Neumann in die praktyk in Berlyn gedien as hoofadvokaat vir die bouvakbond sowel as vir die Sosiaal -Demokratiese Party. Sy naam was na bewering hoog op die Nasionaal -Sosialistiese (Nazi) inhegtenisnemingslys, en hy vertrek in Mei 1933 na Londen. Daar studeer hy aan die London School of Economics saam met Harold Laski (1893 – 1950) en Karl Mannheim (1893 & #x2013 1947), en hy behaal 'n tweede doktorsgraad met 'n proefskrif oor politieke teorie oor “ The Governance of the Rule of Law, en#x201D het veral gerig teen die nasionale sosialistiese juris Carl Schmitt (1888 – 1985), wat het hom vroeër beïndruk. In 1936 kom hy by Max Horkheimer ’ s (1895 – 1973) Institute of Social Research in New York, aanvanklik as 'n regsadviseur en uiteindelik as 'n medewerker aan die navorsingsprogram. Tussen 1943 en 1947, gedryf deur 'n inkrimping van die Instituut se aktiwiteite en die minder as perfekte pas tussen sy politieke fokus en die filosofiese bekommernisse van die kern van die Instituut, was hy ietwat ongemaklik #x2014 in die Amerikaanse staatsdiens, veral betrokke by die beplanning van 'n hervormde sosiaal-demokratiese toekoms vir Duitsland tevergeefs. In 1949, na twee jaar as besoeker, word hy professor in die Departement Publiekreg en Regering aan die Columbia Universiteit in New York. Neumann sterf in 'n motorongeluk op 2 September 1954.

Neumann se publikasies kan in drie tydperke verdeel word, en die belangrikste geskrifte uit al drie fases is op verskillende maniere deur latere geslagte geleerdes in Duitsland, Italië en die Verenigde State opgesoek. Gedurende sy jare as arbeidsadvokaat in Weimar, Duitsland, na 'n metodologiese proefskrif wat daarop gemik was om kritiek op die Duitse sosialisme se mislukking te verleen om verder te gaan as die voor die Eerste Wêreldoorlog (1914 – 1918) taktiese individualisme in sake van strafreg, het Neumann verskeie belangrike artikels, sowel as 'n boek, gepubliseer oor die plek van arbeidsreg in die skema van die Weimar -grondwet, waarna arbeidswet geneem word, na aanleiding van Sinzheimer, as 'n liggaam van sosiaal geïnisieerde reg wat geleidelik teenstrydig is die grondslag van die liberale eiendomsreg van die burgerlike kode. Die gesamentlike pogings van georganiseerde arbeid was 'n integrale voorveronderstelling van hierdie arbeidersbenadering, en die Weimar -grondwet word verstaan ​​as 'n samestelling van demokratiese majoritêre parlementêre bewind en 'n pluralistiese sosiale bedingingsregime.

In die eerste jare van ballingskap na 1933, in sy bekende Behemoth (1942), sowel as in sy postuum gepubliseerde tweede proefskrif —, wat albei sterk gekritiseer het in die lig van die gebeure sy eie vroeëre aannames oor georganiseerde arbeid en Neumann het 'n diagnose van Nasionaal -Sosialisme aangebied as 'n politieke misvorming wat voortspruit uit die wettige en politieke orde van monopolie -kapitalisme, wat nie liberalisme of arbeidersisme kan begryp nie. Sy strukturele ontleding het daartoe gelei dat hy die siening ontken, wat nie vreemd was vir sommige van sy instituutgenote nie, dat die regime as 'n brutaal oorontwikkelde staat met 'n allesomvattende burokrasie beskou moet word. Die fascistiese slagspreuke van “ korporatisme ” en “ totalitêre staat ” was volgens Neumann blote ideologiese dekking vir 'n toestand van onsamehangende konflik. Nazi -Duitsland was nie te vergelyk met Thomas Hobbes nie Leviatan (1651) maar aan syne Behemoth (1682), die verslag van burgeroorlog en “ verwarring. ”

Nieteenstaande die marxistiese sosiologiese instrumente wat hy op die struktuur toegepas het, het Neumann se kritiek gefokus op die afwesigheid van 'n rasionele staat in Nazi -Duitsland en die dinamiese vernietigende gevolge van die onoplosbare magstryd wat die heerskappy vorm. Uitbreidende en uitbuitende oorlog sonder beperking was die enigste manier vir so 'n regime, en so 'n oorwinning kan nie 'n vaste oorwinning behaal nie. Die raamwerk van Neumann se argument herinner aan die lees van G. W. F. Hegel (1770 – 1831) wat byna dieselfde tyd deur sy vriend Herbert Marcuse (1898 – 1979) in Rede en revolusie (1941), maar Neumann ontbreek die filosofiese belange van Marcuse en hy het die gewig van sy werk op die samevoeging van sy politieke tesisse geplaas met sy gedetailleerde en gesaghebbende ontledings van huidige sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese inligting uit Duitse bronne. Dit was laasgenoemde aspek wat hom die grootste erkenning besorg het van die dosyn of meer akademici wat dit hersien het Behemoth, maar die meer veronderstellende raam het jonger politieke skrywers gefassineer, soos C. Wright Mills (1916 – 1962), wat die werk verwelkom het as 'n inspirasie vir 'n nuwe, ongekunstelde begin vir linkse diagnose van tendense waarvan die gevare nie tot Duitsland beperk was nie . Mills se invloedryk Power Elite (1956) pas die analitiese kenmerke wat hy in Neumann se studie die meeste waardeer het toe op die Amerikaanse toestande van die 1950's. Die mengsel van Neumann van hoë humanistiese ideale en hardnekkige aanvaarding van hardnekkige feite lok 'n kiesdistrik aan die onafhanklike linkerkant, veral in Duitsland, in.

Neumann se geskrifte na sy jarelange staatsdiens in oorlogstyd was konstruktief in die strewe, ondanks sy af en toe ontkenning van die kritiese teorieformules van die Institute of Social Research, maar die werk was onoortuigend. In balans was dit 'n poging om 'n teorie van liberale demokrasie te ontwikkel wat reageer op die sosiale en kulturele bekommernisse van die radikale denkers wat hy as sy modelle geneem het, maar wat terselfdertyd 'n veilige grondwetlike orde sou ondersteun. Die onderskeidende kenmerk van sy werk is deurgaans die oortuiging dat die wet 'n magswyse is, en tweedens dat nie alle mag in die regsvorm eenvoudig tot oorheersing deur geweld of vrees herlei kan word nie. In sy aspek as 'n patroon van gewaarborgde regte, het die oppergesag van die reg 'n minimum etiese funksie buite sy ideologiese en ekonomiese rolle in sy karakter as reël deur demokratiese inwerkingstelling, dit het die moontlikheid om die samelewing te transformeer. Die sentrale raaisel van Neumann was hoe 'n politieke mag, onderhewig aan die logika van mag en gekonfronteer met die totalitêre bedreiging in alle gevorderde samelewings, die doelwitte kan dien wat implisiet is in die idee van 'n vrye en rasionele mensdom.

SIEN OOK Korporatisme Frankfurt School Hegemony Imperialism Mills, C. Wright Nazisme Power Elite Totalitarisme Tweede Wêreldoorlog


Neutraliteit, die geskiedenis, ekonomie en reg [Boekresensie]



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Franz Neumann - Geskiedenis

Deur Peter Kross

Op 1 Februarie 1943 het 'n groep genaamd die US Army Signal Intelligence Service, die voorloper van die hedendaagse National Security Agency (NSA), 'n projek begin om diplomatieke seinverkeer wat deur 'n bondgenoot van die Verenigde State gestuur is, te onderskep en te ontleed: die Soviet Unie. Die onderneming het die kodenaam "Venona" gehad.
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Slegs in die afgelope jaar het die NSA gedeeltes van sy omvangryke lêers oor die Venona -projek aan die publiek bekend gemaak, en wat ons leer, verander die manier waarop ons na ons geskiedenis kyk op maniere waaraan slegs jare tevore nie gedink kon word nie. Die Venona-projek gee die hedendaagse historikus 'n duideliker beeld van hoeveel ons Sowjet-bondgenoot in oorlogstyd die Amerikaanse regering binnegedring het onder die administrasie van president Franklin D. Roosevelt, sowel as ons militêre en nasionale verdedigingsbedrywe, tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. Die lêers werp ook 'n helder lig op die mentaliteit van die Koue Oorlog wat die Amerikaanse buitelandse beleid byna 50 jaar lank oorheers het.

Carter Clarke se Venona -projek

Venona was die geesteskind van kolonel Carter Clarke, die hoof van die spesiale tak van die Amerikaanse weermag, 'n afdeling van die militêre intelligensie -afdeling van die oorlogsdepartement. Gedurende 1943 het kolonel Clarke seine gekry dat 'n moontlike Sowjet-Duitse vredesooreenkoms aan die gang is, en hy wou uitvind of die gerug waar is. Hy beveel sy klein kodebreker-eenheid om al die Sowjet-diplomatieke verkeer te lees wat van die Verenigde State na Moskou gestuur word. Die kolonel se crack -span kodebrekers kon kopieë van Sowjet -boodskappe opneem via internasionale kabelverkeer wat oor die drade gestuur word. Deur haarsny maande van proef en fout was die ontleders in staat om die Sowjet -kode te kraak. Wat hulle ontdek het, was nie inligting wat tot 'n aparte vrede gelei het nie, maar 'n massiewe Sowjet -spioenasie -penetrasie -operasie van die hoogste vlakke van die Amerikaanse regering.

Kolonel (later generaal) Carter Clarke, direkteur van die Army Security Agency.

Die hoofkwartier van die Venona -projek was geleë op 'n afgeleë plek in Virginia met die naam Arlington Hall. Vanaf hierdie veilige plek het die kodebrekers gewerk aan duisende bladsye kabels wat van Sowjet -diplomatieke missies regoor die wêreld onderskep is.

Die Sowjet -amptenaar wat in 1943 toevertrou is met die hantering van hierdie boodskappe, was Pavel Fitin, hoof van die buitelandse intelligensie -direktoraat van die MGB (Ministerie van Staatsveiligheid) in Moskou. Fitin het vyf verskillende spioenasie-takke in die Verenigde State bestuur: (1) kommersiële ondernemings soos die Amtorg Trading Corporation wat alle inligting wat uit die Amerikaanse Lend-Lease-program aan die Sowjetunie kom, hanteer (2) die gebruik van Sowjet-diplomate as intelligensie-agente (3) direkte betrekkinge met die MGB-hoofkwartier in Moskou (4) die bestuur van die Direktoraat vir Intelligensie van die GRU-Sowjet-leër (GRU, Sowjet-militêre intelligensie) en (5) die GRU-Sowjet-vloot-inligtingspersoneel.

Met verloop van tyd het die Legal Resident Agent by die Sowjet -ambassade in Washington, DC, Anatoli Gromov, wat in September 1944 in die Verenigde State aangekom het, intelligensiepligte oorgeneem. Hy sou later 'n geheime Amerikaanse spioenasie -eenheid bestuur deur 'n Amerikaner genaamd Gregory Silvermaster. Die lêers oor Gromov sê dat hy 'die aktiwiteite van die regeringsnetwerk sou oorneem na sy aankoms'.

Teen die tyd dat die ontleders van Venona vordering gemaak het met die breek van die Sowjet -verkeer, was die oorlog verby. Maar in die vyftigerjare het hulle verneem dat die Sowjetunie, een van die vernaamste bondgenote van die Verenigde State in die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, die supergeheime Manhattan-projek binnegedring het, waarin Amerikaanse wetenskaplikes in totale geheimhouding gewerk het om die atoombom te ontwikkel.

Die ontdekkings van Venona

Die jaar 1945 was deurslaggewend vir die insameling van inligting oor Venona. In daardie jaar het 'n Sowjet-kodebeampte wat werk in die Russiese ambassade in Ottawa, Kanada, Igor Gouzenko, na Kanadese owerhede gegaan met honderde bladsye hoogs geheime dokumente. Gouzenko het aan die Kanadese gesê dat die Sowjets 'n mol in hul intelligensiestelsel het. Hy noem ook talle amptenare wat vir die Sowjetunie gewerk het en nasionale geheime deurgegee het. Onder die name van vermeende spioene was opvallende amptenare van die Roosevelt-administrasie soos Alger Hiss Harry Dexter White, die tweede persoon op die hoogste vlak in die ministerie van tesourie Lauchlin Currie, een van die vertrouelinge van die FDR en die atoomspioenasie-ring onder leiding van Julius Rosenberg.

Die arrestasie van Julius Rosenberg sou uiteindelik lei tot die tronkstraf van onder meer sy vrou, haar broer Ethel, David Greenglass Harry Gold en die Britse wetenskaplike Klaus Fuchs. Die Venona -lêers bevat talle lêers oor al hierdie individue, sowel as hul voorname. Hierdie dokumente gee geskiedkundiges 'n gedetailleerde verslag oor hoe al hierdie mense met mekaar omgegaan het en in watter mate hulle tydens die oorlog betrokke was by spioenasie -aktiwiteite teen die Verenigde State.

'N Ander prominente persoon wat na vore gekom het om die bewerings van Igor Gouzenko te dokumenteer, was Elizabeth Bentley, 'n voormalige MGB -koerier in Washington.

Ontleders van Venona kon die voorname van die Sowjet -kabels by regte mense en plekke pas. Byvoorbeeld, "Kapitan" was FDR, "Antenna" en "Liberaal" was Julius Rosenberg, "Enormoz" was die Manhattan -projek, "Babylon" was San Francisco, en "Good Girl" was Elizabeth Bentley, 'n gewone, matrone vrou in haar middel 30's.

Een van die beste ontleders in die Arlington Hall in 1946 was Meredith Gardiner, wat boodskappe tussen MGB se hoofkwartier in Moskou en hul konsulaat in New York kon ontsyfer. Onder die leidrade wat Gardiner gevind het, was die feit dat die MGB spioene in Latyns -Amerika gehad het en dat hulle baie gesprekke gevoer het oor die Amerikaanse presidentsverkiesing in 1944. Van 1947 tot 1952 het ontleders van Arlington Hall al die Russiese verkeer tussen die Sowjetunie en die Verenigde State verbreek. In 1953 is Amerikaanse kodebrekers aansienlik gehelp in hul werk toe hulle daarin slaag om 'n afskrif van 'n gedeeltelik verbrande Russiese kodeboek met betrekking tot hierdie boodskapverkeer te kry.

Kim Philby Leer van Venona

Die Sowjette het 'n algemene idee gehad van wat die mense in die Arlington Hall doen. Toe Elizabeth Bentley na die FBI gaan met haar inligting oor Sowjet -spioenasie -aktiwiteite in die Verenigde State, het sy berig dat die Britse intelligensiebeampte Kim Philby, 'n betroubare veteraan van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog van die Britse spioenasiediens en geheime Russiese agent, aan die Sowjetunie gegee het besonderhede oor Venona in 1944. Toe Philby in die vroeë vyftigerjare in Washington werksaam was, het hy gereeld na Arlington Hall gegaan en met Amerikaanse ontleders vergader, met wie hy baie vriende was.

Die Amerikaanse kommunis en Sowjet -koerier Elizabeth Bentley is deur die VSA in 'n dubbele agent verander.

Benewens die Manhattan -projek, was Venona een van die mees geheime projekte wat tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog bedryf is. Die senior lede van die weermag en die FBI het slegs 'n paar bevoorregtes in die Roosevelt -administrasie kennis gegee van Venona met 'n 'behoefte om te weet'. Trouens, die CIA is eers in 1952 in die kol gebring, en selfs toe ontvang hy nog nie alle ontsyferde boodskappe tot in 1953 nie. Vreemd genoeg is dit geglo dat president Franklin D. Roosevelt nie 'n behoefte het om te weet nie.

Hou Venona Materials geheim

Die gedeklassifiseerde dokumente oor die Venona-projek wat eers in die negentigerjare aan die publiek bekend gemaak is, vertel van die hoë intrige en agterdog onder die belangrikste intelligensie-takke van die Amerikaanse regering tydens en na die oorlog wat veroorsaak het dat hulle die kennis van Venona beperk het tot slegs die mense wat geag kon word om dit te deel.

Een van die eerste boodskappe in die Amerikaanse regering wat verband hou met die deel van intelligensie van die Venona -projek, kom in 1950 van 'n heer V.P. Keay aan Alan Belmont, 'n hooggeplaaste FBI-amptenaar. In die memorandum het die skrywer gesê dat 'n sekere kaptein Joseph Wenger, die adjunk -direkteur van die Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), 'n heer Reynolds meegedeel het dat 'n groot druk op 'n admiraalsteen, wat direkteur van die AFSA, om die Venona -materiaal te versprei.

Mnr. Keay skryf dat generaal Carter Clarke, destyds die direkteur van die Army Security Agency, 'mnr. Reynolds het in groot vertroue dat admiraal Stone 'n begeerte aangedui het om ten minste [leë] materiaal aan die Central Intelligence Agency te versprei. Op daardie stadium het generaal Clarke die begeertes van Admiral Stone weerstaan ​​en het hy daarin geslaag om generaal [Omar] Bradley instruksies aan Admiral Stone te gee dat [leeg] materiaal slegs aan die FBI beskikbaar gestel sou word. Kaptein Wenger vermoed dat die bestaan ​​van [blank]. Hy het gesê dat admiraal Stone nie weet wat die uitkoms sal wees nie, maar hy belowe om mnr. Reynolds volledig op hoogte te hou voordat enige stappe gedoen word.

Die memo beveel verder aan dat die FBI nie die Venona -materiaal aan 'n ander Amerikaanse agentskap as die Buro moet versprei nie. Generaal Bradley word ingelig oor die inhoud, en as 'n spesifieke item ontwikkel word wat volgens admiraal Stone of generaal Bradley aan CIA of enige ander Amerikaanse agentskap beskikbaar gestel moet word, kan dit as 'n spesiale saak hanteer word en reëlings vervolmaak dat die inligting onder die aandag van die CIA gebring kan word sonder om die bron van inligting in gevaar te stel. ”

Binnegevegte binne die intelligensiegemeenskap

Die binnegevegte in Washington onder die voorste militêre en wetstoepassers oor die verspreiding van die Venona -transkripsies het gedurende hierdie tydperk voortgegaan, en humeur het onder die deelnemers opgevlam. Twee van hierdie teëstanders was die voorgenoemde generaal Clarke en Admiral Stone. Volgens die gedeklassifiseerde dokumente in die Venona -lêers was generaal Clarke nie te bly toe hy verneem dat admiraal Stone toegewy is aan die werk van die Army Security Agency oor die Venona -materiaal nie. Admiraal Stone was van mening dat president Roosevelt en admiraal Roscoe Hillenkoetter, wat later in Mei 1947 die eerste direkteur van die nuutgeskepte CIA sou word, toegang tot Venona moes kry.

Net waarom president Roosevelt, die opperbevelhebber van die Amerikaanse weermag, nie outomaties op die lys van Venona -ontvangers was nie, is moeilik om te verstaan. Maar diegene wat in die rondte was, het geag dat FDR om een ​​of ander onverklaarbare rede nie aan Venona toegesê sou word nie.

Volgens die lêers het generaal Clarke "sterk verskil met Admiral Stone en het die admiraal meegedeel dat hy van mening was dat die enigste mense wat geregtig was om iets oor hierdie bron te weet [blank] en die FBI was." Mettertyd het Clarke 'n ontmoeting met generaal Bradley gehad, en die generaal was dit eens met sy standpunt dat "hy persoonlik die verantwoordelikheid sou neem om die president of enigiemand anders in kennis te stel van die inhoud van hierdie materiaal as dit dit vereis."

Daar is vasgestel dat die FBI al die verspreiding van Venona sal behartig en dat hierdie sensitiewe inligting nie aan enige ander regeringsorganisasie of persoon sonder vooraf goedkeuring sal verskaf nie.

Hou AFSA van die CIA

In Mei 1952 is 'n vergadering gehou tussen sekere lede van die AFSA en die CIA om die jongste nuus rakende die Venona -bande te bespreek. Die verteenwoordiger van AFSA was Oliver Kirby, die assistenthoof van die Russiese afdeling van die agentskap. In 'n vorige onderhoud tussen twee FBI -agente en Kirby het hy gesê dat hy en kaptein Jeffery Dennis, die hoof van die Russiese afdeling, op 20 Mei 1952 'n ontmoeting gehad het met Jason Paige en William Harvey, albei van die CIA. Die vergadering is gereël deur generaal Walter Bedell Smith van die CIA en generaal Ralph Canine van AFSA. Voordat die vergadering plaasgevind het, het kaptein Dennis deur sy meerderes meegedeel dat 'geen onderriginligting wat AFSA van die Buro ontvang het, met die CIA -verteenwoordigers gewys of bespreek moet word nie'.

Tydens die vergadering is die twee CIA -verteenwoordigers 'n opsomming van Venona -boodskappe getoon, maar dit bevat geen identifikasie deur die FBI nie. Die CIA-mans het gesê dat hulle belangstel om meer inligting te ontvang oor die penetrasie deur die Sowjets van die Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1944-1945. Mnr. Harvey en sy kollega was veral geïnteresseerd in meer inligting oor 'n Britse diplomaat en geheime Sowjet-spioen met die naam Donald MacLean (een van die sogenaamde Cambridge Five), asook inligting oor 'n Britse wetenskaplike met die naam Klaus Fuchs wat toegang tot die supergeheime Manhattan-projek.

Duits-gebore Klaus Fuchs, Britse kernwetenskaplike wat by Los Alamos gewerk het, het die Sowjets baie A-bomgeheime gegee.

Hierdie vergadering was lank en duur ongeveer drie en 'n half uur. Onder die onderwerpe wat bespreek is, was dat die onderskepte boodskappe tussen New York en Moskou plaasgevind het, en dat ander inligting tussen Canberra, Australië en Moskou opgeneem is.

Mnr. Kirby het aan die CIA -verteenwoordigers verduidelik dat AFSA nie 'in die identifikasiebedryf' is nie - dit was eerder die taak van die FBI en dat hy nie die tipe inligting aan die CIA kon gee nie. 'Hulle het taktvol voorgestel dat sulke besonderhede slegs deur die Buro beskikbaar sou wees.'

In sy onderhoud met FBI -agente het mnr. Kirby gesê: "hy het dit nie nodig gevind om aan die CIA te verduidelik in watter mate die materiaal gepubliseer en aan die buro beskikbaar gestel is nie, en hy is nie gevra nie. Hy het verder gesê dat hy nie gevra is nie, en het ook nie aan die CIA -verteenwoordigers gesê dat die Buro die resultate van ons ondersoek in besonder besonderhede aan AFSA verstrek het nie. Hy het gesê dat die CIA -verteenwoordigers aangedui het dat hulle voornemens is om die Buro te nader oor sekere aspekte van hierdie probleem. ”

In 'n interessante eenkant het mnr. Kirby gesê dat hy nie Meredith Gardiner, een van die vernaamste ontleders in die Arlington Hall wat die Venona -lêers gebreek het, ingelig het oor hierdie vergadering nie, want "hy wou nie hê dat Gardiner in die posisie moes staan ​​om te antwoord nie vrae oor die omvang van die materiaal en die identifikasies wat uit die materiaal gemaak word. ”

Beperkte toegang vir die CIA

Dit was nie die laaste episode wat beide partye in hul voortslepende vete sou hê oor die deel van Venona -materiaal nie.

Teen Junie 1952 is 'n voorlopige ooreenkoms deur die CIA en die FBI gesementeer sodat laasgenoemde sekere toegang tot Venona -materiaal kon kry. 'N Interne memo in die FBI wat deur Alan Belmont aan mnr. D.M. Ladd het gespesifiseer watter tipe inligting die CIA sou kry. Die CIA wou inligting hê oor MGB -penetrasie van die OSS en gevalle waar die CIA werklik belang het.

Na baie onderhandel is 'n ooreenkoms aangegaan om inligting met die CIA te deel deur generaal Smith van die CIA en General Canine van AFSA. Die intelligensie wat aan die CIA verskaf sou word, het betrekking op “aktiwiteite van die MGB in die Verenigde State en het in beperkte mate betrekking op MGB -aktiwiteite in ander lande”. Hierdie inligting is verskaf aan William Harvey en Jason Paige, wat voorheen met verteenwoordigers van AFSA vergader het. Harvey het gesê dat hy inligting benodig oor voormalige werknemers van die OSS wat in die geheim vir die Russe gewerk het, alhoewel die FBI huiwerig was om sulke materiaal te verskaf. Daar is uiteindelik ooreengekom dat enige besprekings met die CIA beperkend en beperk moet wees tot hierdie twee kategorieë om te verseker dat geen ander geheime per ongeluk onthul word nie.

As vise -president was Harry Truman nie toegewyd aan die Venona -transkripsies nie, en na die dood van president Roosevelt in April 1945 was hy steeds nie volledig ingelig oor al die besonderhede van die program nie. Hy is egter gereeld op die hoogte gehou van die belangrikste aspekte van die materiaal.

J. Edgar Hoover en Venona

Een persoon wat wel totale toegang tot die Venona -ontsyferings gehad het, was FBI -direkteur J. Edgar Hoover. Hy is in kennis gestel van die besonderhede in 'n memorandum wat deur die FBI -agent Ladd in die lente van 1951 geskryf is. dat die aanvanklike FBI -ondersoek egter getoon het dat MGB -agente baie jare later by hul spioenasie -aktiwiteite betrokke was. Die belangrikste aspek van die memorandum was dat die Sowjets hoofsaaklik geïnteresseerd was in die insameling van soveel inligting as moontlik oor die atoomenergieprogram van die Verenigde State (dit wil sê die Manhattan -projek). Ander belangrike aspekte rakende die MGB was die infiltrasie van die Amerikaanse regering en die infiltrasie van Trotskyite en Wit Russiese aktiwiteite.

Hoover is meegedeel dat die FBI 'n bron het wat baie van hul inligting oor Venona aan hulle verskaf het, maar dit was dikwels 'fragmentaries' en dat die Sowjet se uitgebreide gebruik van kodename dit ook moeilik maak om te identifiseer.

Hoover is verder ingelig dat die FBI 108 mense wat by Sowjet -spioenasiebedrywighede betrokke was, positief geïdentifiseer het, dat 44 ander deur ander bronne geïdentifiseer is en dat 64 mense nog onbekend was. 'N Bykomende 64 mense wie se name voorheen nie bekend was nie, word nou ondersoek.

Harry Dexter White: Kode-naam “Jurist ”

Die belangrikste aspek van die Venona -lêers was die identifisering van baie lede van die Roosevelt -administrasie wat tydens die Tweede Wêreldoorlog in die geheim vir die Sowjetunie bespied het. Baie van hierdie mense was vertrouelinge van die president en het 'n aansienlike invloed op die administrasie gehad.

Een van hierdie mans was met die naam 'Juris', wat geïdentifiseer is as presidensiële adviseur Harry Dexter White, eens die administratiewe assistent van die voormalige sekretaris van die tesourie. White het in 1944 geopereer, en die Venona -transkripsies sê dat hy aan die Sowjets verslag gedoen het oor 'n gesprek tussen die destydse minister van buitelandse sake, Cordell Hull, en vise -president Henry Wallace, en dat hy ook verslag gedoen het oor Wallace se reis na China. 'Op 5 Augustus 1944', sê die transkripsies, 'meld hy aan die Sowjets dat hy vol vertroue is in die oorwinning van president Roosevelt in die komende verkiesings, tensy daar 'n groot militêre mislukking was. He also reported that Truman’s nomination as Vice President was calculated to secure the vote of the conservative wing of the Democratic party.” It was also mentioned that Jurist was willing to perform any self-sacrifice on behalf of the MGB but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have “an effect on the elections.”

Ethel Rosenberg’s brother, David Greenglass, a Soviet spy who worked on the Manhattan Project, served 10 years in prison.

In 1937, White worked as the assistant director of the Division of Monetary Research in the Treasury Department. Although White was an informer for the Soviet Union, he was not a “card-carrying” member of the Communist Party of the United States—just one who was loyal to its cause. White’s Soviet controllers were often annoyed with him, saying that he wasn’t providing enough valuable intelligence for them, but the spy, or “mole,” consistently gave them as much information as he could.

Theodore Hall

The files also show intelligence interest in a young scientist named Theodore Hall who came to their attention in November 1944 when he made a trip to New York, probably to see his MGB controllers. Hall was working as a physicist at the secret atomic bomb research facility in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as one of the wunderkinds on the project. He was a supplier of information for the MGB, which now had a pipeline into the most secret U.S. government project. Hall used an intermediary named “Beck” who, in turn, gave the data to another person named Saville Sax, who forwarded it to the Soviet consulate.

When Hall first approached the Russians, a member of the American Communist Party named Bernard Schuster did a background check on him, and Hall was brought into the fold. In all, there were eight Venona cables referring to Hall’s espionage activities, beginning with his recruitment in November 1944 through his work at Los Alamos ending in July 1945. Hall was a brilliant young man, having graduated from Harvard at age 18. When Hall arrived in New York on leave from Los Alamos, he contacted his old roommate, Saville Sax, another Russian sympathizer. While in New York, Sax contacted the MGB, told them about his friend Hall, and became intertwined in the plots against the United States regarding the Manhattan Project. Sax traveled to New Mexico, where he picked up information provided to him by Hall. The names Theodore Hall and Saville Sax were a huge find for modern-day historians when the Venona files were finally declassified.

Soviet Spies in the OSS

The Russians made their most important penetration of the U.S. government when they planted high-level agents in the OSS—the United States’ elite intelligence-gathering organization—during World War II. At the start of the war, the United States had no organized intelligence services and in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack, that task proved to be the number one item on FDR’s agenda.

The OSS was headed by William Donovan, a World War I Medal of Honor recipient, New York lawyer, and Republican. FDR knew Donovan from his stint in New York politics, and although Donovan was in the opposition party, the president respected him for his integrity and honor. When he started the OSS, Donovan was not particular whom he hired he was looking for the best and brightest—men and women who could do the job without asking too many questions. In that regard, Donovan hired a number of people who had Communist leanings, if not outright sympathizers. The Venona transcripts reveal that at least a dozen people employed at the OSS were Communist sympathizers who provided the MGB with valuable information during the war.

Among them were Donald Wheeler, one of their most important assets and a former Treasury employee. Wheeler worked on German issues for the OSS and passed his information to the New York Soviet resident. The MGB said that Wheeler was of “especially great interest” and that the information he sent was “a rich source of material” on Germany’s economic program. The OSS soon realized that Wheeler was a Communist but decided to let him remain in his position. Wheeler provided the Soviets with the names of a number of OSS agents and ultimately left the OSS for the State Department. His identity as a Soviet mole was given to the FBI by Elizabeth Bentley, a high-ranking Soviet mole who changed sides and became a reliable source for the FBI. Bentley was responsible for unearthing a number of high-profile American government agents who were secretly employed by the OSS as well as other government departments.

Duncan Lee was a Yale graduate and a lawyer who worked for Bill Donovan’s law firm before joining the OSS. He joined the OSS in 1943 and also reported to Elizabeth Bentley whom he knew only by her code name, “Helen.” He supplied the Russians with information on the OSS’s relationship with Polish intelligence, but at times his intelligence take was not what the Russians were looking for. Bentley later told the FBI that Lee was not really eager to work with the Russians for fear of being arrested by the FBI. After Bentley’s defection, the Russians deactivated Lee in 1945.

Franz Neumann, code-named “Ruff” by the Soviets, worked in the OSS’s foreign division and supplied the Russians with information from various American foreign diplomats to Washington. From his position at the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS, Neumann provided the Soviets with personal communications from American ambassadors serving in overseas posts to OSS headquarters. However, by 1943, the Russians wrote that “Ruff does practically nothing” but was instrumental in informing the Russians that Allen Dulles was speaking with certain members of the German underground who were planning to overthrow Hitler. After his service at the OSS, Neumann joined the staff of the Nuremberg War Crime Trials and moved to Germany after the war.

Alger Hiss: Code-Name “Ales”

Among the declassified Venona transcripts, the ones that most changed the way modern-day historians look at the Cold War revolved around Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Alger Hiss, whose cases dominated the postwar era and highlighted the so-called McCarthy era in 1950s America. This article cannot describe in total the entire Rosenberg-Hiss cases because of space constraints, but the most relevant material released in the Venona files makes for fascinating reading and does much to explain that McCarthy’s efforts to root out Communists in government, although later discredited, weren’t all a matter of paranoia.

Alger Hiss had been one of America’s most respected diplomats, serving in Washington since the 1930s. For members of that generation, his name invokes memories of a time when the Communist threat seemed to be just around the corner.

The fallout from the Hiss case pitted liberals and conservatives against each other—a battle that continues to this day. Now, almost 60 years after the trial of Alger Hiss, new revelations may finally put to rest the question of whether Hiss was an agent for the Soviet Union during and after World War II.

Alger Hiss, former U.S. State Department official, was indicted by a grand jury for perjury after Whitaker Chambers, a former Soviet spy working in Washington D.C., told the House Un-American Activities Commission that Hiss was a spy.

A number of the Venona cables implicated Hiss as a Soviet asset who went by the code name “Ales.” The files also report a meeting between a KGB officer and a GRU officer whose source in Washington was “Ales.” Another file linking Hiss to Soviet intelligence comes from a cable to Moscow from its agent “Vadim”—who was, in reality, Anatoli Gromov, the station chief of the NKVD (the forerunner of the KGB), in which he reports a conversation between agent “A” and “Ales.”

The Venona files say that “A” was Iskhak Akhmerov, one of the most important Soviet spies in the United States during the war. This same intercept says that “Ales” had been working for the Soviets since 1935. The files buttress the Hiss-Russia relationship in that “Ales functioned as the leader of a small group of neighbors probationers, for the most part consisting of his relations.” (In the Venona transcripts, “neighbors” refers to members of the American Communist Party.) The tapes also say that “Ales” went on a separate trip to Moscow after the Big Three meeting in Yalta in February 1945. The record proves that Hiss went to the Soviet capital on a plane carrying U.S. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, along with two other career diplomats.

With the release of the Venona files, it now seems that historians finally have answered the riddle of what role Alger Hiss played during World War II and the Cold War. However, partisans on both sides of the political divide will undoubtedly interpret the newly released files with an eye toward vindication for their own point of view.

The Controversial Rosenberg Trial

Fifty-eight years have passed since the June 19, 1953, execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in Sing Sing prison on espionage charges for their involvement in stealing America’s atomic secrets during World War II––a case that still creates passionate debate over their death sentences and to what extent they were both involved with the Soviet Union’s espionage operations. With the end of the Cold War, America’s most prominent code-breaking service, the National Security Agency, as well as a former Soviet intelligence officer who knew the Rosenbergs well, have shed new light on the role they performed for the Soviets during the war.

The Russians gave Julius Rosenberg two code names: “Antenna” and “Liberal.” From 1944 to 1945, the Venona analysts picked up 21 cables referring to him. They learned that by May 22, 1944, Rosenberg’s spy network operating out of New York City was flourishing. Julius recruited Alfred Sarant, a classmate at CCNY who had previously worked at the Signal Corps laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

The early Venona files also report that the Russians provided Julius with his own camera in order to copy stolen documents at his home. Additionally, Rosenberg recruited a man named Russell McNutt, code-named “Fogel,” who was a civil engineer at the Oak Ridge, Tennessee, plant that made components for the atomic bomb. In 1944 the KGB said that McNutt’s recruitment was “one of the year’s main achievements.”

Julius also brought into his spy cell friends and colleagues such as Morton Sobell, William Pearl, and his wife’s brother, David Greenglass. Another person who aided Rosenberg was an American soldier named Harry Gold who was an intelligence operative and courier for the Soviet GRU.

A retired Russian spy who was close to the couple during the war, Alexander Feklisov, provided more information on Ethel and Julius Rosenberg’s wartime espionage activities. In 1977, Feklisov gave a number of high-profile interviews to American news organizations regarding his knowledge of the Rosenberg case. He said he met with Julius in the summer of 1946 in a New York restaurant and gave him $1,000 in expense money. Prior to that date, Feklisov said that, between 1943 and 1946, he met with Julius in New York more than 50 times, helping him to establish his espionage network.

He emphatically told his interviewers that although Ethel Rosenberg was aware of her husband’s work for the Russians, she had no direct contact with any member of Soviet intelligence. Of Ethel Rosenberg, the Venona documents say that she “knows about her husband’s work, but is in delicate health and does not work.” When questioned about Julius’s role in stealing America’s atomic secrets, Feklisov said that he played only a minor role in the affair.

Headline from the Los Angeles Times, 20 June 1953, reporting the previous day’s execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for spying.

The new information provided by the Venona transcripts, as well as by Alexander Feklisov, adds new details to the case. The Rosenbergs’ sensational trial and execution came at a time in American history when Cold War hysteria and McCarthyism were at their height. Whether they were its first victims or pawns in a larger game of Cold War politics is still being debated.

3,000 Letters to U.S. Spies

By the time the Venona project ended, more than 3,000 letters from the Soviet Union to their personnel in the United States had been read. The Freedom of Information Act led to the opening of the Venona files, and in 1995 the world learned of its contents.

Who knows what other historical treasures are still hidden in the vaults of the National Archives that may yet still shed more light on the secrets of our Cold War past?


Our Historical Timeline

1860 — Mother Francis Bachmann sends six sisters from Philadelphia to Utica and Syracuse, New York.

1860 — Third Franciscan Order of Syracuse, New York formed when Bishop of Philadelphia James F. Wood tells Sister Bernardina Dorn and Sister Antonia Eulenstein that sisters serving in central New York would be incorporated into Albany, New York diocese.

1861 — Sisters in Philadelphia respond to call to serve in the Diocese of Buffalo. They arrived Dec. 18 with 75 cents in their pockets, 50 cents of which went to have their luggage delivered.

1863 — Sisters in Buffalo become a new community for the Diocese of Buffalo.

1865 — Sisters from Buffalo go to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and open St. Francis Hospital. The 29 sisters ministering there become part of the Diocese of Pittsburgh in 1871.

1882 — Sisters from Buffalo move to New York City to assist Father John Drumgoole at his institution for homeless youth.

1883 — Mother Marianne Cope, now St. Marianne, takes five sisters to the Sandwich Islands, now Hawaii, to care for those afflicted with the Hansen’s disease (leprosy), in response to a request.

1893 — Twenty-one sisters return to Buffalo and 28 sisters remain in the New York City area to form the nucleus of a new community known as the Sisters of St. Francis of the Mission of the Immaculate Virgin. The community eventually builds its motherhouse in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York.

1970s — The six communities of Franciscan sisters stemming from the community started by Sister Mary Francis Bachmann, Sister Mary Margaret Boll and Sister Bernardina Dorn become reacquainted.

1997 — Major superiors of the three congregations located in Hastings-on-Hudson, Syracuse and Williamsville (Diocese of Buffalo) begin meeting informally. Following this the three leadership teams began to meet. By 1999, the leadership teams of the three congregations stated, “We will explore intentionally and together a shared future.”

1997 — The leadership teams announce exploration of a shared future. Over four years, a task group meets, plans and communicates their progress to the congregations.

Nov. 29, 2003 — The three communities vote unanimously to unite.

July 14, 2004 — The Sisters of St. Francis of the Neumann Communities officially forms and holds its first General Chapter.

2005 — Sisters of St. Francis of Millvale, Pennsylvania send a formal letter of petition for merger with the newly formed Sisters of St. Francis of the Neumann Communities.

April 18, 2007 — The Sisters of St. Francis of Millvale vote to merge with the Sisters of St. Francis of the Neumann Communities. Incorporation ceremonies are held in August.


Anxiety and Politics

The English version of this article was first published in 1957. The journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique republished it 60 years later in 2017. In this essay, Franz L. Neumann discusses the role of anxiety in politics. The article asks: How does it happen that the masses sell their souls to leaders and follow them blindly? On what does the power of attraction of leaders over masses rest? What are the historical situations in which this identification of leader and masses is successful, and what view of history do the men have who accept leaders? For answering these questions, the author suggests a combination of political economy, Freudian political psychology, and ideology critique. He sees anxiety in the context of alienation. Alienation is analysed as a multidimensional phenomenon consisting of economic, political, social and psychological alienation. Neumann introduces the notions of Caesaristic identification, institutionalised anxiety and persecutory anxiety. The essay shows that fascism remains an actual threat in capitalist societies.

Acknowledgement:
The editors of tripleC express their gratitude to the Neumann and Marcuse families for their support in republishing this essay, to Simon & Schuster for granting us the rights, and to Denise Rose Hansen for her invaluable editorial assistance.
Original source: From the book “The Democratic and the Authoritarian State” by Franz Neumann. Copyright © 1957 by the Free Press. Copyright renewed © 1985 by the Free Press, a division of Macmillan, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. Originally delivered as a lecture before the Free University of Berlin and published in the series “Recht und Staat,” Tübingen,1954. Translated by Professor Peter Gay.

This article is published in tripleC sonder a CC licence.

Oor die skrywer
Franz Leopold Neumann (1900-1954) was a political theorist associated with the Frankfurt School. He obtained a doctoral degree in legal studies at the University of Frankfurt with the dissertation „Rechtsphilosophische Einleitung zu einer Abhandlung über das Verhältnis von Staat und Strafe“ (A Legal-Philosophical Introduction to A Treatise on the Relationship between the State and Punishment). Neumann became the German Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) main legal advisor at a time when the Nazis and Hitler gained strength in Germany. At the time when Hitler came to power in 1933, the legal office had to be closed and Neumann had to flee from Germany. In London, he in 1936 obtained his second doctoral degree from the London School of Economics with the work “The Governance of the Rule of Law” under the supervision of Harold Laski and Karl Mannheim. Neumann moved to New York in 1936, where he became a member of the Institute of Social Research (also known as the “Frankfurt School”) that was then in exile in the USA. In 1942, he started working for the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), where he together with Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer analysed Nazi Germany. In 1942, Neumann published his main book is Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944 (2 nd , updated edition published in 1944), one of the most profound analyses of Nazi Germany’s political economy and ideology. Franz L. Neumann died in 1954 in a car accident.

Author Biography

Franz Leopold Neumann (1900-1954) was a political theorist associated with the Frankfurt School. He obtained a doctoral degree in legal studies at the University of Frankfurt with the dissertation „Rechtsphilosophische Einleitung zu einer Abhandlung über das Verhältnis von Staat und Strafe“ (A Legal-Philosophical Introduction to A Treatise on the Relationship between the State and Punishment). Neumann became the German Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) main legal advisor at a time when the Nazis and Hitler gained strength in Germany. At the time when Hitler came to power in 1933, the legal office had to be closed and Neumann had to flee from Germany. In London, he in 1936 obtained his second doctoral degree from the London School of Economics with the work “The Governance of the Rule of Law” under the supervision of Harold Laski and Karl Mannheim. Neumann moved to New York in 1936, where he became a member of the Institute of Social Research (also known as the “Frankfurt School”) that was then in exile in the USA. In 1942, he started working for the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), where he together with Herbert Marcuse and Otto Kirchheimer analysed Nazi Germany. In 1942, Neumann published his main book is Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933–1944 (2 nd , updated edition published in 1944), one of the most profound analyses of Nazi Germany’s political economy and ideology. Franz L. Neumann died in 1954 in a car accident.


Biografie

Neumann was born in Joachimsthal, Margraviate of Brandenburg, near Berlin. In 1815 he interrupted his studies at Berlin to serve as a volunteer in the Hundred Days against Napoleon, and was wounded in the Battle of Ligny. Subsequently, he entered Berlin University as a student of theology, but soon turned to scientific subjects. His earlier papers were mostly concerned with crystallography, and the reputation they gained him led to his appointment as Privatdozent at the University of Königsberg, where in 1828 he became extraordinary, and in 1829 ordinary, professor of mineralogy and physics. His 1831 study on the specific heats of compounds included what is now known as Neumann's Law: the molecular heat of a compound is equal to the sum of the atomic heats of its constituents.

Devoting himself next to optics, he produced memoirs which earned him a high place among early searchers of a true dynamical theory of light. In 1832, by the aid of a particular hypothesis as to the constitution of the ether, he reached by a rigorous dynamical calculation results agreeing with those obtained by Augustin Louis Cauchy, and succeeded in deducing laws of double refraction closely resembling those of Augustin-Jean Fresnel. In studying double refraction, with his deduction of the elastic constants (on which the optical properties depend) Neumann employed the assumption that the symmetry of the elastic behavior of a crystal was equal to that of its form. In other words, he assumed that the magnitudes of the components of a physical property in symmetric positions are equivalent. This assumption substantially reduced the number of independent constants and greatly simplified the elastic equations. However, four decades passed before Neumann elaborated his application of symmetry in a course on elasticity in 1873. This principle was later formalized by his student Woldemar Voigt (1850–1918) in 1885: ‘‘the symmetry of the physical phenomenon is at least as high as the crystallographic symmetry,’’ which became a fundamental postulate of crystal physics known as ‘‘Neumann’s principle’’. In 1900, Voigt attributed this principle to Neumann's 1832 paper even though, at most, all that was present in that work was an implicit assumption that the symmetry of the phenomenon was equal to that of the crystal. Bernhard Minnigerode (1837–1896), another student of Neumann, first expressed this relation in written form in 1887 in the journal Neues Jahrb. Mineral Geol. Paleontol. (Vol. 5, p.𧆑). Ώ ]

Later, Neumann attacked the problem of giving mathematical expression to the conditions holding for a surface separating two crystalline media, and worked out from theory the laws of double refraction in strained crystalline bodies. He also made important contributions to the mathematical theory of electrodynamics, and in papers published in 1845 and 1847 established mathematically the laws of the induction of electric currents. ΐ] His last publication, which appeared in 1878, was on spherical harmonics (Beiträge zur Theorie der Kugelfunctionen).

With the mathematician Carl Gustav Jacobi, he founded in 1834 the mathematisch-physikalisches Seminar which operated in two sections, one for mathematics and one for mathematical physics. Not every student took both sections. In his section on mathematical physics Neumann taught mathematical methods and as well as the techniques of an exact experimental physics grounded in the type of precision measurement perfected by his astronomer colleague Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel. The objective of his seminar exercises was to perfect one's ability to practice an exact experimental physics through the control of both constant and random experimental errors. Only a few students actually produced original research in the seminar a notable exception was Gustav Robert Kirchhoff who formulated Kirchhoff's Laws on the basis of his seminar research. This seminar was the model for many others of the same type established after 1834, including Kirchhoff's own at Heidelberg University.

Neumann retired from his professorship in 1876, and died at Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Rusland ) in 1895 at the age of 96.

His children were talented. His son, Carl Gottfried Neumann (1832–1925), became in 1858 Privatdozent, and in 1863 extraordinary professor of mathematics at Halle. He was then appointed to the ordinary chair of mathematics successively at Basel (1863), Tübingen (1865) and Leipzig (1868).


Wat Neumann familie rekords sal jy vind?

There are 44,000 census records available for the last name Neumann. Like a window into their day-to-day life, Neumann census records can tell you where and how your ancestors worked, their level of education, veteran status, and more.

There are 37,000 immigration records available for the last name Neumann. Passasierslyste is u kaartjie om te weet wanneer u voorouers in die VSA aangekom het en hoe hulle die reis onderneem het - van die skeepsnaam tot die aankoms- en vertrekhawe.

There are 48,000 military records available for the last name Neumann. For the veterans among your Neumann ancestors, military collections provide insights into where and when they served, and even physical descriptions.

There are 44,000 census records available for the last name Neumann. Like a window into their day-to-day life, Neumann census records can tell you where and how your ancestors worked, their level of education, veteran status, and more.

There are 37,000 immigration records available for the last name Neumann. Passasierslyste is u kaartjie om te weet wanneer u voorouers in die VSA aangekom het en hoe hulle die reis onderneem het - van die skeepsnaam tot die aankoms- en vertrekhawe.

There are 48,000 military records available for the last name Neumann. For the veterans among your Neumann ancestors, military collections provide insights into where and when they served, and even physical descriptions.


The State of the Political: Conceptions of Politics and the State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann

This book offers a broad-ranging re-interpretation of the understanding of politics and the state in the writings of three major German thinkers, Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann. It rejects the typical separation of these writers on the basis of their allegedly incompatible ideological positions, and suggests instead that once properly located in their historical context, the tendentious character of these interpretative boundaries becomes clear. The book interprets the conceptions of politics and the state in the writings of these three thinkers by means of an investigation of thei . Meer

This book offers a broad-ranging re-interpretation of the understanding of politics and the state in the writings of three major German thinkers, Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Franz Neumann. It rejects the typical separation of these writers on the basis of their allegedly incompatible ideological positions, and suggests instead that once properly located in their historical context, the tendentious character of these interpretative boundaries becomes clear. The book interprets the conceptions of politics and the state in the writings of these three thinkers by means of an investigation of their adaptation and modification of particular German traditions of thinking about the state, or Staatsrechtslehre. Indeed, when the theoretical considerations of this state-legal theory are combined with their contemporary political criticism, a richer and more deeply textured account of the issues that engaged the attention of Weber, Schmitt and Neumann is possible. Thus, the broad range of subjects discussed in this book include parliamentarism and democracy in Germany, academic freedom and political economy, political representation, cultural criticism and patriotism, and the relationship between rationality, law, sovereignty and the constitution. The study attempts to restore a sense of proportion to the discussion of the three authors' writings, focusing on the extensive ideas that they shared rather than insisting on their necessary ideological separation. It is a detailed re-appraisal of a crucial moment in modern intellectual history, and highlights the profound importance of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz Neumann for the history of European ideas.


Secret Reports on Nazi Germany : The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort

During the Second World War, three prominent members of the Frankfurt School—Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and Otto Kirchheimer—worked as intelligence analysts for the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime forerunner of the CIA. This book brings together their most important intelligence reports on Nazi Germany, most of them published here for the first time.

These reports provide a fresh perspective on Hitler's regime and the Second World War, and a fascinating window on Frankfurt School critical theory. They develop a detailed analysis of Nazism as a social and economic system and the role of anti-Semitism in Nazism, as well as a coherent plan for the reconstruction of postwar Germany as a democratic political system with a socialist economy. These reports played a significant role in the development of postwar Allied policy, including denazification and the preparation of the Nuremberg Trials. They also reveal how wartime intelligence analysis shaped the intellectual agendas of these three important German-Jewish scholars who fled Nazi persecution prior to the war.

Secret Reports on Nazi Germany features a foreword by Raymond Geuss as well as a comprehensive general introduction by Raffaele Laudani that puts these writings in historical and intellectual context.


Kyk die video: Cursos Cebrap: Introdução do Direito na Teoria Crítica - Franz Neumann - parte 1